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Pursuant to Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession of 22 January 1972 a Council working
party, convened as a result of a decision taken by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives of the Member States, prepared a draft Convention on the accession of the
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on its
interpretation by the Court of Justice. This working party was composed of government
experts from the nine Member States and representatives from the Commission. The
rapporteur, Mr P. Schlosser, Professor of Law at the University of Munich, drafted the
explanatory report which was submitted to the governments at the same time as the draft
prepared by the experts. The text of this report, which is a commentary on the ConventioJ!
of Accession signed at Luxembourg on 9 October 1978, is now being published in this issue
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CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
. Under Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession, the
new Member States undertook 'to accede to the
Conventions provided for in Article 220 of the
EEC Treaty, and to the Protocols on the
interpretation of those Conventions by the Court
of Justice, signed by the original Member States
and to this end to enter into negotiations with the
original Member States in order to make the
necessary adjustments thereto . As a first step the
Commission of the European Communities made
preparations for the impending discussions on the
contemplated adjustments. On 29 November
1971 , it submitted to the Council an interim
report on the additions considered necessary to
the two Conventions signed in 1968, namely the
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1968 Convention
and the Convention on the mutual recognition of
companies and kgal persons. Following
consultations with the new Member States, the
Commission on 15 September 1972 drew up a
comprehensive report to the Council on the main
problems arising from adjusting both
Conventions to the legal institutions and systems
of the new Member States. On the basis of this
report, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives decided on 11 October 1972 to
set up a Working Party which was to 
composed of delegates of the original and the
new Member States of the Community and of a
representative of the Commission. The Working
Party held its inaugural meeting on 16 November
1972 under the chairmanship of the Netherlands
delegate in accordance with the rota. On this
occasion, it decided to focus its attention initially
on negotiations concerning adjustments to the
1968 Convention which had already been ratified
by the original Member States of the EEC and to
the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on its interpretation
the Interpretation Protocol of 1971'), and to
postpone the work entrusted to it regarding the
Convention on the mutual recognition of
companies and legal persons. At its second
meeting, the Working Party elected the author of'
this report as its rapporteur. On the basis of a
request made by the Working Party at its third
meeting in June 1973 the Committee 
Permanent Representatives appointed Mr Jenard,
the 'Directeur d'administration aupres du
ministere belge des Affaires ttrangeres , as its
permanent chairman.
2. The Working Party initially considered proposing
the legal form of a Protocol for the accession of
the new Member States to the 1968 Convention
and that the adjustments contemplated should be
annexed thereto. However, this method would
have introduced some confusion into the subject.
A distinction would then have had to be made
between three different Protocols, i.e. the
Protocol referred to in Article 65 of the 1968
Convention, the Interpretation Protocol of 1971
and the new Protocol on accession. Furthermore
there were no grounds for dividing the new
provisions required in consequence of the
accession of the new Member States to the 1968
Convention by putting some into a protocol and
others into an act of accession annexed to it. The
Working Party therefore presented the outcome
of its discussions in the form of a draft
Convention between the original Member States
and the new Member States of the EEc. This
draft Convention makes provision for accession
both to the 1968 Convention and to the
Interpretation Protocol of 1971 (Title I) as well as
for the necessary changes to them (Titles II and
IV). The accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom to the 1968 Convention extends
also to the Protocol referred to in Article 65
which is an integral part of the 1968 Convention.
The Working Party also proposed adjustments to
this Protocol (Title III).
The decision of the Working Party to adopt the
legal form of  Convention incorporating
adjustments instead of replacing the 1968
Convention by a new Convention has the
advantage that the unchanged provisions of the
1968 Convention do not require renewed
ratification.
Accordingly three different 'Conventions' will in
future have to be distinguished:
The Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters in its original form will be referred to as
the 1968 Convention' (1).
The expression 'Accession Convention' refers to
the draft Convention proposed by the Working
Party.
After ratification of the Accession Convention
certain provisions of the 1968 Convention will
exist in an amended form. References in thisNo C 59/78 Official Journal of the European Communities
report to the amended form will be indicated by
the addition of that word, e.g. 'Article 5 (2) as
amended' .
3. The structure of this report does not closely
follow the structure of the proposed new
Accession Convention. In many places this
report can only be understood, or at any rate is
CHAPTER 2
easier to understand, if it is read in conjunction
with the corresponding parts of the reports on the
1968 Convention and on the Interpretation
Protocol of 1971 which were drawn up by the
present permanent chairman and erstwhile
rapporteur of the Working Party (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Jenard report'). The structure
of this report is based on that of these earlier
reports.
REASONS FOR THE CONVENTION
4. The second chapter of the Jenard report sets out
the reasons for concluding a Convention. They
apply with at least as much force to the new
Member States as they did to the relationships
between the original Member States of the EEC,
but they do not call for further close examination
here. The obligation on the new Member States
to accede to the 1968 Convention is laid down in
Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession to the EEC
Treaty. However, in order to give a clear view of
the legal position, it may be helpful to
supplement the references in the Jenard report to
the laws in force in the original Member States of
the EEC and to the existing Conventions between
these States with details concerning the new
Member States.
THE LA W IN FORCE IN THE NEW MEMBER
STATES
1.  UNITED KINGDOM
5. The legal position in the United Kingdom is
characterized by six significant features.
6. (a) In the first place, there is a distinction
between recognition and enforcement at common
law on the one hand and under the Foreign
judgments (reciprocal enforcement) Act 1933 on
the other.
At common law, a judgment given in a foreign
State may serve as a basis for proceedings before
courts in the United Kingdom, if the adjudicating
court was competent to assume jurisdiction. This
legal consequence follows irrespective of whether
or not there is reciprocity. In this connection
recognitidn and enforceability are not limited to
the use of the foreign judgment as evidence. The
United Kingdom court dealing with the case may
not in general review the substance of the foreign
judgment. There are, of course, a limited number
of grounds for refusing recognition.
For recognition and enforcement under the
Foreign judgments (reciprocal enforcement) Act
1933 on the other hand the successful party does
not have to institute fresh proceedings before
courts in the United Kingdom on the basis of the
foreign judgment. The successful party merely
has to have the judgment registered with the
appropriate court. However this simplified
recognition and enforcement procedure is
available only where the judgment to be
recognized was given by a Superior Court, and
more important, where a convention on the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments is in force between the State of origin
and the United Kingdom. Once the foreign
judgment is registered, it has the same legal force
and effect as a judgment given by the court 
registration.
7. (b) Both these methods are available in the
United Kingdom only for the enforcement of
judgments which order payment of a specific sum
of money. Consequently maintenance orders
made by foreign courts which stipulate periodic
payments are not generally enforceable in the
United Kingdom. However, the Maintenance
orders (reciprocal enforcement) Act which came
into force in 1972 makes it possible for
international treaty obligations to be concluded
in this field. 'Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/79
8. (c) Both at common law and under the 1933 Act, it is a requirement for recognition and
enforcement that the judgment should be ' final
and conclusive between the parties This
requirement is clearly satisfied where the
adjudicating court can no longer alter its
judgment or can only do so in very exceptional
circumstances. Similarly, neither the fact that the
period during which an appeal may be made is
still running nor even a pending appeal prevent
this requirement from being satisfied. However
maintenance orders which stipulate periodic
payments are excluded from recognition since
they may be varied to take account of changed
circumstances unless they are covered by the
abovementioned Maintenance orders (reciprocal
enforcement) Act 1972.
9. (d) It is possible to institute proceedings on the
basis of a foreign judgment or to make an
application for its registration under the 1933 Act
during a period of six years from the date on
which the judgment was given.
10. (e) United Kingdom law distingl.\ishes between
the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the same way as the other States of
the Community. If a foreign judgment fulfils the
common law requirements for its recognition or
if it is registered with a United Kingdom court, it
becomes effective also in fields other than
enforcement. A clear distinction is made between
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in for example the bilateral
Conventions with France and Germany.
The requirements mentioned in paragraphs 
and 9 are not set out in those Conventions as
requirements for recognition.
11. (f) Finally, it should be noted that the United
Kingdom although not a federal State, is not a
single legal and judicial area. It consists of three
areas with different legal systems: England and
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Whilst the
common law rules described in paragraph 6
apply uniformly to the whole of the United King-
dom, the different judicial systems in each of the
three legal areas of this State have to be taken
into consideration when the 1933 Act is applied.
Applications for registration have to be made in
England and Wales to the High Court of Justice
in Scotland to the Court of Session, and 
Northern Ireland to the High Court of Justice of
Northern Ireland. If registration is granted, the
judgment can be enforced only in the area in
which the relevant courts have jurisdiction, which
extends to the whole of England and Wales, of
Scotland or of Northern Ireland respectively (see
paragraph 209; for maintenance orders, see
paragraphs 210 and 218)., Recognition of a
judgment is, nevertheless, independent of its
registration.
2.  IRELAND
12. The common law provlSlons of Irish law are
similar to those which apply in the United
Kingdom. The only statutory provisions of Irish
law on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments are contained in the
Maintenance orders (reciprocal enforcement)
Act 1974. This Act gives effect to 
international agreement between Ireland and the
United Kingdom for the reciprocal recognition of
maintenance orders made by courts in those
States. The agreement is expressed to terminate
on the coming into force of the 1968 Convention
for both States.
3.  DENMARK
13. Under paragraph 223a of the Law of 11 April
1916, foreign judgments can be recognized only if
a treaty providing reciprocity has been concluded
with the State of origin, or if binding effect has
been given to judgments of a foreign State by
Royal Decree. Denmark has concluded no
bilateral conventions on recognition and
enforcement. There is only one Royal Decree of
the type referred to and it concerns judgments
given by German courts (2).
EXISTING CONVENTIONS
14. Apart from Conventions relating to particular
matters (see paragraph 238  et seq.
), 
the United
Kingdom is the only new Member State to be
bound to other Member States of the EEC by
bilateral Conventions on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments. These are the
Conventions with France, Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
listed in the new version of Article 55 (seeNo C 59/80 Official Journal of the European Communities
paragraph 237). These bilateral Conventions
serve to implement the, Foreign judgments
(reciprocal enforcement) Act for the United
Kingdom (see paragraph 6) and therefore contain
provisions which more or less follow the same
pattern. The requirements for recognition and
enforcement correspond to the criteria mentioned
in paragraphs 6 to 11 above. Rules providing for
direct' jurisdiction (3) are not included.
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT 9F THE PROPOSED
ADJUSTMENTS
15. Neither Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession nor
the terms of reference given to the Working Party
provide any clear guide of what is meant by
necessary adjustments
The term could be given a very narrow
interpretation. The emphasis would then have to
be laid above all on the requirement of necessity,
in the sense of indispensability. At the beginning
of the Working Party s discussions it became
clear, however, that such a narrow view of the
contemplated adjustments was bound to make it
more difficult for the 1968 Convention to take
root in the legal systems of the new Member
States. There are a variety of reasons for this.
1.  SPECIAL STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE NEW MEMBER
STATES
16. The 1968 Convention implicitly proceeded from a
legal background common to the original
Member States of the EEc. By contrast the legal
systems of the new Member States unmistakably
contain certain special structural features. It
would hardly have been reasonable to expect
these States to adjust their national law to the
legal position on which the 1968 Convention is
based.
On the contrary, adjustment of the Convention
seemed the more obvious course on occasion.
This applies, for example, to the distinction made
in Articles 30 and 38 between ordinary and
extraordinary appeals (see paragraph 195 
seq.),  which does not exist in United Kingdom
and Irish law, to the system of registering
judgments in the United Kingdom instead of the
system of granting enforcement orders (see para-
graph 208) and to the concept of the trust which
is a characteristic feature of the common law (4
(see paragraph 109  et seq.).  The same also applies
to th~ inter-relation existing in Denmark between
judicial and administrative competence in
maintenance cases (see paragraph 66  et seq.
2.  AMBIGUITIES IN THE EXISTING TEXT
17. In certain cases, enqumes about the precise
meaning of some provisions of the 1968
Convention by the States obliged to accede to it
clearly showed that their interpretation was often
uncertain and controversial. The Working Party
decided therefore to propose that certain
provisions of the 1968 Convention should be
given a more precise wording or an authoritative
interpretation. This applies, for example, to the
provisions about granting legal aid 
enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 223).
The Working Party also dealt in this way with the
provisions of Article 57 on the relation between
the 1968 Convention and other Conventions, (see
paragraph 238  et seq.
). 
In most cases, however
the information requested could be given in a
sufficiently clear and uniform way, so that this
report need do no more than refer to it.
3.  FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA 
THE ORIGINAL MEMBER STATES OF THE
EEC
18. In yet other cases, enquiries by the new Member
States about the content of some provisions of the
1968 Convention revealed that in the original
Member States of the EEC too the law had in the
meantime evolved in such a way that general
adjustments rather than adjustments restricted to
relations with the new Member States seemed
advisable. This applies particularly to proceedings
in matters of family law in which ancillary relief
and especially maintenance claims, are now often
combined with the main proceedings concerning
status. In family and matrimonial matters, such
combined proceedings have replaced the
traditional system of separating status
proceedings from subsequent proceedings in
many countries during the years following the
signing of the 1968 Convention. This is the
reason for the revised Article 5 (2) proposed by
the Working Party (see paragraphs 32 and 90).
The development of consumer protection law in
the Member States led to a completely new
version of Section 4 of Title II, and in one case
the 1968 Convention was amended as a result of
judgments of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (see paragraph 179).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/81
4.  SPECIFIC ECONOMIC EFFECTS
19. Finally, it became apparent that certain
provisions of the 1968 Convention in their
application to the new Member States would
have economic repercussions unequalled in the
original Member States. Thus, the worldwide
CHAPTER 3
significance of the British insurance market
prompted the Working Party to recommend
amendments concerning jurisdiction in insurance
matters (see paragraph 136). The new paragraph
(7) of Article 5 (see paragraph 122) is justified by
the special position occupied by British maritime
jurisdiction.
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
20. As already discussed in the Jenard report, the
provisions governing the scope of the 1968
Convention contain four significant elements.
These required some further explanation in the
context of the relationship of the original
Member States to each other. They are:
1. Limitation to proceedings and judgments on
matters involving international legal
relationships (I).
2. Duty of the national courts to observe the
provisions governing the scope of the 1968
Convention of their own motion (II).
3. Limitation of the Convention to civil and
commercial matters (III).
4. A list (Article 1, second paragraph) of matters
excluded from the scope of the Convention
(IV).
In the relatJonship of the original Member States
to each other there was no problem about a fifth
criterion which is much more clearly brought out
in the title of the 1968 Convention than in Article
1 which defines its scope. The 1968 Convention
only applies where court proceedings and court
decisions are involved. Proceedings and decisions
of administrative authorities do not come within
the scope of the 1968 Convention. This gave rise
to a particular problem of adjustment in relation
to Denmark (V).
I. MA TIERS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS
21. The accession of the new Member States to the
1968 Convention in no way affects the
application of the principle that only proceedings
and judgments about matters involving
international legal relationships are affected, so
that reference need only be made to Section I of
Chapter III of the Jenard report.
II. BINDING NATURE OF THE CONVENTION
22. Under Articles 19 and 20 of the 1968 Convention
the provisions concerning 'direct jurisdiction' are
to be observed by the court of its own motion: in
some cases, i.e. where exclusive jurisdiction
exists, irrespective of whether the defendant takes
any steps; in other cases only where the
defendant challenges the jurisdiction. Similarly, a
court must also of its own motion consider
whether there exists an agreement on jurisdiction
which excludes the court s jurisdiction and which
is valid in accordance with Article 17.
An obligation to observe the rules of jurisdiction
of its own motion is by no means an unusual
duty for a court in the original Member States.
However, the United Kingdom delegation pointed
out that such a provision would mean a
fundamental change for its courts. Hitherto
United Kingdom courts had been able to reach a
decision only on the basis of submissions of fact
or law made by the parties. Without infringing
this principle, no possibility existed of examining
their jurisdiction of their own motion.
However, Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession
cannot be interpreted as requiring the amendment
of any provisions of the Conventions referred to
on the ground that introduction of those
provisions into the legal system of a new Member
State would necessitate certain changes in its long-
established legal practices and procedures.No C 59/82 Official Journal of the European Communities
It does not necessarily follow from Articles 19
and 20 of the 1968 Convention that the courts
must, of their own motion, investigate the facts
relevant to deciding the question of jurisdiction
that they must for example inquire where the
defendant is domiciled. The only essential factor
is that uncontested assertions by the parties
should not bind the court. For this reason the
following rule is reconcilable with the 1968
Convention: a court may assume jurisdiction only
if it is completely satisfied of all the facts on
which such jurisdiction is based; if it is not so
satis~ied it can and must request the parties to
provide the necessary evidence, in default of
which the action will be dismissed as
inadmissible. In such circumstances the lack of
jurisdiction would be declared by the court of its
own motion, and not as a result of a challenge by
one of the parties. Whether a court is itself
obliged to investigate the facts relevant to
jurisdiction, or whether it can, or must, place the
burden of proof in this respect on the party
interested in the jurisdiction of the court
concerned, is determined solely by national law.
Indeed some of the legal systems of the original
Member States, for example Germany, do not
require the court itself to undertake factual
investigations in a case of exclusive jurisdiction
even though lack of such jurisdiction has to be
considered by the court of its own motion.
III. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MA TIERS
23. The scope of the 1968 Convention is limited to
legal proceedings and judgments which relate to
civil and commercial matters. All such
proceedings not expressly excluded fall within its
scope.
In particular, it is irrelevant whether an action is
brought 'against' a named defendant (see
paragraphs 124  et seq.
). 
It is true that in such a
case Article 2  et seq.  cannot operate; but
otherwise the 1968 Convention remains
applicable.
The distinction between civil and commercial
matters on the one hand and matters of public
law on the other is well recognized in the legal
systems of the original Member States and is, in
spite of some important differences, on the whole
arrived at on the basis of similar criteria. Thus
the term ' civil law also includes certain
important special subjects which are not public
law, especially, for example, parts of labour law.
For this reason the draftsmen of the original text
of the 1968 Convention, and the Jenard report
did not include a definition of civil and
commercial matters and merely stated that the
1968 Convention also applies to decisions of
criminal and administrative courts, provided they
are given in a civil or commercial matter, which
occasionally happens. In this last respect, the
accession of the three new Member States
presents no additional problems. But as regards
the main distinction referred to earlier
considerable difficulties arise.
In the United Kingdom and Ireland the
distinction commonly made in the original EEC
States between private law and public law is
hardly known. This meant that the problems of
adjustment could not be solved simply by a
reference to these classifications. In view of the
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities of 14 October 1976 (5), which was
delivered during the final stages of the discussions
and which decided in favour of an interpretation
which made no reference to the 'applicable
national law, the Working Party restricted itself
to declaring, in Article 1 , paragraph 1 , that
revenue, customs or administrative matters are
not civil or commercial matters within the
meaning of the Convention. Moreover, the legal
practice in the Member States of the Community,
including the new Member States, must take
account of the above judgment which states that
in interpreting the concept of civil and
commercial matters, reference must be made
first, to the objectives and scheme of the
Convention and secondly, to the general
principles which stem from the corpus of the
national legal systems
As a result of this all that this report can do is tb
throw light on the Court's instructions by setting
out some details of comparative law.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN IRELAND AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
24. In the United Kingdom and in Ireland the
expression 'civil law' is not a technical term and
has more than one meaning. It is used mainly asOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/83
the opposite of criminal law. Except in this
limited sense, no distinction is made between
private' and 'public' law which is in any way
comparable to that made in the legal systems of
the original Member States, where it is of
fundamental importance. Constitutional law,
administrative law and tax law are all included in
civil law . Admittedly the United Kingdom is
already a party to several Conventions which
expressly apply only to ' civil and commercial
matters These include all the bilateral
Conventions on the enforcement of foreign
judgments concluded by the United Kingdom.
None of these, however, contains any rules which
decide the circumstances under which an original
court before which an issue is brought may
assume jurisdiction. They govern only the
recognition and enforcement of judgments and
deal with questions of jurisdiction only indirectly
as a condition of recognition. Moreover, these
Conventions generally only apply to judgments
ordering the payment of a specific sum of money
(see paragraph 7). In drafting them, a pragmatic
approach dispensing with a definition of 'civil
and commercial matters' proved , therefore, quite
adequate.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE CONTINENTAL
MEMBER STATES
25. In the legal systems of the original Member
States, the State itself and corporations exercising
public functions such as local authorities may
become involved in legal transactions in two
ways. Having regard to their special functions
and the fact that they are formally part of public
law they may act outside private law in a 'sove-
reign' capacity. If they do this , their administra-
tive ac ('Verwaltungsakt
, '
decision executoire
is of a special nature. The State and some other
public corporations may, however, also engage in
legal transactions in the same way as private
individuals. They can conclude contracts subject
to private law, for example with transport
undertakings for the carriage of goods or persons
in accordance with tariffs generally in force or
with a property owner for the lease of premises.
The State and public corporations can also incur
tortious liability in the same way as private
individuals, for example as a result of a traffic
accident in which an official car is involved. The
real difficulty arises from distinguishing between
instances in which the State and its independent
organs act in a private law capacity and those in
which they act in a public law capacity. A few
guidelines on how this difficulty may 
overcome are set out below.
The difficulties of finding a dividing line are of
three kinds. The field of activities governed by
public law differs in the various continental
Member States (1). Public authorities frequently
have a choice of the form in which they wish to
act (2). The position is relatively clear only
regarding the legal relations between the State
and its independent organs (3).
1.  THE V AR YING EXTENT OF PUBLIC LA 
26. The most important difference between national
administrative laws on the continent consists in
the legal rules governing the duties of public
authorities to provide supplies for themselves and
for public tasks. For this purpose the French legal
system has established the separate concept of
administrative contracts which are governed
independently of the 'Code civil' by a special law
the 'Code des marches publics The
administrative contract is used both when public
authorities wish to cover their own requirements
and when public works, such as surface or
underground construction, land development, etc.
have to be undertaken. In such situations the
French State and public corporations do not act
in the capacity of private persons. The
characteristic result of this is that, if the other
parties to the contract do not perform their
obligations, the State and public corporations do
not have to bring an action before the courts, but
may impose unilaterally enforceable sanctions by
an administrative act (' decision executoire ). The
legal situation in Germany is quite different.
There the administrative contract plays a
completely subordinate role. Supplies to the
administrative agencies, and in particular the
placing of contracts for public works, are carried
out solely on the basis of private law. Even where
the State undertakes large projects like the
construction of a dam or the channelling of a
river, it concludes its contracts with the firms
concerned like a private individual.No C 59/84
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27. However, the borderline between the public law
and the private law activities of public agencies is
not rigidly prescribed in some of the legal
systems. Public authorities have, within certain
limits, a right to choose whether in carrying out
their functions they wish to use the method of a
sovereign act', i.e. an administrative contract, or
merely to conclude a private transaction.
In respect of those areas where public authorities
may act either under private or public law, it is
not always easy to decide whether or not they
have acted as private individuals. In practice a
clear indication is often lacking.
3.  RELATIONSHIP  OF  PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
TO ONE ANOTHER
28. Relations between public authorities may also be
governed either by private or by public law. If
governed by public law, such relations are not
subject to the 1968 Convention, even if, as in
Italy, they are not considered part 
administrative law. However, relations of States
and public corporations with each other would
fall almost without exception within the sphere of
private law, if they contain international aspects
(and are not subject to public international law).
It is hard to imagine how, for example, it would
be possible for relations under public law to exist
between two local authorities in different States.
However, such relations could, of course, be
established in future by treaties.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW
29. The Working Party considered it obvious that
criminal proceedings and criminal judgments of
all kinds are excluded from the scope of the 1968
Convention, and that this matter needed
therefore, no clarification in the revised text (see
paragraph 17). This applies not only to criminal
proceedings  stricto sensu.  Other proceedings
imposing sanctions for breaches of orders or
prohibitions intended to safeguard the public
interest also fall outside the scope of civil law.
Certain difficulties may arise in some cases in
classifying private penalties known to some legal
systems like contractual penalty clauses, penalties
imposed by associations, etc. Since in many legal
systems criminal proceedings may be brought by
a private plaintiff, a distinction cannot be made
by reference to the party which instituted the
proceedings. The decisive factor is whether the
penalty is for the benefit of the private plaintiff or
some other private individual. Thus the decisions
of the Danish industrial courts imposing fines
which are for the benefit of the plaintiff or some
other aggrieved party, certainly fall within the
scope of the 1968 Convention.
IV. MATTERS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED
30. The second paragraph of Article 1 sets out under
four points the civil matters excluded from the
scope of the 1968 Convention. The accession of
the new Member States raises problems in respect
of all four points.
STATUS OR LEGAL CAPACITY OF NATURAL
PERSONS RIGHTS IN PROPERTY ARISING OUT
OF A MATRIMONIAL RELA TIONSHIP, WILLS
AND SUCCESSION
31. The Working Party encountered considerable
difficulties when dealing with two problems
relating to point (1) of the second paragraph of
Article 1. The first problem was that of
maintenance proceedings ancillary to status
proceedings (1) and the second problem was the
meaning of the term 'regimes matrimoniaux
(rights in property arising out of a matrimonial
relationship) (2). Apart from these two problems
the enquiries directed to the Working Party by
the new Member States in respect of point (1) of
the second paragraph of Article 1 were relatively
easy to answer (3).
1.  MAINTENANCE JUDGMENTS ANCILLARY
TO  STATUS PROCEEDINGS (ANCILLARY
MAINTENANCE JUDGMENTS)
32. When the 1968 Convention was drawn up, the
principle still applied in the original Member
States that disputes relating to property could not
be combined with status proceedings, nor couldOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/85
maintenance proceedings be combined with
proceedings for the dissolution of a marriage or
paternity proceedings. It was therefore possible
without running the risk of creating
disadvantages caused by artificially separating
proceedings which in reality belonged together, to
exclude status matters, but not maintenance
proceedings, from the scope of the 1968
Convention. Once this rule comes up against
national legislation which allows combined
proceedings comprising maintenance claims and
status matters, it will perforce give rise to great
difficulties. These difficulties had already becorpe
serious in the original Member States, as soon as
the widespread reform of family law had led to
an increasing number of combined proceedings in
those countries. Accordingly a mere adjustment
of the 1968 Convention as between the original
and new Member States would have provided
only a piecemeal solution. Time and oppohunity
were ripe for an adjustment of the 1968
Convention, even as regards , the relationships
between the original Member States, to take
account of the developments in the law which
had taken place (see paragraph 18).
33. (a) The solution proposed by the Working Party
is the outcome of a lengthy and intensive study of
the possible alternatives. A distinctive feature of
the 1968 Convention is the inter-relation of the
application of its rules of jurisdiction at the
adjudicating stage and the prohibition against
reopening the question of jurisdiction at the
recognition stage. Consequeijtly, on the basis of
the original text of the Convention only two
completely clear-cut solutions present themselves
as regards the treatment of ancillary maintenance
judgments. The first is that the adjudicating court
dealing with a status matter may give an ancillary
maintenance judgment only when it has
jurisdiction under the 1968 Convention; the
maintenance judgment must then be recognized
by the foreign court which may not re-examine
whether the original adjudicating court had
jurisdiction. The second possible solution is that
ancillary maintenance judgments should also be
excluded from the scope of the 1968 Convention
under point (1) of the second paragraph of
Article 1 as being ancillary to status judgments.
However both solutions have practical
drawbacks. The second would result in ancillary
maintenance judgments being generally excluded
from recognition and enforcement under the
1968 Convention, even though the great majority
of cases are decided by courts which would have
had jurisdiction under its provisions. In 
unacceptably high number of cases established
maintenance claims would then no longer be able
to move freely. The first solution would
constitute a retrograde step from the progressive
and widely acclaimed achievement of combined
proceedings and judgments in status and mainte-
nance matters.
34. In view of the above, the simplest solution would
have been to inClude rules of jurisdiction covering
status proceedings in the 1968 Convention.
However, the reasons given earlier against taking
that course are still valid. Therefore, the only way
out is to opt for one of the two alternatives
outlined above, whilst mitigating its drawbacks
as far as possible. In the view of the Working
Party, to deprive maintenance judgments
ancillary to status proceedings of the guarantee of
their enforceability abroad, or to recognize them
only to a severely limited extent, would be the
greater evil.
35. The Working Party therefore tried first of all to
find a solution along the following lines. National
. courts dealing with status matters should have
unrestricted power to decide also on maintenance
claims even when they cannot use their
jurisdiction in respect of the maintenance claim
on any provision of the 1968 Convention;
ancillary maintenance judgments should in
principle be recognized and enforced, but the
court addressed may, contrary to the principles of
the 1968 Convention which would otherwise
apply, re-examine whether the court which gave
judgment on the maintenance claims had
jurisdiction under the provisions of Title II.
However, the principle that the jurisdiction of the
court of origin should not be re-examined during
the recognition and enforcement stages was one
of the really decisive achievements of the 1968
Convention. Any further restriction of this
principle, even if limited to one area, would be
justifiable only if all other conceivable
alternatives were even more unacceptable.
36. The proposed addition to Article 5 would on the
whole have most advantages. It prevents
maintenance judgments which are ancillary to
status judgments being given on the basis of the
rule of exorbitant jurisdiction which generally
applies in family law matters, namely the rule
which declares the nationality of only one of the
two parties as sufficient. One can accept that
maintenance proceedings may not be combined
with status proceedings where the competence of
the court concerned is based solely on suchNo C 59/86 Official Journal of the European Communities
exorbitant jurisdiction. For status proceedings
jurisdiction will continue to depend on the
nationality of one of the two parties. The
maintenance proceedings will have to be brought
before another court with jurisdiction under the
1968 Convention.
(b) The signifkance of the new approach is as
follows:
37. It applies uniformly to the original and to the
new Member States alike.
38. The jurisdiction of the court of origin may not be
re-examined during the recognition and
enforcement stages. This still follows from the
third paragraph of Article 28 even after the
addition made to Article 5. The court of origin
has a duty to examine very carefully whether it
has jurisdiction under the 1968 Convention
because a wrong decision on the question of
jurisdiction cannot be corrected later on.
39. Similar rules apply in respect of  lis pendens. 
was not necessary to amend Articles 21 and 23.
As long as the maintenance claim is pending
before the court seised of the status proceedings it
may not validly be brought before the courts of
another State.
40. The question whether the court seised of the
status proceedings has indeed jurisdiction also in
respect of the maintenance proceedings, without
having to rely solely on the nationality of one of
the parties to the proceedings, is to be determined
solely by the  lex fori including of course its
private international law and procedural law.
Even where the courts of a State may not as a
rule combine a status matter with a maintenance
claim, but can do so if a foreign legal system
applicable under the provisions of their private
international law so provides they have
jurisdiction in respect of the maintenance claim
under the provisions of Article 5 (2) of the 1968
Convention as amended. This is subject to the
proviso that the court concerned in fact had
jurisdiction in respect of both the status
proceedings and the maintenance claim under the
current provisions of its own national law.
41. The 1968 Convention prohibits the assumption
of a combined jurisdiction which may 
provided for under the national law to cover both
status and maintenance proceedings only where
the court s jurisdiction would be based solely on
the nationality of one of the two parties. This
concerns principally the exorbitant jurisdictions
which are referred to in the second paragraph of
Article 3, and provided for in Article 15 of the
Belgian Civil Code (Code civil), and Articles 14
and 15 of the French and Luxembourg Civil
Code (Code civil), governing proceedings which
do not relate only to status and are therefore not
excluded pursuant to point (1) of the second
paragraph of Article 1. Maintenance actions
combined with status proceedings continue to be
permitted, even if the jurisdiction of the court is
based on grounds other than those which are
normally excluded by the 1968 Convention as
being exorbitant. Jurisdiction on the basis of both
parties having the same nationality is excluded by
the 1968 Convention in respect of ordinary civil
and commercial matters, (Article 3, second
paragraph), but in respect of combined status and
maintenance proceedings, it cannot be considered
as exorbitant, and consequently should not be
inadmissible. The plaintiff's domicile 
recognized in any case as a basis for jurisdiction
in maintenance actions.
Finally, the proposed addition to Article  (2)
deprives courts of jurisdiction to entertain
maintenance claims in combined family law
proceedings only where their jurisdiction in
respect of the status proceedings is based solely
on the nationality of one of the two parties.
Where the jurisdiction of a court depends on the
fulfilment of several conditions, only one of
which is that one of the parties should possess the
nationality of the country concerned, jurisdiction
does not depend solely on the nationality of the
two parties.
Article 606 (3) of the German Code of Civil
Procedure is intended to ensure, in conjunction
with Article 606a, that in matrimonial matters a
German court always has jurisdiction, even when
only one of the spouses is German. The fact that
this provision is only supplementary to other
provisions governing jurisdiction does not change
the fact that jurisdiction may be based solely on
the nationality of one of the parties. Once Article
5 (2) of the 1968 Convention comes into force in
its amended form maintenance claims can no
longer be brought and decided under that
particular jurisdiction.
42. Article 5 (2) does not apply where the defendant is
not domiciled in a Contracting State, or where
maintenance questions can be decided without theOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/87
procedural requirement of a claim or petition by
one spouse against the other (see paragraph 66).
2.  RIGHTS IN PROPERTY ARISING OUT OF A
MATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIP
43. The exclusion of 'rights in property arising out of
a matrimonial relationship' from the scope of the
Convention (Article 1 second paragraph, point
(1)) raises a problem for the United Kingdom and
Ireland.
Neither of these countries has an equivalent legal
concept, although the expression 'matrimonial
property' is used in  legal literature. In principle,
property rights as between spouses are governed
by general law. Agreements between spouses
regulating their property rights are no different in
law from agreements with third parties.
Occasionally, however, there are special statutory
provisions affecting the rights of spouses. Under
English law (Matrimonial homes Act 1967) and
Irish law (Family home protection Act 1976), a
spouse is entitled to certain rights of occupation
of the matrimonial home. Moreover, divorce
courts in the United Kingdom have, under the
Matrimonial causes Act 1973 considerable
powers, though varying in extent in the different
parts of the country, to order the payment of
capital sums by one former spouse to the other.
In England even a general redistribution of
property as between former spouses and their
children is possible.
The concept of 'rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship' can also give rise to
problems in the legal systems of the original
Member States. It does not cover the same legal
relations in all the systems concerned.
For a better understanding of the problems
involved, they are set out more fully below (a),
before the solution proposed by the Working
Party is discussed (b).
44. (a) Three observations may give an indication of
what is meant by 'matrimonial regimes' (rights in
property arising out of  matrimonial
relationship) in the legal systems of the seven
continental Member States. They will deal with
the character of the concept which is confined
exclusively to relationships between spouses
(paragraph 45), with the relationship with the
provisions which apply to all marriages
irrespective of the particular 'matrimonial regime
between the spouses (paragraph 46), and -finally
with the possibility of third parties becoming
involved (paragraph 47).
45. For the purpose of governing the relations
between spouses in respect of property, these
legal systems do not or at least not
predominantly, employ the legal concepts and
institutions otherwise used in their civil law.
Instead, they have developed exclusive legal
institutions the application of which is limited to
relations between spouses, and wh'ose most
important feature is a comprehensive set of rules
governing property. However, there is not merely
one such set of rules in each legal system. Instead
spouses have a choice between several, ranging
from general 'community of property' to strict
separation of property . Even the latter, when
chosen by the spouses, is a special form of
property regime although special features
arising from marriage can then hardly be said to
exist any longer. The choice of a ' property
regime' must take the form of a ' marriage
contract' which  is a special legal concept and
should not be confused with the conclusion of the
marriage itself. If the spouses do not make a
choice, one of the sets of rules governing property
rights applies to them by law (known as the
statutory matrimonial regime
In some legal systems (France and Belgium) the
matrimonial regime' existing at the beginning of
a marriage can subsequently be chang~d only in
exceptional circumstances. In others (Germany)
the spouses are free to alter their 'matrimonial
regIme at any tIme.
Disputes concerning 'matrimonial regimes' can
arise in various forms. There may be a dispute
about the existence and interpretation of 
marriage contract. In certain circumstances, a
spouse may apply to the court for conversion of
one 'matrimonial regime' into a  different one.
Some 'matrimonial regimes' provide for different
rules in respect of different types of property. A
dispute may then arise as to the type of property
to which a particular object belongs. Where the
matrimonial regime' in question differentiates
between the management of different types of
property, there may be disagreement as to which
spouse may manage which items of propel'ty. The
most frequent type of dispute relating to
matrimonial regimes' concerns the winding up of
the 'matrimonial regime' after termination of the
marriage particularly after divorce. The
statutory matrimonial regime' under GermanNo C 59/88 Official Journal of the European Communities
law ('Zugewinngemeinschaft' or community 
acquisitions) then results in an equalization claim
by the spouse whose property has not increased
in value to the same extent as that of his partner.
46. Some provIsions apply to all marriages
irrespective of the particular 'matrimonial regime
under which spouses live, especially in Germany
and France. Significantly the German and French
texts of the 1968 Convention use the term in the
plural ('die Giiterstande
, '
les regimes
matrimoniaux
This can be explained as follows: the Code civil
for instance, deals with property aspects of
marriage in two different parts of the code. Title
of the third book (on the acquisition of
property) refers in detail to the ' contrat de
mariage' and then 'regimes matrimoniaux , while
property aspects of the relations between spouses
are also covered by Articles 212 to 226 in Title V
of the first book. The new French divorce law of
11 July 1975 (6) introduced into the new version
of Article 270  et seq.  of the Code civil
equalization payments normally in the form 
lump sum compensation (Article 274) which are
independent of the particular ' regime' applicable
between the spouses. German law in the fourth
book of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch makes a
similar distinction between the legal consequences
in respect of property rights which generally
follow from marriage (Title V, Article 1353 
seq. and those which follow from ' matrimonial
property law
' , 
which varies according to the
various 'matrimonial regimes . Under both
systems (Article 1357 (2) of the Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch, Article 220 (2) of the French Code
civil) it is possible, for example, to prevent a
spouse from engaging in certain legal transactions
which he is normally entitled to engage in his
capacity as spouse. According to Article 285 of
the Code civil  the court can, after divorce
make orders concerning the matrimonial home
irrespective of the 'matrimonial regime
previously applicable. Similar possibilities exist in
other States.
French legal literature refers to prOVlSlons
concerning property rights which apply to all
marriages as 'regime matrimonial primaire
' .
Other legal systems have no such special
expression. It is within the spirit of Article 1
second paragraph point (1) of the 1968
Convention to exclude those provIsIOns
concerning property rights affecting all marriages
from its scope of application, in so far as they are
not covered by the term 'maintenance claims' (see
paragraph 91  et seq.
In all legal systems of the Community it is
possible to conceive of relations affecting rights
between spouses which are governed by the
general law of contract, law of tort or property
law. Some laws contain provisions specifically
intended to govern cases where such relations
exist between spouses. For example, Article 1595
of the French Code civil contains restrictions on
the admissibility of contracts of sale between
spouses. Case law has sometimes developed
special rules in this field which are designed to
take account of the fact that such transactions
commonly occur in relations between spouses. All
this does not alter the position that legal relations
governed by the general law of contract or tort
remain subject to the provisions of the 1968
Convention, even if they are between spouses.
47. Finally, legal provIsions comprised in the term
matrimonial regimes' are not limited to relations
between the spouses themselves. For example, in
Italian law, in connection with the liquidation of
a 'fondo patrimoniale disputes may arise
between parents and children (Article 171 (3) of
the Codice civile), which under Italian law
unequivocally concern relations arising out of
matrimonial property Jaw
' ('
il regime
patrimoniale della famiglia ). German law
contains the regime of 'continued community of
property
' ('
fortgesetzte Giitergemeinschaft
which forms a link between a surviving spouse
and the issue of the marriage.
48. (b) These findings raise problems similar to those
with which the Working Pary was faced in
connection with the concept 'civil and
commercial matters . It was, however, possible to
define the concept of ' matrimonial regimes' not
only in a negative manner (paragraph 49), but
also positively, albeit rather broadly. This should
enable implementing legislation in the United
Kingdom and Ireland, in reliance on these
statements, to indicate to the courts which legal
relations form part of ' matrimonial regimes
within the meaning of the 1968 Convention
(paragraph 50). Consequently no formal
adjustment of the 196~ Convention became
necessary.
49. As a negative definition, it can be said with
certainty that in no legal system do maintenance
claims between spouses derive from rules
governing 'matrimonial regimes nor areOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/89
maintenance claims confined to claims for
periodic payments (see paragraph 93).
50. The mutual rights of spouses arIsIng from
matrimonial regimes' correspond largely with
what are best described in English as ' rights in
property arising out 'of a / matrimonial
relationship . Apart from maintenance matters
property relations between spouses which are
governed by the differing legal systems of the
original Member States otherwise than 
matrimonial regimes' only seldom give rise to
court proceedings with international aspects.
Thus the following can be said in respect of the
scope of point (1) of the second paragraph of
Article 1 as far as 'matrimonial regimes' are
concerned:
The Convention does not . apply to the
assumption of jurisdiction by United Kingdom
and Irish courts, nor to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments by those
courts, if the subject matter of the proceedings
concerns issues which have arisen between
spouses, or exceptionally between a spouse and a
third party, during or after dissolution of their
marriage, and which affect rights in property
arising out of the matrimonial relationship. The
expression 'rights in property' includes all rights
of administration and disposal  whether by
marriage contract or by statute  of property
belonging to the spouses.
3.  THE REMAINING CONTENTS  OF  ARTICLE
SECOND PARAGRAPH, POINT  (1) OF  THE
1968  CONVENTION
51. (a) The non-applicability of the 1968
Convention in respect of the status or legal
capacity of natural persons concerns in particular
proceedings and judgments relating to:
the voidability and nullity of marriages, and
judicial separation
the dissolution of marriages
the death of a person
the status and legal capacity of a minor and
the legal representation of a person who is
mentally ill; the status and legal capacity of a
minor also includes judgments on the right to
custody after the divorce or legal separation
of the par~nts; this was the Working Party
unanimous reply to the express question put
by the Irish delegation
the nat\onality or domicile (see paragraph 71
et seq. of a person
the care, custody and control of children
irrespective of whether these are in issue in
divorce, guardianship, or other proceedings
the adoption of children.
However the 1968 Convention is only
inapplicable when the proceedings are concerned
directly with legal consequences arising from
these matters. It is not sufficient if the issues
raised are merely of a preliminary nature, even if
their preliminary nature is, or has been, of some
importance in the main proceedings.
52. (b) The expression ' wills and succession' covers
all claims to testate or intestate succession to an
estate. It includes disputes as to the validity or
interpretation of the terms of a wtlI setting up a
trust, even where the trust takes effect on a date
subsequent to the death of the testator. The same
applies to proceedings in respect of the
application and interpretation of statutory
provisions establishing trusts in favour of persons
or institutions as a result of a person dying
intestate. The 1968 Convention does not
therefore, apply to any disputes concerning the
creation, interpretation and administration of
trusts arising under the law of succession
including wills. qn the other hand, disputes
concerning the relations . of the trustee with
persons other than beneficiaries, in other words
the 'external relations' of the trust , come within
the scope of the 1968 Convention (see paragraph
109  et seq.
BANKRUPTCY AND SIMILAR PROCEEDINGS
53. Article 1, second paragraph, point (2), occupies a
special position among the provisions concerning
the legal matters excluded from the 1968
Convention. It was drafted with reference to a
special Convention on bankruptcy which was
being discussed at the same time as the 1968
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Leaving aside special bankruptcy rules for very
special types of business undertakings, the two
Conventions were intended to dovetail almost
completely with each other. Consequently, the
preliminary draft Convention on bankruptcy,
which was first drawn up in 1970, submitted
in an amended form in 1975 (8), deliberately
adopted the principal terms 'bankruptcy
compositions' and ' analogous proceedings' (9) in
the provisons concerning its scope in the same
way eO as they were used in the 1968
Convention. To avoid, as far as possible~ leaving
lacunae between the scope of the two
Conventions efforts are being made in the
discussions on the proposed Convention on
bankruptcy to enumerate in detail all the
principal and secondary proceedings involved (11
and so to eliminate any problems of
interpretation. As long as the proposed
Convention on bankruptcy has not yet come into
force, the application of Article 1, second
paragraph, point (2) of the 1968 Convention
remains difficult. The problems, including the
matters arising from the accession of the new
Member States, are of two kinds. First, it 
necessary to define what proceedings are meant
by bankruptcy, compositions or analogous
proceedings as well as their constituent parts (1).
Secondly, the legal position in the United
Kingdom poses a special problem as the
bankruptcy of 'incorporated companies' is not a
recognized concept in that country (2).
1.  GENERAL AND INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF
PROCEEDINGS EXCLUDED FROM THE
SCOPE OF THE  1968  CONVENTION
54. It is relatively easy to define the basic types of
proceedings that are subject to bankruptcy law
and therefore fall outside the scope of the 1968
Convention. Such proceedings are defined in
almost identical terms in both the Jenard and the
Noel-Lemontey reports  as those
which, depending on the system of law
involved, are based on the suspension of
payments, the insolvency of the debtor or his
inability to raise credit, and which involve the
judicial authorities for the purpose either of
compulsory and collective liquidation of the
assets or simply of supervision by those
authorities. '
In the legal systems of the original States of the
EEC there are only a very few examples of
proceedings of this kind, ranging from two (in
Germany) to four (Italy and Luxembourg). In its
1975 version (8) the Protocol to the preliminary
draft Convention on bankruptcy enumerates the
proceedings according to types of proceedings
and States concerned. A list is reproduced in
Annex I to this report. Naturally, the 1968
Convention does not a fortiori cover global
insolvency proceedings which do not take place
before a court as, for example, can be the case in
France when authorization can be withdrawn
from an insurance undertaking for reasons of
insolvency.
The enumeration in Article 17 of the preliminary
draft Convention on bankruptcy cannot, before
that Convention has come into force, be used for
the interpretation of Article 1, second paragraph
point (2) of the 1968 Convention. Article 17
mentions the kind of proceedings especially
closely connected with bankruptcy where the
courts of the State where the bankruptcy
proceedings are opened are to ,have exclusive
jurisdiction.
It is not desirable at this stage to prescribe this
list, or even an amended list, as binding. Further
amendments may well have to be made during
the discussions on the Convention on
bankruptcy. To prescribe a binding list would
cause confusion, even though the list to be
included in the Protocol to the Convention on
bankruptcy will, after the latter s entry into force
prevail over the 1968 Convention pursuant to
Article 57, since it is part of a special Convention.
Moreover, the list, as already mentioned, does
not include all bankruptcies, compositions and
analogous proceedings. For instance it has
become clear during the discussions on the
Convention on bankruptcy that the list will not
cover insurance undertakings which only
undertake direct insurance (13), without thereby
bringing the bankruptcy of such undertakings
within the scope of the 1968 Convention. Finally
the Working Party was not sure whether all the
proceedings included in the list as it stood at the
beginning of 1976 could properly be regarded as
bankruptcies, compositions or analogous
proceedings, before the list formally comes into
force. This applied particularly to the proceedings
mentioned in connection with the liquidation of
companies (see paragraph 57).
2.  BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
DISSOLUTION OF COMPANIES
THE
55. As far as dissolution, whether or not by decision
of a court, and the capacity to be made bankrupt
are concerned, the legal treatment of Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/91
partnership (14 established under United
Kingdom or Irish law is comparable in every
respect to the treatment of companies established
under continental legal systems. Companies (15
within the meaning of United Kingdom or Irish
law, however, are dealt with in a fundamentally
different way. The Bankruptcy Acts do not apply
to them (16), but instead they are subject to the
winding-up procedure of the Companies
Acts (17); even if they are not registered
companies. Winding-up is not a special
bankruptcy procedure, but a legal concept which
can take different forms and serves different
purposes. A common feature of all winding-up
proceedings is a disposal of assets and the
distribution of their proceeds amongst the
persons entitled thereto with a view of bringing
the company to an end. The start of winding-up
proceedings corresponds, therefore, to what 
understood by 'dissolution' on the continent. The
dissolution of a company on the other hand is
identical with the final result of a liquidation
under continental legal systems.
the dissolution of a company. Legal disputes
incidental to or consequent upon such
proceedings are therefore normal civil or
commercial disputes and as such are not excluded
from the scope of the 1968 Convention. This also
applies in the case of a winding-up subject to the
supervision of the court. The powers of the court
in such a case are not sufficiently dearly defined
for the proceedings to be classed as judicial.
A distinction is made between winding-up by the
court, voluntary winding-up and winding-up
subject to the supervision of the court. The
second kind of winding-up takes place basically
without the intervention of the court, either at the
instance of the members alone or of the members
together with the creditors. Only as a subsidiary
measure and exceptionally can the court appoint
a liquidator. The third kind of winding-up is only
a variation on the second. The court has certain
supervisory powers. A winding-up of a company
by the court requires an application either by the
company or by a creditor which is possible in a
number of circumstances of which insolvency 
only one. Other grounds for a winding-up
include: the number of members falling below the
required minimum, failure to commence, or a
lengthy suspension of, business and the general
ground 'that the court is of the opinion that it is
just and equitable that the company should be
wound up
A winding-up by the court cannot, of course, be
automatically excluded from the scope of the
1968 Convention. For although most proceedings
of this kind serve the purpose of the liquidation
of an insolvent company, this is not always the
case. The Working Party decided to exclude from
the scope of the 1968 Convention only those
proceedings which are or were based on Section
222 (e) of the British Companies Act (18) or the
equivalent provisions in the legislation of Ireland
and Northern Ireland. This would, however
involve too narrow a definition of the
proceedings to be excluded, as the liquidation of
an insolvent company is frequently based on one
of the other grounds referred to in Section 222 of
the British Companies Act, notably in (a), which
states that a special resolution of the members is
sufficient to set proceedings in motion. There is
no alternative therefore to ascertaining the
determining factor in the dissolution in each
particular case. The English version of Article 1
second paragraph point (2), of the 1968
Convention has been worded accordingly. It was
not, however, necessary to alter the text of the
Convention in the other languages. If a
winding-up in the United Kingdom or Ireland is
based on a ground other than the insolvency of
the company, the court concerned with
recognition and enforcement in another
Contracting State will have to examine whether
the company was not in fact insolvent. Only if it
is of the opinion that the company was solvent
will the 1968 Convention apply.
58. Only in that event does the problem arise of
whether exclusive jurisdiction exists for the
courts at the seat of the company pursuant to
Article 16 (2) of the 1968 Convention. In the
United Kingdom and Ireland this is the case for
proceedings which involve or have involved a
solvent company.
56. The legal position outlined has the following
consequences for the application of Article 1
second paragraph, point (2), and Article 16 (2) of
the 1968 Convention in the Continental (b) and
other (a) Member States:
57. (a) A voluntary winding-up under United
Kingdom or Irish law cannot be equated with
court proceedings. The same applies to the
non-judicial proceedings under Danish law for
The term 'dissolution' in Article 16  (2) of the
1968 Convention is not to be understood in the
narrow technical sense in which it is used in legal
systems on the Continent. It also coversNo C 59/92 Official Journal of the European Communities
proceedings concerning the liquidation of 
company after 'dissolution These include
disputes about the amount to be paid out to a
member; such proceedings are nothing more than
stages on the way towards terminating the legal
existence of a company.
59. (b) If a company established under a Continental
legal system is dissolved, i.e. enters the stage of
liquidation, because it has become insolvent
court proceedings relating to the ' dissolution of
the company' are only conceivable as disputes
concerning the admissibility of, or the mode and
manner of conducting, winding-up proceedings.
All this is outside the scope of the 1968
Convention. On the other hand all other
proceedings intended to declare or to bring about
the dissolution of a company are not the concern
of the law of winding-up. It is unnecessary to
examine whether the company concerned is
solvent or insolvent. It also makes no difference
if bankruptcy law questions arise as a preliminary
issue. For instance, when litigation ensues as to
whether a company should be dissolved, because
a person who allegedly belongs to it has gone
bankrupt, the dispute is not about a matter of
bankruptcy law, but of a type which falls within
the scope of the 1968 Convention. The
Convention also applies if, in connection with the
dissolution of a company not involving the
courts, third parties contend in legal proceedings
that, they are creditors of the company and
consequently entitled to satisfaction out of assets
of the company.
SOCIAL SECURITY
60. Matters relating to social security were expressly
excluded from the scope of the 1968 Convention.
This was intended to avoid the difficulties which
would arise from the fact that in some Member
States this area of law comes under public law
whereas in others it is on the border-line between
public and private law. Legal proceedings by
social security authorities against third parties
for example against wrongdoers, in exercise of
rights of action which they have acquired by
subrogation or by operation of law, do come
within the scope of the 1968 Convention.
ARBITRATION
61. The United Kingdom requested information on
matters regarding the effect of the exclusion of
arbitration' from the scope of the 1968
Convention, which were not dealt with in the
Jenard report. Two divergent basic positions
which it was not possible to reconcile emerged
from the discussion on the interpretation of the
relevant provisions of Article 1 second
paragraph, point (4). The point of view expressed
principally on behalf of the United Kingdom was
that this provision covers all disputes which the
parties had effectively agreed should be settled by
arbitration, including any secondary disputes
connected with the agreed arbitration. The other
point of view, defended by the original Member
States of the EEC, only regards proceedings
before national courts as part of ' arbitration' if
they refer to arbitration proceedings, whether
concluded, in progress or to be started. It was
nevertheless agreed that no amendment should be
made to the text. The new Member States can
deal with this problem of interpretation in their
implementing legislation. The Working Party was
prepared to accept this conclusion, because all the
Member States of the Community, with the
exception of Luxembourg and Ireland, had in the
meantime become parties to the United Nations
Convention of 10 June 1958 on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and
Ireland is willing to give sympathetic
consideration to the question of her acceding to
it. In any event, the differing basic positions lead
to a different result in practice only in one
particular instance (see paragraph 62).
1.  DECISIONS OF NATIONAL COURTS 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF  DISPUTE
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF 
ARB ITRA TI  NAG REEMENT.
62. If a national court adjudicates on the subject
matter of a dispute, because it overlooked 
arbitration agreement or considered it
inapplicable, can recognition and enforcement of
that judgment be refused in another State of the
Community on the ground that the arbitration
agreement was after all valid and that therefore
pursuant to Article 1 , second paragraph, point
(4), the judgment falls outside the scope of the
1968 Convention? Only if the first interpretation
(see paragraph 61) is accepted can an affirmative
answer be given to this question.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/93
In support of the view that this would be the
correct course, it is argued that since a court in
the State addressed is free, contrary to the view of
the court in the State of origin, to regard a
dispute as affecting the status of an individual, or
the law of succession, or as falling outside the
scope of civil law, and therefore as being outside
the scope of the 1968 Convention, it must in the
same way be free to take the opposite view to
that taken by the court of origin and to reject the
applicability of the 1968 Convention because
arbitration is involved.
Against this, it is contended that the literal
meaning of the word ' arbitration' itself implies
that it cannot extend to every dispute affected by
an arbitration agreement; that 'arbitration' refers
only to arbitration proceedings. Proceedings
before national courts would therefore be
affected by Article 1, second paragraph, point (4)
of the 1968 Convention only if they dealt with
arbitration as a main issue and did not have to
, consider the validity of an arbitration agreement
merely as a matter incidental to an examination
of the competence of the court of origin to
assume jurisdiction. It has been contended that
the court in the State addressed can no longer
re-open the issue of classification; if the court of
the State of origin, in assuming jurisdiction, has
taken a certain view as to the applicability of the
1968 Convention, this becomes binding on the
court in the State addressed.
2.  OTHER PROCEEDINGS CONNECTED WITH
ARBITRA nON BEFORE NA TIONAL
COURTS
63. (a) The 1968 Convention as such in no way
restricts the freedom of the parties to submit
disputes to arbitration. This applies even to
proceedings for which the 1968 Convention has
established exclusive jurisdiction. Nor, of course
does the Convention prevent national legislation
from invalidating arbitration agreements affecting
disputes for which exclusive jurisdiction exists
under national law or pursuant to the 1968
Convention.
64. (b) The 1968 Convention does not cover court
proceedings which are ancillary to arbitration
proceedings, for example the appointment or
dismissal of arbitrators, the fixing of the place of
arbitration, the extension of the time limit for
making awards or the obtaining of a preliminary
ruling on questions of substance as provided for
under English law in the procedure known as
statement of a special case' (Section 21 of the
Arbitration Act 1950). In the same way a
judgment determining whether an arbitration
a~reement is valid or not, or because it is invalid
ordering the parties not to continue the
arbitration proceedings, is not covered by the
1968 Convention.
65. (c) Nor does the 1968 Convention cover
proceedings and decisions concerning
applications for the revocation, amendment
recognition and enforcement of arbitration
awards. This also applies to court decisions
incorporating arbitration awards  a common
method of recognition. under United Kingdom
law. If an arbitration award is revoked and the
revoking court or another national court itself
decides the subject matter in dispute, the 1968
Convention is applicable.
V. JUDICIAL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
JUDGMENTS
AND
66. As between the original Member States, and also
as between those States and the United Kingdom
and Ireland, the 1968 Convention could and can
in one particular respect be based on a
surprisingly uniform legal tradition. Almost
everywhere the same tasks pertaining to the field
of private law are assigned to the courts. The
authorities which constitute 'courts can
everywhere be recognized easily and with
certainty. This is also true in cases where
proceedings are being conducted in 'court' which
are not the result of an action by one party
against' another party (see paragraphs 23 and
124  et seq.
). 
The accession of Denmark raised
new problems.
Although the Working Party had no difficulty in
confirming that the Industrial Court under the
Danish Industrial Court Act of 21 April 1964
(Bulletin No 124) was, in spite of its unusual
structure, clearly to be considerod a court within
the meaning of the 1968 Convention, it was more
difficult to decide how to classify proceedings in
maintenance matters, which, in Denmark, failing
an amicable settlement, are almost always held
before administrative authorities and terminate
with a decision by the latter.No C 59/94 Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 3.-79
1.  THE LEGAL POSITION IN DENMARK
67. The legal position may be summed up as follows.
Maintenance matters are determined as regards
the obligation to pay either by agreement or by a
court judgment. The amount of the payment and
the scale of any necessary modifications are
however, determined by an authority known as
the ' Amtmand', which under Danish law 
clearly not  court but an administrative
authority which in this case plays a judicial role.
It is true that decisions given in such proceedings
come under The Hague Convention on the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating
to maintenance obligations, but this is only
because under that Convention the matter does
not specifically require a court judgment.
2.  ARTICLE Va  OF  THE PROTOCOL AND ITS
EFFECT
68. There would, however, be an imbalance in the
scope of the 1968 Convention, if it excluded
maintenance proceedings of the type found in
Denmark on the sole ground that they do not
take place before courts.
The amendment to the 1968 Convention thus
made necessary is contained in the proposal for
the adoption ofa new Article Va in the Protocol.
CHAPTER 4
This method appeared simpler than attempting to
amend a large number of separate provisions of
the 1968 Convention.
Wherever the 1968 Convention refers to 'court'
or 'judge' it must in the future be taken to include
Danish administrative authorities when dealing
with maintenance matters (as in Article 2, first
paragraph, Article 3, first paragraph, Article 4
first paragraph, Article 5 (2), Article 17, Article
, Articles 20 to 22, Article 27 (4), Article 28
third paragraph and Article 52). This applies in
particular to Article 4 first paragraph, even
though in the French, Italian and Dutch texts
unlike the German version, the word' court ' does
not appear.
Similarly, wherever the 1968 Convention refers
to 'judgments , the decisions arrived at by the
Danish administrative authorities in maintenance
matters will in future be included in the legal
definition of the term 'judgment' contained in
Article 25. Its content is extended in this respect
by the addition of Article Va to the Protocol, so
that it is now to be understood as reading:
For the purposes of this Convention
judgment" means any judgment given by a
court or tribunal of a Contracting State 
including in matters relating to maintenance
the Danish administrative authorities 
whatever the judgment may be called. . .'.
JURISDICTION
GENERAL REMARKS
69. In section A of Chapter 4 of his report, Mr.
Jenard sets out the main ideas underlying the
rules of jurisdiction of the 1968 Convention.
None of this is affected by the accession of the
new Member States. The extent to which three
features of the law in the United Kingdom and in
Ireland are consistent with the application of the
1968 Convention must, however, be clarified.
These features are: the far-reaching jurisdiction of
the Superior Courts (1), the concept of domicile
(2) and, lastly, the discretionary powers enjoyed
by the courts to determine territorial jurisdiction
(3).
1.  FIRST INSTANCE JURISDICTION  OF  THE
SUPERIOR COURTS
70. The Continental Member States of the
Community have geographically defined
jurisdictions where courts of first instance are
competent to give judgments even in the most
important civil disputes. There are many courts
of equal status: approximately 50 'Landgerichte
in Germany, and an equal number of 'tribunaux
de grande instance' in France and ' Tribunali' in
Italy. Where the 1968 Convention itself lays
down both the international and local jurisdiction
of the courts, as for example in Articles 5 and 6
jurisdiction is given to only one of the many
courts with equal status in a State. There is little
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of Ireland and the United Kingdom in so far as a
Superior Court has jurisdiction as a court of first
instance.
In Ireland, the High Court is the only court of
first instance with unlimited jurisdiction. It can
exceptionally, sit outside Dublin. Nothing in the
1968 Convention precludes this. In addition to
the High Court, there is a Circuit Court and a
District Court. In respect of tp.ese courts too, the
expression 'the Court' is used in the singular and
there is only one Court for the whole country,
but each of its judges is permanently assigned to a
specific circuit or district. The local jurisdiction
laid down in the 1968 Convention means, in the
case of Ireland, the judge assigned to a certain
circui t' or ' district
In the United Kingdom three Superior Courts
have jurisdiction at first instance: the High Court
of Justice for England and Wales, the Outer
House of the Court of Session for Scotland and
the High Court for Northern Ireland. Each of
these courts qas, however, exclusive jurisdiction
for the entire territory of the relevant part of the
United Kingdom (see paragraph 11). Thus the
same comments as those made in connection with
the territorial jurisdiction of the Irish High Court
apply also to each judicial area. The possibility of
transferring a case from London to a district
registry of the High Court does not mean transfer
to another court. Bearing in mind that foreign
judgments have to be registered separately in
- respect of each of the judicial areas of the United
Kingdom in order to become enforceable therein
(see paragraph 208), the distinction between
international and local jurisdiction becomes
largely irrelevant in the United Kingdom. The
rules in the 1968 Convention governing local
jurisdiction are relevant to the Superior Courts of
first instance in the United Kingdom only in so
far as a distinction has to be made between the
courts of England and Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. The competence of the other
courts (County Courts, Magistrates' Courts , and
in Scotland, the Sheriff Courts) presents no
particular problems.
2.  THE CONCEPT OF 'DOMICILE' AND THE
APPLICA TION OF THE CONVENTION
71. (a) The concept of domicile is of fundamental
importance for the 1968 Convention in
determining jurisdiction (e.g. Articles 2 to 6, 8
12 (3), 17 and 32). In the legal systems of
the original Member States of the EEC its
meaning differs to some extent. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, it expresses a person
connection with a local community within the
national territory. In France and Luxembourg, it
denotes a person s exact address. In Belgium, for
, purposes of jurisdiction the term denotes the
place where a person is entered in the register of
population as having his principal residence
(Article 36 of the Code judiciaire). These
differences explain why" in determining a
person s domicile, e.g. German law places greater
emphasis on the stability of the connection with a
specific place than do some of the other legal
systems.
Notwithstanding these differences the basic
concept of 'domicile' is the same in all the legal
systems of the original Member States of the
EEC, namely the connection of a person with a
smaller local unit within the State. This made it
possible in Article 52 of the 1968 Convention to
leave a more precise definition of the term to the
law of the State in which the 'domicile' of a
person had to be ascertained. It did not lead to an
uneven application of the provisions of the 1968
Convention. Clearly, for the purposes of applying
them in the original Member States of th~
Community it is irrelevant whether the concept of
domicile refers to a specific address or to a local
community.
72. (b) The concept of domicile under the law in
Ireland and the United Kingdom differs
considerably in several respects from the
Continental con~ept.
First, this concept does not refer to a person
connection with a particular place and even less
with a particular residence within a place, but to
his having his roots within a territory covered by
a particular legal system (see paragraph 11). A
person domicile only indicates whether he
comes under the legal system of England and
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, or possibly
under a foreign legal system. A person s legal
connection with a particular place is denoted by
the word 'residence , not 'domicile
According to United Kingdom law, a person
always has one 'domicile' and can never have
more than' one. At birth a legitimate child
acquires the domicile of its father, an illegitimate
child that of its mother.  child retains its
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After it reaches its majority, it may acquire
another domicile but for this there are very strict
requirements: the usual place of residence must
have been transferred to another country  with
the intention of keeping it there permanently or
at least for an unlimited period.
73. (c) Article 52 of the 1968 Convention does not
expressly provide for the linking of the concept of
domicile with a particular place or a particular
residence, nor does it expressly prohibit it from
being connected with a particular national
territory. The United Kingdom and Ireland
would, consequently, be free to retain their
traditional concept of domicile when the
jurisdiction of their courts is invoked. The
Working Party came to the conclusion that this
would lead to a certain imbalance in the
application of the 1968 Convention. In certain
cases, the courts of the United Kingdom or
Ireland could assume jurisdiction on the basis of
their rules on the retention of domicile, although
by the law of all the other Member States of the
Community, such a person would be domiciled at
his actual place of residence within their territory.
The Working Party therefore requested the
United Kingdom a!1d Ireland to provide in their
legislation implementing the 1968 Convention
(see paragraph 256), at any rate for the purposes
of that Convention, for a concept of domicile
which would depart from their traditional rules
and would tend to reflect more the concept of
domicile' as understood in the original  States of
the EEc.
In Article 69 (5) of the Convention for the
European patent for the common market which
was drawn up concurrently with the Working
Party s discussions, the concept of 'Wohnsitz' is
translated as 'residence' and for the meaning of
the expression reference is made to Articles 52
and 53 of the 1968 Convention. To prevent
confusion, the proposed new Article V c of the
Protocol makes it clear that the concept of
residence' within the meaning of the Community
Patent Convention should be ascertained in the
same way as the concept of 'domicile' in the 1968
Convention.
74. (d) It should be noted that the application of the
third paragraph of Article 52 raises the problem
of different concepts of domicile, when
considering which system of law determines
whether a person s domicile depends on that of
another person. The relevant factor, in such a
case, may be where the dependent person 
domiciled. Under United Kingdom private
international law, the question whether a person
has a dependent domicile is not determined by
that person s nationality, but by his domicile in
the traditional sense of that concept. The
re-definition of 'domicile' in connection with the
first paragraph of Article 52 in no way affects
this.
If a foreigner under age who has settled in
England is sued in an English court, that court
must take account of the different concepts of
domicile. As a first step it must establish where
the defendant had his 'domicile' before settling in
England. This is decided in accordance with the
traditional meaning of that concept. The law thus
found to be applicable will then determine
whether the minor was in a position to acquire a
domicile' in England within the meaning of the
1968 Convention. The English court must then
ascertain whether the requirements for 
domicile' in the area covered by the English
court concerned are satisfied.
75. (e) There is no equivalent in the law of the
United Kingdom to the concept of the 'seat' of a
company in Continental law. In order to achIeve
the results which under private international law
are linked on the continent with the 'seat' of a
company, the United Kingdom looks to the legal
system where the company was incorporated
law of incorporation , Section 406 of the
Companies Act, 1948). The 'domicile' of a
company in the traditional sense of the term (see
paragraph 72) is taken to be the judicial area in
which it was incorporated. The new Member
States of the Community are not obliged to
introduce a legal concept which corresponds to
that of a company s 'seat' within the meaning of
the continental legal systems, just as in general
they are not obliged to adapt their concept of
domicile. However, should the United Kingdom
and Ireland not change their law on this point,
the result would again be an imbalance in the
application of the 1968 Convention. It would
therefore, be desirable for the United Kingdom to
introduce for the purposes of the Convention an
appropriate concept in its national legislation
such as 'domicile of a company , which would
correspond more closely to the Continental
concept of the ' se~t' of a company than the
present United Kingdom concept of ' law of
incorporation
' .
Such a provision would not preclude a company
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in accordance with legislation in the United
Kingdom and a ' seat' in a Continental State in
accordance with the legislation of that State. As a
result of the second sentence of Article 53 , a
company is enabled under the laws of several of
the original States of the EEC to have a 'seat' in
more than one State. The problems which might
arise from such a situation can be overcome by
the provisions in the 1968 Convention on  lis
pendens  and related actions (see paragraph 162).
3.  DISCRETIONARY POWERS REGARDING
JURISDICTION AND TRANSFER OF
PROCEEDINGS
76. The idea that a national court has discretion in
the exercise of its jurisdiction either territorially
or as regards the subject matter of a dispute does
not generally exist in Continental legal systems.
Even where, in the rules relating to jurisdiction
tests of an exceptionally flexible nature are laid
down, no room is left for the exercise of any
discretionary latitude. It is true that Continental
legal systems recognize the power of a court to
transfer proceedings from one court to another.
Even then the court has no discretion in
determining whether or not this power should be
exercised. In contrast, the law in the United
Kingdom and in Ireland has evolved judicial
discretionary powers in certain fields. In some
cases, these correspond in practice to legal
provisions regarding jurisdiction which are more
detailed in the Continental States, while in others
they have no counterpart on the Continent. It is
therefore difficult to evaluate such powers within
the context of the 1968 Convention. A distinction
has to be made between the international and
national application of this legal concept.
77. (a) In relationships with the courts of other States
and also, within the United Kingdom, as between
the courts of different judicial areas (see
paragraph 11) the doctrine of  forum conveniens
in Scotland forum non conveniens  is of
relevance.
The courts are allowed, although only in very
rare and exceptional cases, to disregard the fact
that proceedings may already be pending before
foreign courts, or courts of another judicial area.
Exceptionally, the courts may refuse to hear or
decide a case, if they believe it would be better for
the case to be heard before a court having
equivalent jurisdiction in another State (or
another judicial area) because this would increase
the likelihood of an efficient and impartial
hearing of the particular case.
There are several special reasons why in practice
such discretionary powers are exercised: the strict
requirements traditionally imposed by the laws of
the United Kingdom and Ireland regarding
changes of domicile (see paragraph 72); the rules
allowing establishment of jurisdiction by merely
serving a writ or originating summons in the
territory of the State concerned (see paragraphs
85 and 86); the principles developed particularly
strongly in the procedural law of these States
requiring directness in the taking of evidence with
the consequent restrictions on making use of
evidence taken abroad or merely in another
judicial area; and finally, the considerable
difficulties arising in the application of foreign
law by United Kingdom or Irish courts.
78. According to the views of the delegations from
the Continental Member States of the
Community such possibilities are not open to the
courts of those States when, under the 1968
Convention, they have jurisdiction and are asked
to adjudicate.
Article 21 expressly prohibits a court from
disregarding the fact that proceedings are already
pending ab~oad. For the rest the view was
expressed that under the 1968 Convention the
Contracting States are not only entitled to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions laid down in Title 2; they are also
obliged to do so. A plaintiff must be sure which
court has jurisdiction. He should not have to
waste his time and money risking that the court
concerned may consider itself less competent than
another. In particular, in accordance with the
general spirit of the 1968 Convention, the fact
that foreign law has to be applied either
generally or in a particular case, should not
constitute a sufficient reason for  court to
decline jurisdiction. Where the courts of several
States have jurisdiction the plaintiff has
deliberately been given a right of choice, which
should not be weakened by application of the
doctrine of  forum conveniens.  The plaintiff may
have chosen another apparently 'inappropriate
court from among the competent courts in order
to obtain a judgment in the State in which he also
wishes to enforce it. Furthermore, the risk of a
negative conflict of jurisdiction should not be
disregarded: despite the United Kingdom court
decision, the judge on the Continent could
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reasons in favour of the doctrine of  forum
conveniens  will lose considerably in significance
as soon as the 1968 Convention becomes
applicable in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
The implementing legislation will necessitate not
inconsiderable changes in the laws of those
States, both in respect of the definition of the
concept of domicile (see paragraph 73) and on
account of the abolition of jurisdictional
competence based merely on service of a writ
within the area of the court (see paragraph 86).
To correct rules of jurisdiction in a particular
case by means of the concept of  forum
conveniens  will then be largely unnecessary. After
considering these arguments the United Kingdom
and Irish delegations did not press for a formal
adjustment of the 1968 Convention on this point.
79. (b) A concept similar to the doctrine of  forum
conveniens  is also applied within the territory of
the State, though the term itself is not used in that
context. This may be due to the fact that the
same result can be achieved by the device of
transferring the case to another court having
alternative jurisdiction within the same State or
the same legal area (see paragraph 11). The
Working Party had to examine to what extent the
1968 Convention restricted such powers of
transfer. In this connection certain comments
made earlier may be repeated: the powers of the
Superior Courts in Ireland or in a judicial area of
the United Kingdom (see paragraph 70) to decide
as a court of first instance remain unchanged. For
the rest, the following applies:
80. (aa) The previous legal position in Ireland and
the United Kingdom remains essentially the same.
Each court can transfer proceedings to another
court, if that court has equivalent jurisdiction and
can better deal with the matter. For example, if
an action is brought before the High Court, the
value of which is unlikely to exceed the amount
which limits the jurisdiction of the lower court
the High Court has power to transfer the
proceedings to such a court, but it is not obliged
to do so. A Circuit Court in Ireland, a County
Court or Magistrates' Court in England and a
Sheriff Court in Scotland  but not an Irish
District Court (see paragraph 70) - may transfer
proceedings to another court of the same
category or exceptionally to a court of another
category, if the location of the evidence or the
circumstances for a fair hearing should make
such a course desirable in the interest of the
parties.
Some Continental legal systems also provide for
the possibility, albeit on a much smaller scale, of
a judge having discretion to confer jurisdiction on
a court which would not otherwise have it. This
is the case under, for instance, Article 36 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure, if proper
proceedings are not possible before the court
which originally had jurisdiction. Under Section
356 of the new French Code of Civil
Procedure (19) proceedings may be transferred to
another court of the same type, if a risk of lack of
impartiality exists.
81. (bb) The 1968 Convention in no way affects the
competence as regards subject matter of the
courts of a State. The national legal systems are
thus free to provide for the possibility of transfer
of cases between courts of different categories.
For the most part, the 1968 Convention does not
affect the territorial jurisdiction of the courts
within a State, but only their international
jurisdiction. This is clearly reflected by the basic
rule on jurisdiction contained in Article 2. Unless
the jurisdiction of a court where proceedings are
instituted against a person domiciled in the
United Kingdom or Ireland is derived from a
provision of the 1968 Convention which at the
same time determines local jurisdiction, as for
example Article 5, the 1968 Convention does not
prevent a transfer of the proceedings to another
court in the same State. Even in respect of
exclusive jurisdiction, Article 16 only lays down
the international jurisdiction of the courts of a
State, and does not prevent a transfer within that
State.
Finally, the 1968 Convention does not of course
prev~nt a transfer to the court which actually has
local ' jurisdiction under the Convention. This
would occur where both parties agree to the
transfer and the requirements for jurisdiction by
consent pursuant to Article 17 are satisfied.
The only type of case which remains problematic
is where an action is brought before a court in
circumstances where the 1968 Convention gives
the plaintiff a choice of jurisdiction. An action in
tort or a liability insurance claim is brought at the
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maintenance claim at the domicile of the
maintenance creditor. It appears obvious that in
special exceptional cases a transfer to another
court of the same State must be permitted, when
proper proceedings are not possible before the
court which would otherwise have jurisdiction. ,
However, the Working Party did not feel justified
in incorporating these matters expressly in the
1968 Conventation. They could be covered by a
rule of interpretation to the effect that the court
having local jurisdiction may, in exceptional
cases, include the court which is designated as
having local jurisdiction by the decision of
another court. The courts for the place 'where the
harmful event occurred' could thus be a
neighbouring court designated by another court
if the courts for the place of the harmful event;
should be unable to hear the proceedings.
In so far as a court's discretionary powers to
confer jurisdiction on other courts and in
particular to transfer proceedings to another
court are not defined in detail such discretionary
powers should, of course, only be used in the
spirit of the 1968 Convention, if the latter has
determined, not only international but also local
jurisdiction. A transfer merely on account of the
cost of the proceedings or in order to facilitate
the taking of evidence would be possible only
with the consent of the plaintiff, who had the
choice of jurisdiction.
COMMENTS ON THE SECTIONS OF TITLE II
Section 1
General provisions
82. The proposed adjustments to Articles 2  to 4
are confined to inserting certain exorbitant
jurisdictions in the legal systems of the new
Member States into the second paragraph of
Article 3. The occasion has been taken to adjust
the text of that Article to take account also of an
amendment to the law which has been introduced
in Belgium. Detailed comments on the proposed
alterations (I) precede two more general remarks
on the relevance of this provision to the whole
structure of the 1968 Convention (II).
I.  Detailed comments
83. 1. Belgium
In Belgium, Articles 52, 52 bis and 53 of the law
of 25 March 1876 had already been superseded
before the coming into force of the 1968
Convention by Articles 635, 637 and 638 of the
Judicial Code. Nevertheless only Article 638 of
the Judicial Code is mentioned in the second
paragraph of Article 3 in its revised version. It
corresponds to Article 53 of the law of 25 March
1876 and provides that where Belgian courts do
not possess jurisdiction based on other
provisions, a plaintiff resident in Belgium may sue
any person before the court of his place of
residence. The version of Article 3, valid hitherto
erroneously classed the jurisdiction based on
Articles 52 and 52 bis of the abovementioned law
as exorbitant.
84. 2. Denmark
The provIsIOns of Danish law included in the
second paragraph of Article 3 state that a
foreigner may be sued before any Danish court in
whose district he is resident or has property when
the document instituting the proceedings is
served. On this last point the provision
corresponds to similar German provisions
included in the list of exorbitant jurisdictions. On
the first point reference may be made to what
follows concerning Ireland (see paragraph 85).
There is a separate Code of, Civil Procedure for
Greenland (see paragraph 253); special reference
had therefore to be made to the corresponding
provisions affecting that country.
85. 3. Ireland
According to the principles of common law
which are unwritten and apply equally in the
United Kingdom and Ireland, a court has
jurisdiction in principle if the plaintiff has been
properly served with the court process. The
jurisdiction of Irish (and United Kingdom) courts
is indirectly restricted to the extent of the limits
imposed on the service of a writ of summons.
Service is available without special leave only
within the territory of Ireland (or the United
Kingdom). However every service validly
effected there is sufficient to establish
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the territory concerned will suffice. Service
abroad will be authorized only where certain
specified conditions are satisfied. As regards legal
relations within the, EEC  especially because of
the possibility of free movement of judgments
resulting from the 1968 Convention  there is
no longer any justification for founding the
jurisdiction of a court on the mere temporary
presence of a person in the State of the court
concerned. This common law jurisdiction, for
which of course no statutory enactment can be
cited, had therefore to be classed as exorbitant.
86. 4. United Kingdom
As regards the United Kingdom it will suffice for
point (a) of Article 3, second paragraph, of the
1968 Convention as amended, to refer to what
has been said above in the case of Ireland. Points
(b) and (c) deal with some characteristic features
of Scottish law. To establish jurisdiction merely
by service of a writ of summons during the
temporary presence of the defendant is a rare
though not totally unknown, practice in Scotland.
Scottish courts usually base their jurisdiction in
respect of a defendant not permanently resident
there on other factors, namely that he has been in
Scotland for at least 40 days, or that he owns
immovable property in Scotland or that he owns
movable property which has been impounded in
Scotland. In such cases service on the defendant is
also required, but this may be effected by post or
exceptionally, by posting it on the court notice
board. In the case of Germany, the 1968
Convention has already classed jurisdiction based
solely on the existence of property in Germany as
exorbitant. Any jurisdiction based solely on the
seizure of property within a country must be
treated in the same way.
II.  The relevance of the second paragraph of Article 
to the whole structure of the  1968  Convention
87. 1. The special significance of the second
paragraph of Article 
The rejection as exorbitant of jurisdictional bases
hitherto considered to be important in the new
Member States should not, any more than the
original version of the second paragraph of
Article 3, mislead anyone into thinking that the
scope of the first paragraph of Article 3 would
thereby be more closely circumscribed. Only
particularly extravagant claims to international
jurisdiction by the courts of a Member State are
expressly underlined. Other rules founding
jurisdiction in the national laws of the new
Member States are compatible with the 1968
Convention also only to the extent that they do
not offend against Article 2 and Articles 4 to 18.
Thus, for example, the jurisdiction of English
courts in respect of persons domiciled in the
Community can no longer be based on the
ground that the claim concerns a contract which
was concluded in England or is governed by
English law. On the other hand, the rules on the
jurisdiction of English courts in connection with
breaches of contract in England or claims
connected with the commission or omission of an
act in England largely correspond to the
provisions in Article 5 (1) to (3).
2. Impossibility of founding jurisdiction
on the location of property
88. With regard to Germany, Denmark and the
United Kingdom the list in the second paragraph
of Article 3 contains provisions rejecting
jurisdiction derived solely from the existence of
property in the territory of the State in which the
court is situated. Such jurisdiction cannot be
asserted even if the proceedings concern a dispute
over rights of ownership, or possession, or the
capacity to dispose of the specific property in
question. Persons domiciled on the Continent 
Europe may not be sued in Scotland, even if the
aim of the action is to recover movable property
situated or seized there or to determine its
ownership. Interpleader actions (England and
Wales) and multiple poinding (Scotland) are no
longer permissible in the United Kingdom in
respect of persons domiciled in another Member
State of the Community, in so far as the
international jurisdiction of the English or
Scottish courts does not result from other
provisions of the 1968 ConventIOn. This applies
for example, to actions brought by an auctioneer
to establish whether ownership of an article sent
to him for disposal belongs to his customer or a
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There is, however, no reason why United
Kingdom legislation should not introduce
appropriate measures pursuant to Article 24, to
provide protection to persons (such 
auctioneers) faced with conflicting legal claims.
This might, for instance, take the form of a court
order authorizing an article to be temporarily
withdrawn from auction.
As regards persons who are domiciled outside the
Community, the provisions which hithe'rto
governed the jurisdiction of courts in the new
Member States remains unaffected. Even the rules
of jurisdiction mentioned in the second paragraph
of Article 3 may continue to apply to such
persons. Judgments delivered by courts which
thus have jurisdiction must also be rec0gnized
and enforced in other States of the Community -
unless one of the exceptions in the new paragraph
5 of Article 27 or in Article 59 as amended
applies.
This latter provision is the only one concerning
which the list in Article 3, second paragraph is
not only of illustrative significance but has direct
and restrictive importance. (see paragraph 249).
Section 2
Special jurisdictions (21
89. In the sphere of special non-exclusive
jurisdictions the problems of adjustment were
confined to judicial competence as regards
maintenance claims (I), questions raised by trusts
in United Kingdom and Irish law (II) and
problems in connection with jurisdiction in
maritime cases (III). In addition, the Working
Party dealt with a few less important individual
questions (IV).
Reference should be made here to the Judgments
of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities of 6 October 1976 (12/76; 14/76)
and of 30 November 1976 (21/76) which were
delivered shortly before or after the end of the
negotiations (22
I.  Maintenance claims
90. The need for an adjustment of Article 5 (2) arose
because the laws of the new Member States 
was also by then the case with the laws of many
of the original States of the EEC  allow status
proceedings to be combined with proceedings
concerning maintenance claims (see paragraphs
32 to 42). As far as other problems were
concerned no formal adjustment was ,required.
However certain special features of United
Kingdom and Irish law give rise to questions of
interpretation; the views of the Working Party as
to their solutions should be recorded. They
concern a more precise definition of the term
maintenance (1) and how maintenance
entitlements are to be adjusted to changed
circumstances in accordance with the system 
jurisdiction and ft'cognition established by the
1968 Convention (2).
1. The term 'maintenance
91. (a) The 1968 Convention refers simply to
maintenance' in Article 5 (2), the only Article
which uses the expression. Several legal concepts
used within one and the same national legal
system can be covered by this term. For example,
Italian law speaks of ' alimenti' (Article 433 
seq.  of the codice civile) to indicate payments
amongst relations and spouses, but payments
after divorce are ' assegni' (23). The new French
divorce law (24), too, does not speak of 'aliments
but of\.kvoir de secours . In addition French legal,
terminology uses the expressions ' devoir
entretien' and ' contribution aux charges du
menage . All those are ' maintenance' within the
meaning of Article 5 (2) of the 1968 Convention.
92. (b) The Article says nothing, however, about the
legal basis from which maintenance claims can
emanate. The wording differs markedly from that
of the Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on
the recognition and enforcement of decisions
relating to maintenance obligations. Article 1 of
that Convention excludes from its scope
maintenance claims arising from tort, contract
and the law of succession. However, there is no
significant difference regarding the concept of
maintenance as used in the two Conventions. The
1968 Convention is in any case not applicable to
maintenance claims under the law of succession
(second paragraph, point (1) of Article 1).
Maintenance' claims as the legal consequence of
tortious act are, in legal theory, claims for
damages, even if the amount of compensation
depends on the needs of the injured party.
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which previously did not exist are, according to
the form employed, gifts, contracts of sale or
other contracts for a consideration. Obligations
arising therefrom, even where they consist in the
payment of 'maintenance , are to be treated like
other contractual obligations. In such cases
Article 5 (1) rather than 5 (2) of the 1968
Convention applies as far as jurisdiction is
concerned; the outcome hardly differs from an
application of Article 5 (2). 'Maintenance
obligations created by contract are generally to be
fulfilled at the domicile or habitual residence of
the maintenance creditor. Thus actions may also
be brought there. Article 5 (2) is applicable
however, where a maintenance contract merely
crystallizes an existing maintenance obligation
which originated from a family relationship.
Judicial proceedings concerning ' maintenance
claims are still civil and commercial matters even
where Article 5 (2) is not applicable because the
claim arises from a tortious act or a contract.
93. (c) The concept of maintenance does not stipulate
that the claim must be for periodic payments.
Under Article 1613 (2) of the German Civil Code
for example, the maintenance creditor may in
addition to regular payments, claim payment of a
lump sum on the ground of exceptional need.
Under Article 1615 (e) of the Code a father may
agree with his illegitimate child on the payment
of a lump sum settlement. Article 5 (4), third
sentence of the Italian, divorce law 
1 December 1970 allows divorced spouses to
agree on the payment of maintenance in the form
of a lump sum settlement. Finally, under Article
285 of the French Civil Code, as amended by the
divorce law of 11 July 1975, the French courts
can order maintenance in the form of a single
capital payment even without the agreement of
the spouses. The mere fact that the courts in the
United Kingdom have power to order not only
periodic payments by one spouse to the other
after a divorce, but also the payment of a single
lump sum of money, does not therefore prevent
the proceedings or a judgment from being treated
as a maintenance matter. Even the creation of
charges on property and the transfer of property
as provided on the Continent, for example in
Article 8 of the Italian divorce law, can be in the
nature of maintenance.
94. (d) It is difficult to distinguish between claims for
maintenance on the one hand and claims for
damages and the division of property on the
other.
95. (aa) In Continental Europe a motivating factor in
assessing the amount of maintenance due to a
divorced spouse by his former partner is to
compensate an innocent spouse for his loss of
matrimonial status. A typical example 
contained in Article 301 of the Civil Code in its
original form, which still applies in Luxembourg.
In its two paragraphs a sharp distinction is drawn
in respect of post-matrimonial relations between
a claim for maintenance and compensation for
material and non-material damages. Yet material
damages generally consist in the loss of the
provision of maintenance which the divorced
party would have enjoyed as a spouse. Thus the
claims deriving from the two paragraphs of
Article 301 of the Civil Code overlap in practice
especially since they can both take the form of a
pension or a single capital payment. It remains to
be seen whether the new French divorce law of
11 July 1975, which makes a clearer distinction
between 'prestatiops compensatoires' and 'devoir
de secours , will change this situation.
Under Section 23 (1) (c) and (f) and Section 27
(6) (c) of the English Matrimonial causes Act
1973, an English divorce court, too, may order a
lump sum to be paid by one divorced spouse to
the other or to a child. However, English law
which is characterized by judicial discretionary
powers and which does not favour inflexible
systematic rules, does not make a distinction as to
whether the payments ordered by the Court are
intended as damages or as maintenance.
96. (bb) The 1968 Convention is not applicable at
all where the payments claimed or ordered are
governed by matrimonial property law (see
paragraph 45  et seq).  Where claims for damages
are involved Article 5 (2) is not relevant.
Whether or not that provision applies depends, in
the case of a lump sum payment, solely on
whether a payment under family law is in the
nature of maintenance.
The maintenance nature of the payment is likely
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between 'spouses, a division of property or
damages may well be the underlying factor.
Where both spouses are earning well, payment of
a lump sum can only serve the purpose of a
division of property or compensation for
non-material damage. In that case the obligation
to pay is not in the nature of maintenance. If
payment is in pursuance of a division of property,
the 1968 Convention does not apply at all. If it is
to compensate for non-material damage, there is
no scope for the application of Article 5 (2).
A divorce court may not adjudicate in the matter
in either case, unless it has jurisdiction under
Article 2 or Article 5 (1).
97. (e) All legal systems have to deal with the
problems of how the needs of a person requiring
financial support are to be met when the
maintenance debtor defaults. Others also liable to
provide maintenance if necessary a public
authority, may have to step in temporarily. They,
in turn, should be able to obtain a refund of their
outlay from the (principal) maintenance debtor.
Legal systems have therefore evolved various
methods to overcome this problem. Some of them
provide for the maintenance claim to be
transferred to the payer, thereby giving it a new
creditor, but not otherwise changing its nature.
Others confer on the payer an independent right
to compensation. United Kingdom law makes
particular use of the latter method in cases where
the Supplementary Benefits Commission has paid
maintenance. As already mentioned in the Jenard
report (25) claims of this type are covered by the
1968 Convention even where claims for
compensation are based on a payment made by
public authority in accordance with
administrative law or under provisions of social
security legislation. It is not, however, the
purpose of the special rules of jurisdiction in
Article 5 (2) to confer jurisdiction in respect of
compensation claims on the courts of the
domicile of the maintenance creditor or even
those of the seat of the public authority 
whichever of the two abovementioned methods a
legal system may have opted for.
2. Adjustment of maintenance orders
98. Economic circumstances in general and the
particular economic position of those obliged to
pay and those entitled to receive maintenance are
constantly changing. The need for periodical
adjustments of maintenance orders arises
particularly in times of creeping inflation.
Jurisdiction to order adjustments depends on the
general provisions of the 1968 Convention. Since
this is a problem of great practical importance it
may be appropriate to preface its discussion in
detail with a brief comparative legal survey.
99. (a) Continental legal systems differ according to
whether the emphasis of the relevant legal
provisions is placed on the concept of an
infringement of the principle of finality of a
maintenance judgment or more on the concept of
an adjustment of the question of the claim (aa).
In this respect, as in many others, the provisions
of United Kingdom (bb) and Irish (cc) law do not
fit into this scheme.
100. (aa) The prOVISIOns of German law relating to
adjustments of maintenance orders are based on
the concept of a special procedural remedy in
the nature of a review of the proceedings
(Wiederaufnahmeklage) .
Since there are no special provisions governing
jurisdiction, the general provisions governing
jurisdiction in maintenance claims are considered
applicable. This means that the original court
making the maintenance order may have lost its
competence to adjust it. Enforcement authorities,
even when they are courts, have no power, either
in general or in maintenance cases, to adjust a
judgment to changed circumstances. Provisions
giving protection against enforcement of a
judgment for social reasons apply irrespective of
whether or not the amount ordered to be paid in
, the judgment is subject to variation. This is also
true regarding the subsidiary provision of Article
765 (a) of the Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil
Procedure) (26), which is of general application
and states that enforcement measures may be
rescinded or disallowed in very special
circumstances if they constitute an undue
hardship for the debtor.
Accordingly legal theory and case law accept that
a foreign maintenance order may be adjusted by a
German court, if the latter has jurisdiction (27
In the legal systems in the other original Member
States of the EEC the problem has always been
regarded as one of substantive law and not as aNo C 59/104 Official Journal of the European Communities
remedy providing protection against enforcement
of judicial decisions. Accordingly jurisdiction
depends on the general principles applying to
maintenance cases (28
). 
Indirect adjustments
cannot be obtained by invoking, as a defence
against measures of enforcement, a change in the
circumstances which were taken into account 
determining the amount of the maintenance.
In general, the 1968 Convention is based on a
similar legal position obtaining in all the original
Member States: in the case of proceedings for
adjustment of  maintenance order the
jurisdiction of the court concerned has to be
examined afresh.
101. (bb) In the United Kingdom, the most important
legal basis for amendment of maintenance orders
is Section 53 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of
1952 in conjunction with Sections 8 to 10 of the
Matrimonial proceedings (Magistrates' Courts)
Act 1960 which will be suspended in 1979 by the
Domestic proceedings and Magistrates' Courts
Act 1978. According to these Acts, the Court
may revoke or vary maintenance orders, or revive
them after they have been revoked or varied. In
addition, the court in whose district the applicant
is now resident also has jurisdiction in such
matters (29). In principle, the court s discretion is
unfettered in such cases, but an application for
variation may not be based on facts or evidence
which could have been relied on when the
original order was made (30). The same applies
under Section 31 of the Matrimonial causes Act
1973. A divorce court can vary or discharge an
order it has made with regard to maintenance
irrespective of whether the original basis for its
jurisdiction still exists or not.
102. To these possibilities must be added another
characteristic aspect of the British judicial system.
Enforcement of judgments is linked much more
closely than on the Continent to the jurisdiction
of the particular court which gave the judgment
(see paragraph 208). Before a judgment can be
enforced by the executive organs of another
court, it must be registered with that other court.
After registration, it is regarded as a judgment of
that court. A further consequence is that, after
, such registration, the court with which it 
registered is empowered to amend it. Hitherto
the United Kingdom has also applied this system
in cases where foreign maintenance judgments
have been registered with a British court to be
enforced in the United Kingdom (31
103. (cc) In Ireland the District Court has jurisdiction
to make maintenance orders in respect of spouses
and children of a marriage and also in respect of
illegitimate children. The Court also has power to
vary or revoke its maintenance orders. The
jurisdiction of the Court is exercised by the judge
for the district where either of the parties to the
proceedings is ordinarily resident or carries on
any profession or occupation or, in the case of
illegitimate children, the judge for the district in
which the mother of the child resides. A judge
who makes a maintenance order loses jurisdiction
to vary it if these requirements as to residence, etc.,
are no longer fulfilled. Apart from the possibility
of having a maintenance order varied there is a
right of appeal to the Circuit Court from such
orders made by the District Court. The Circuit
Court also has jurisdiction to make maintenance
orders in proceedings relating to the guardianship
of infants. It may also vary or revoke its
maintenance orders. Its jurisdiction is exercised
by the judge for the circuit in which the
defendant is ordinarily resident at the date of
application for maintenance or at the date of
application for a variation of a maintenance
order, as the case may be. An appeal lies to the
High Court.
The High Court may order maintenance to be
paid including alimony pending suit and
permanent alimony following the granting of
divorce  a mensa et thoro.  It has jurisdiction to
vary its own maintenance orders and appeals
against its orders lie to the Supreme Court.
104. (b) Although it nowhere states this expressly, the
1968 Convention is based on the principle that
all judgments given in a Member State can be
contested in that State by all the legal remedies
available under the law of that State, even when
the basis on which the competence of the courts
of that State was founded no longer exists. In
France, a French judgment may be contested by
an appeal, appeal in cassation and an application
to set aside a conviction, even if the defendant
has long since ceased to be domiciled in France. It
follows from the obligation of recognition that no
Contracting State can claim jurisdiction with
regard to appeals against judgments given in
another Contracting State. This also covers
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action of reduction in Scotland or 
Wiederaufnahmeklage' in Germany. Conversely,
every claim to jurisdiction which is not based on
proceedings to pursue a remedy by way of appeal
must satisfy the provisions of the 1968
Convention. This has three important
consequences (see paragraphs 105 to 107) for
decisions concerning jurisdiction for the
adjustment of maintenance orders. A fourth
concerns recognition and enforcement and is
mentioned now as a connected matter. (See
paragraph 108).
105. On no account may the court of the State
. ,
addressed examine whether the amount awarded
is still appropriate, without having regard to the
jurisdiction provisions of the 1968 Convention. If
the proceedings are an appeal, the courts of the
State of origin will remain competent.
Alternatively the new action may be quite distinct
from the original proceedings, in which case the
jurisdiction provisions of the 1978 Convention
must be observed.
106. (bb)Under the legal systems of all six originalEEC
States, the adjustment of maintenance orders, at
any rate ~s far as jurisdiction is concerned, is not
regarded as a remedy by way of appeal (see
paragraph 100). Accordingly the courts of the
State of origin lose their competence to adjust
maintenance orders within the original scope of
the 1968 Convention, if the conditions on 'which
their jurisdiction was based no longer exist. The
1968 Convention could not, however, be applied
consistently, if the courts in the United Kingdom
were to claim jurisdiction to adjust decisions
irrespective of the continued existence of the facts
on which jurisdiction was originally based.
107. Applications for the adjustment of maintenance
claims can only be made in courts with
jurisdiction under Article 2 or Article  (2), as
amended, of the 1968 Convention. For example
if the maintenance creditor claims adjustment due
to increases in the cost of living, he may choose
between the international jurisdiction of the
domicile of the maintenance debtor and the local
jurisdiction of the place where he himself is
domiciled or habitually resident. However, if the
maintenance debtor seeks adjustment because of
a deterioration in his financial circumstances, he
can only apply under the international
jurisdiction referred to in Article 2, i.e. the
jurisdiction of the domicile of the maintenance
creditor, even where the original judgment
(pursuant to Article 2 where it is applicable) was
given in the State of his own domicile and the
parties have retained their places of residence.
108. If a maintenance debtor wishes effect to be given
in another State to an adjusted order, account
must be taken of the reversed roles of the parties.
Adjustment at the instance of the maintenance
debtor can only be aimed at a remission or
reduction of the amount of maintenance.
Reliance on such a decision in another
Contracting State does not therefore involve
enforcement' within the  meaning of Sections 2
and 3 of Title III, but rather recognition as
referred to in Section 1 of that Title. It is true that
the second paragraph of Article 26 makes
provision for a special application to obtain
recognition of a judgment, and the provisions of
Sections 2 and 3 of Title III concerning
enforcement are applicable to such 
application. If in these circumstances
recognition is to be granted to a judgment which
has been amended on the application of the
maintenance debtor, the position is as follows:
the applicant within the meaning of Articles 34
and 36 is not the creditor but the debtor, and
therefore, according to Article 34, the creditor is
the party who is not entitled to make any
submissions. The right of appeal of the party
against whom enforcement is sought, provided
for in Article 36, lies with the creditor in this
case. As applicant, the maintenance debtor has
the right laid down in the second paragraph of
Article 42, read together with the second
paragraph of Article 26, to request recognition of
part only of an adjusting order. For the
application of Article 44 it has to be determined
whether, as plaintiff, he was granted legal aid in
the original proceedings.
II.  Trusts
1. Problems which the Convention in its
present form would create with
regard to trusts
109. A distinguishing feature of United Kingdom and,
Irish law is the trust. In these two States it
provides the solution to many problems which
Continental legal systems overcome in anNo C  59/106 Official Journal of the European Communities
altogether different way. The basic structure of a
trust may be described as the relationship which
arises when a person or persons (the trustees)
hold rights of any kind for the benefit of one or
more persons (the beneficiaries) or for some
object permitted by law, in such a way that the
real benefit of the property accrues, not to the
trustees, but to the beneficiaries (who may,
however, include one or more of the trustees) or
other object of the trust. Basically two kinds 
legal relationships can be distinguished in a trust;
they may be defined as the internal relationships
and the external relationships.
110. (a) In his external relationships, i.e. in legal
dealings with persons who are not beneficiaries of
the trust, the trustee acts like any other owner of
property. He can dispose of and acquire rights,
enter into commitments binding on the trust and
acquire rights for its benefit. As far as these acts
are concerned no adjustments to the 1968
Convention are necessary. Its provisions on
jurisdiction are applicable, as in legal dealings
between persons who are not acting as trustees. If
a Belgian lessee of property situated in Belgium
but belonging to an English trust, sues to be
allowed into occupation Article 16 (1) 
applicable irrespective of the fact that the
property belongs to a trust.
111. (b) Problems arise in connection with the
internal relationships of a trust, i.e. as between
the trustees themselves, between persons claiming
the status of trustees and, above all, between
trustees on the one hand and the beneficiaries of
a trust on the other. Disputes may occur among a
number of persons as to who has been properly
appointed as a trustee; among a number of
trustees doubts may arise as to the extent of their
respective rights to one another; there may be
disputes between the trustees and the
beneficiaries as to the rights of the latter to or in
connection with the trust property, as to whether
for example, the trustee is obliged to hand over
assets to a child beneficiary of the trust after the
child has attained a certain age. Disputes may
also arise between the settlor and other parties
involved in the trust.
112. The internal relationships of a trust are not
necessarily covered by the 1968 Convention.
They are excluded from its scope when the trust
deals with one of the matters referred to in the
second paragraph of Article 1. Thus as a legal
institution the trust plays a significant role in
connection with the law of succession. If a trust
has been established by a will, disputes arising
from the internal relationships are outside the
scope of the 1968 Convention (see paragraph
52). The same applies when a trustee is appointed
in bankruptcy proceedings; he would correspond to  liquidator ('Konkursverwalter
Continental legal systems.
113. Where the 1968 Convention is applicable to the
internal relationships of a trust, its provisions on
jurisdiction were in their original form not always
well adapted to this legal institution. To base
jurisdiction on the domicile of the defendant
trustee would not be appropriate in trust matters.
trust has no legal personality as such. If
however, an action is brought against a defendant
in his capacity as trustee, his domicile would not
necessarily be a suitable basis for determining
jurisdiction. If a person leaves the United
Kingdom to go to Corsica, it is right and proper
that, in the absence of any special jurisdiction
claims directed against him personally should be
brought only before Corsican courts. If, however
he is a sole or joint trustee or co-trustee of trust
property situated in the United Kingdom and
hitherto administered there, the beneficiaries and
the other trustees cannot be expected to seek
redress in a Corsican court.
Moreover the legal relationships between
trustees  inter se and between the trustees and the
beneficiaries, are not of a contractual nature; in
most cases, the trustees are not even authorized
to conclude agreements conferring jurisdiction by
consent. Jurisdiction for actions arising from the
internal relationships of a trust can be based
therefore, neither on Article 5 (1) nor  as a rule
on agreements conferring jurisdiction by
consent pursuant to Article 17. To overcome this
difficulty simply by amending the 1968
Convention so as to allow a settlor to stipulate
which courts are to have jurisdiction would only
partly solve the problem. Such an amendment
would not include already existing trusts, and the
most suitable jurisdiction for possible disputes
cannot always be foreseen when creating a trust.
2. The solution proposed
114. (a)The solution proposed in the new paragraph(6)
of Article 5 is based on the argument that trustsOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C  59/107
even though they have no legal personality, may
be said to have a geographical centre of
operation. This would fulfil functions similar to
those fulfilled by the 'seat' of  business
associations without legal personality. It is true
that United Kingdom and Irish law have so far
provided only a tentative definition of such a
central point of a trust. However, the concept of
the domicile of a trust is not, at present
unknown in legal practice and theory (32). In his
manual on Private International Law the Scottish
Professor Anton gives the following
definition (33
The domicile of a trust is thought to be
basically a matter depending upon the wishes
of a truster and his expressed intentions will
usually be conclusive. In their absence the
truster s intentions will be inferred from such
circumstances as the administrative centre of
the trust, the place of residence of the
trustees, the situs of the assets of the trust, the
nature of the trust purposes and the place
where these are to be fulfilled.
No doubt these notions about the domicile of a
trust were developed mainly for the purpose of
determining the legal system to be applied
usually either English or Scottish law. The
principal characteristics of 'domicile' so defined
and some of the factors on which it is based
would also justify making it the basis for
founding jurisdiction. The proposed new
provision does not, strictly speaking, create a
special jurisdiction. It covers only a very limited
number of cases and is, therefore, added to
Article 5 rather than to Article 2. For the
non-exclusive character of the new provision see
paragraph 118.
115. (b) The following are some detailed comments
on the Working Party s proposal (see paragraph
181).
116. The concepts 'trust'
, '
trustee' and 'domicile' have
not been translated into the other Community
languages, since they relate to a distinctive feature
of United Kingdom and Irish law. However, the
Member States can give a more detailed
definition of the concept of a trust in their
national language in their legislation
implementing the Accession Convention.
117. The phrase 'created by the operation of a statute
or by a written instrument, or created orally and
evidenced in writing is intended to indicate
clearly that the new rules on jurisdiction apply
only to cases in which under United Kingdom or
Irish law a trust has been expressly constituted
or for which provision is made by Statute. This is
important, because these legal systems solve
many problems with which Continental systems
have to deal in a completely different way, by
means of so-called 'constructive' or 'implied'
trusts. Where the latter are involved, the new
Article 5 (6) is not applicable, as for instance
where, after conclusion of a contract of sale, but
prior to the transfer of title, the vendor is treated
as holding the property on trust for the purchaser
(see paragraph 172). Trusts resulting from the
operation of a statutory provision are unlikely to
fall within the scope of the 1968 Convention.
Since in the United Kingdom, for example,
children cannot own real property, a trust in their
favour arises by operation of statute, if the
circumstances are such that adult persons would
have acquired ownership.
118. It should be noted that the new provision is not
exclusive. It merely establishes an additional
jurisdiction. The trustee who has gone to Corsica
(see paragraph 113) can also be sued in the courts
there. However, a settlor would be free to
stipulate an exclusive jurisdiction (see paragraph
174).
119. If proceedings are brought in a Contracting State
relating to a trust which is subject to a foreign
legal system, the question arises as to which law
determines the domicile of that trust. The new
version of Article 53 proposes the same criterion
as that adopted in the 1968 Convention for
ascertaining the 'seat' of a company. As far as the
legal systems of England and Wales, Scotland
Northern Ireland and Ireland are concerned
application of this provision should present no
, serious difficulty. There are at present no rules of
private international law in the legal systems of
the Continental Member States of the
Community for determining the domicile of a
trust. The courts of those States will have to
evolve such rules to enable them to apply the
trust provisions of the 1968 Convention. Two
possibilities exist. It could be contended that the
domicile of a trust should be determined by theNo C  59/108 Official Journal of the European Communities
legal system to which the trust is subject. One
could, however, also contend that the court
concerned should decide the issue in accordance
with its own  lex fori  which would have to evolve
its own appropriate criteria.
recognized maritime claim it would 
unreasonable to expect the creditor to seek a
decision on his claim before the courts of the
shipowner domicile. For this reason the
Working Party gave lengthy consideration to the
possible inclusion of  special section on
admiralty jurisdiction in Title II. Article 36 of the
Accession Convention is derived from an earlier
draft prepared for that purpose (see paragraph
131). Parallel negotiations on Article 57 of the
1968 Convention did, however lead to a
generally acceptable interpretation which will
enable States party to a Convention on maritime
law to assume jurisdiction on any particular
matter dealt with in that Convention, even in
respect of persons domiciled in a Community
State which is not a party to that Convention (see
paragraph 236  et seq.
). 
Furthermore all
delegations are in support of a Joint Declaration
urging the Community States to accede to the
most important of all the Conventions on
maritime law, namely the Brussels Convention of
10 May 1952 (see paragraph 238). The Working
Party, confident that this Joint Declaration will
be adopted and implemented, finally dropped its
plans for a section dealing with admiralty
jurisdiction. This would also avoid interfering
with the general principles of the 1968
Convention, and maintain a clear dividing line
between its scope and that of other Conventions.
120. In principle, the exclusive jurisdictions provided
for by Article 16 take priority over the new
Article 5 (6). However, it is not easy to establish
the' precise extent of that priority.
In legal disputes arISIng from internal trust
relationships, the legal relations referred to in the
provisions in question usually play only 
incidental role, if any. The trustee requires court
approval for certain acts of management. Even
where the management of immovable property is
concerned, any such applications to the court do
not affect the proprietary rights of the trustee, but
only his fiduciary obligations under the trust.
Article 16 (1) does not apply. One could
however, envisage a dispute arising between two
people as to which of them was trustee of certain
property. If one of them instituted proceedings
against the other in a German court claiming the
cancellation of the entry in the land register
showing the defendant as the owner of the
property and the substitution of an entry showing
the plaintiff as the true owner, there can be no
doubt that, under Article 16 (1) or (3), the
German court would have exclusive jurisdiction.
However, if a declaration is sought that 
particular person is a trustee of a particular trust
which includes certain property, Article 16 (1)
does not become applicable merely because that
property includes immovable property.
Two issues remain outstanding, however, since
they are not fully covered by the Brussels
Conventions of 1952 and 1957: jurisdiction in
the event of the arrest of salvaged cargo or freight
(the new Article 5 (7)) (1) and actions for
limitation of liability in maritime matters (the
new Article 6a) (2). Moreover, until Denmark and
Ireland accede to the Brussels Arrest Convention
of 10 May 1952, transitional provisions had also
to be introduced (3). Finally, a particularity
affecting only Denmark and Ireland (4) still
remained to be settled.
III.  Admiralty jurisdiction
121. The exercise of jurisdiction in maritime matters
has traditionally played a far greater role in the
United Kingdom than in the Continental States of
the Community. The scope of the international
competence of the courts, as it has been
developed in the United Kingdom, has become of
worldwide significance for admiralty jurisdiction.
This factor is reflected not least in the Brussels
Conventions of 1952 and 1957 (see paragraph
238  et seq.
). 
It would have been inappropriate to
limit the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction to the
basis of jurisdiction included in the 1968
Convention in its original form. If a ship is
arrested in a State because of an internationally
1. Jurisdiction in connection with the
arrest of salvaged cargo or freight
122. (a) The Brussels Convention of 1952 allows a
claimant,  inter alia to invoke the jurisdiction of a
State in which  ship has been arrested on
account of a salvage claim (Article 7 (1) (b)).
Implicit in this provision is a rule of substantive
law. A claim to remuneration for salvage entitlesOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C  59/109
the salvage firm to a maritime lien on the ship. A
similar lien in favour of a salvage firm can also
exist on the cargo; this can be of some economic
importance, if it is the cargo rather than the ship
which was salvaged, or if the salvaged ship is so
badly damaged that its value is less than the cost
of the salvage operation. The value of the cargo
of a modern supertanker c,!n amount to a
considerable sum. Finally, prior rights can also
arise in regard to freight. If freight is payable
solely in the event of the safe arrival of the cargo
at the place of destination, it is appropriate that
the salvage firm should have a prior right to be
satisfied out of the claim to freight which was
preserved due to the salvage of the cargo.
Accordingly United Kingdom law provides that a
salvage firm may apply for the arrest of the
salvaged cargo of' the freight claim preserved due
to its intervention and may also apply to the
court concerned for a final decision on its claims
to remuneration for salvage. Jurisdiction of this
kind is similar in scope to the provisions of
Article 7 of the Brussels Convention of 1952. As
there is no other Convention on the arrest of
salvaged cargo and freight which would remain
applicable under Article 57, the United Kingdom
would, on acceding to the 1968 Convention, have
suffered an unacceptable loss of jurisdiction if a
special provision had not been introduced.
123. (b) The proposed solution applies the underlying
principle of Article 7 of the Brussels Convention
of 1952 to jurisdiction after the arrest of salvaged
cargo or freight claims.
Under Article 24 of the 1968 Convention, there is
no limitation on national laws wIth regard to the
granting of provisional legal safeguards including
arrest. However, they could not provide that
arrest, whether authorized or effected, should
suffice to found jurisdiction as to the substance of
the matter. The exception introduced in Article 5
(7) (a) is confined to arrest to safeguard a salvage
claim.
Article 5 (7) (b) introduces an extension of
jurisdiction not expressly modelled on the
Brussels Convention of 1952. It is a result of
practical experience. After salvage operations 
whether involving a ship, cargo or freight 
arrest is sometimes ordered, but not actually
carried into effect, because bailor other security
has been provided. This must be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the arresting court to
decide also on the substance of the matter.
The object . of the prOVlSlOn is to confer
jurisdiction only with regard to those claims
which are secured by a maritime lien. If the
owner of a ship in difficulties has concluded a
contract for its salvage, as his contract with the
cargo owner frequently obliges him to do, any
disputes arising from the former contract will not
be governed by this provision.
2. Jurisdiction to order a limitation of
liability
124. It is not easy to say precisely how the app~ication
of Article 57 of the 1968 Convention links up
with that of the International Convention of 10
October 1957 relating to the limitation of the
liability of owners of seagoing ships (34) (see end
of paragraph 128) and with relevant national
laws. The latter Convention contains no express
provisions directly affecting international
jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments. The
Working Party did not consider that it was its
task to deal systematically with the issues raised
by that Convention and to devise proposals for
solving them. It would, however, be particularly
unfortunate in certain respects if the jurisdictional
lacunae of the 1957 Convention on the limitation
of liability were carried over into the 1968
Convention and were supplemented 
accordance with the general provisions on
jurisdiction of that Convention.
A distinction needs to be drawn between three
differing aspects arising in connection with the
limitation of liability in matters of maritime law.
First, a procedure exists for setting up and
allocating the liability fund. Secondly, the
entitlement to damages against the shipowner
must be judicially determined. Finally, and
distinct from both, there is the assessment of
limitation of liability regarding a given claim.No C 59/110 Official Journal of the European Communities
The procedural details giving effect to these three
aspects vary in the different legal systems of the
Community.
125. Under one system, which is followed in particular
in the United Kingdom, limitation of liability
necessitates an action against one of the claimants
either by way of originating proceedings or, if
an action has already been brought against the
shipowner, as a counterclaim. The liability fund
is set up at the court dealing with the limitation
of liability issue, and other claimants must also
lodge their claims with the same court.
126. Under the system obtaining in Germany, for
example proceedings for the limitation of
liability are started not by means of an action
brought against a claimant, but by a simple
application which is not directed 'against' any
person, and which leads to the setting up of the
fund.
If the application is successful, all claimants must
lodge their claims with that court. If any disputes
arise about the validity of any of the claims
lodged, they have to be dealt with by special
proceedings taking the form of an action by the
claimant against the fund administrator, creditor
or shipowner contesting the claim. Under this
system an independent action by the shipowner
against the claimant in connection with limitation
of liability is also possible. Such an action leads
not to the setting up of a liability fund or to an
immediately effective limitation of liability, but
merely establishes whether liability is subject to
potential limitation, in case of future proceedings
to assess the extent of such liability.
127. The new Article 6a does not apply to an action
by a claimant against the shipowner, fund
administrator or other competing claimants, nor
to the collective proceedings tor creating and
allocating the liability fund, but only to the
independent action brought by  shipowner
against a claimant (a). Otherwise the present
provisions of the 1968 Convention which are
relevant to limitation of maritime liability apply
(b ).
128. (a) The actual or potential limitation of the
liability of a shipowner can, however, in all legal
systems of the Community be used otherwise
than as a defence. If a shipowner anticipates a
liability claim, it may be in his interest to take the
initiative by asking for a declaration that he has
only limited or potentially limited liability for the
claim. In that case he can choose from one of the
jurisdictions which are competent by virtue of
, Articles 2 to 6. According to these provisions, he
cannot bring an action in the courts of his
domicile. Since, powever, he could be sued in
those courts, it would be desirable also to allow
him to have recourse to this jurisdiction. It is the
purpose of Article 6a to provide for this.
Moreover, apart from the Brussels Convention of
1952, this is the only jurisdiction where the
shipowner could reasonably concentrate all
actions affecting limitation of his liability. The
result for English law (see paragraph 125) is that
the fund can be set up and allocated by that same
court. In addition, Article 6a makes it clear that
proceedings for limitation of liability can also be
brought by the shipowner in any other court
which has jurisdiction over the claim. It also
enables national legislations to give jurisdiction to
a court within their territory other than the court
which would normally have jurisdiction.
129. (b) For proceedings concerning the validity as
such of a claim against a shipowner, Articles 2 to
6 are exclusively applicable.
In addition, Article 22 is always applicable. If
proceedings to limit liability have been brought in
one State, a court in another State which has
before it an application to establish or to limit
liability may stay the proceedings or even decline
jurisdiction.
130. (c) A clear distinction must be drawn between the
question of jurisdiction and the question which
substantive law on limitation of liability is to be
applied. This need not be the law of the State
whose courts have jurisdiction for assessing the
limitation of liability. The law applicable for the
limitation of liability also defines more precisely
the type of case in which limitation of liability
can be claimed at all.131. 3. Transitional provisions
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All the delegations hope that Denmark and
Ireland will accede to the Brussels Convention of
10 May 1952 (see paragraph 121). This will
however, naturally take some time, and it is
reasonable to allow a transitional period of three
years after the entry into force of the Accession
Convention. It would be harsh if, within that
period, in the two States concerned jurisdiction in
maritime matters were to be limited to what is
authorized under the terms of Articles 2 to 6a.
Article 36 of the Accession Convention therefore
contains transitional provisions in favour of those
States. These provisions correspond, apart from
variations in the drafting, to the provisions which
the Working Party originally proposed to
recommend for the special section on maritime
law as general rules of jurisdiction regarding the
arrest of seagoing ships. In preparing these
provisions the Working Party drew heavily, in
fact almost exclusively, on the rules of the 1952
Brussels Convention relating to the arrest of
seagoing ships (see paragraph 121).
Since they are temporary, the transitional
provisions do not merit detailed comments on
how they differ from the text of that Convention.
132. 4. Disputes between a shipmaster and
crew members
The new Article Vb of the Protocol annexed to
the 1968 Convention is based on a request by
Denmark founded on Danish tradition. This has
become part of the Danish Seamen s Law No 420
of 18 June 1973 which states that disputes
between a crew member and a shipmaster of a
Danish vessel may not be brought before foreign
courts. The same principle is also embodied in
some consular conventions between Denmark
and other States. Following a specific request
from the Irish delegation, the scope of this
provision has also been extended to Irish ships.
IV.  Other special matters
133. 1. Jurisdiction based on the place of
performance
In the course of the negotiations it emerged that
the French and Dutch texts of Article 5 (1) were
less specific than the German and Italian texts on
the question of the designation of the obligation.
The former could be misinterpreted as including
other contractual obligations than those which
were the subject of the legal proceedings in
question. The revised versions of the French
and Dutch texts should clear up this misunder-
standing (35
134. Jurisdiction in matters relating to
tort
Article 5 (3) deals with the special tort
jurisdiction. It presupposes that the wrongful act
has already been committed and refers to the
place where the harmful event has occurred. The
legal systems of some States provide for
preventive injunctions in matters relating to tort.
This applies, for example, in cases where it 
desired to prevent the publication of a libel or the
sale of goods which have been manufactured or
put on the market in breach of the law on patents
or industrial property rights. In particular the
laws of the United Kingdom and Germany
provide for measures of this nature. No doubt
Article 24 is applicable when courts have an
application for provisional protective measures
before them, even if their decision has, in
practice, final effect. There is much to be said for
the proposition that the courts specified in Article
5 (3) should also have jurisdiction in proceedings
whose main object is to prevent the imminent
commission of a tort.
135. 3. Third party proceedings and claims
for redress
In Article 6 (2), the term ' third party proceedings
relates to a legal institution which is common to
the legal systems of all the original Member
States, with the exception of Germany. However
a jurisdictional basis which rests solely on the
capacity of a third party to be joined as such in
the proceedings cannot exist by itself. It must
necessarily be supplemented by legal criteria
which determine which parties may in which
capacity and for what purpose be joined in legal
proceedings. Thus the provisions already existing
, or which may in future be introduced into, the
legal systems of the new Member States with
reference to the joining of third parties in legal
proceedings, remain unaffected by the 1968
Convention.Section 3
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Jurisdiction  in  insurance matters
136. The accession of the United Kingdom introduced
a totally new dimension to the insurance business
as it had been practised hitherto within the
European Community. Lloyds of London has a
substantial share of the market in the
international insurance of large risks (36
In . view of this situation the United Kingdom
requested a number of adjustments. Its main
argument was that the protection afforded by
Articles 7 to 12 was unnecessary for
policy-holders domiciled outside the Community
(I) or of great economic importance (II). The
United Kingdom expressed concern that, without
an adjustment of the 1968 Convention, insurers
within the Community might be forced to
demand higher premiums than their competitors
in other States.
There were additional reasons for each particular
request for an adjustment. As regards contracts of
insurance with policy-holders domiciled outside
the Community the United Kingdom sought the
unrestricted admissibility of agreements
conferring jurisdiction to be vouchsafed so that
appropriate steps could be taken with regard to
the binding provisions contained in the national
laws of many policy-holders insuring with
English insurers (I). Requests for adjustments also
referred, in conjunction with the other requests
for adjustments, to the scope of Articles 9 and 10
which seemed to require clarification (III). Finally
there were requests for a few minor adjustments
(IV).
The original request of the United Kingdom 
respect of the first two problems, namely that the
insurance matters in question should be excluded
from the scope of Articles 7 to 12 was too
far-reaching in view of the general objectives of
the 1968 Convention. In particular a number of
features of the mandatory rules of jurisdiction
which differ for the various types of insurance
had to be retained (see paragraphs 138, 139 and
143). However, the special structure of the British
insurance market had to be taken into account 
not least so that it would not be driven to resort
systematically to arbitration. Although the 1968
Convention does not restrict the possibility of
settling disputes by arbitration (see paragraph
63), national law should be careful not to
encourage arbitration simply by making
proceedings before national courts too
complicated and uncertain for the parties. The
Working Party therefore endeavoured to extend
the possibilities of conferring jurisdiction by
consent. For the form of such agreements see
paragraph 176.
1.  Insurance contracts taken out by policy-holders
domiciled outside the Community
13 7. As already indicated earlier (see note 36),
insurance contracts with policy-holders domiciled
outside the Community account for a very large
part of the British insurance business. The 1968
Convention does not expressly stipulate to what
extent such contracts may provide for jurisdiction
by consent. Article 4 applies only to the
comparatively rare case where the policy-holder
is the defendant in subsequent proceedings. In so
far as the jurisdiction of courts outside the
Community can be determined by agreement, the
general question arises as to what restrictions
should be imposed on such agreements having
regard to the exclusive jurisdictions provided for
by the 1968 Convention (see paragraphs 148
162  et seq.).  The main problem in this connection
was the jurisdiction under Articles 9 and 
which, it was thought, could not be excluded.
Howeve , this difficulty did not affect insurance
contracts only with policy-holders domiciled
outside the Community. It also affects, more
generally, agreements on jurisdiction which are
authorized by Article 12.
In view of the great importance for the United
Kingdom of the question of agreements on
jurisdiction with poli~y-holders domiciled outside
the Community, it was necessary to incorporate
the admissibility in principle of such agreements
on jurisdiction expressly in the 1968 Convention.
, therefore, a policy-holder domiciled outside
the Community insures a risk in England
exclusive jurisdiction may be conferred by
agreement on English courts as well as on the
courts of the policy-holder s domicile or others.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/113
This basic rule had however to be limited again in
two ways in the new paragraph (4) of Article 12.
Fire  insurance for owners of buildings which
are subject to a charge, usufructuaries
warehouse occupiers, pawnbrokers;
Goods  insurance for pawnbrokers;
138.  Compulsory insurance Pension funds  for theatres cultural
orchestras, district master chimney sweeps
supplementary pension funds for the public
serVIce. Where a statutory obligation exists to take out
insurance no departure from the provisions of
Articles 8 to 11 on compulsory insurance can be
permitted, even if the policy-holder is domiciled
outside the Community. If a person domiciled in
Switzerland owns a motor car which is normally
based in Germany, then the car must, under
German law, be insured against liability. Such an
insurance contract may not contain provisions for
jurisdiction by consent concerning accidents
occurring in Germany.
2. Lander
The possibility of invoking the jurisdiction of
German courts (Article 8) cannot be contractually
excluded. This is so even although the relevant
German law of 5 April 1965 on compulsory
insurance (Bundesgesetzblatt I, page 213) does
not expressly prohibit agreements on jurisdiction.
However, in practice German law prevents the
conclusion of agreements on jurisdiction in the
area of compulsory insurance because approval
of conditions of insurance containing such a
provision would be withheld.
There is no uniformity as between the Lander
of the Federal Republic of Germany, but
there is in particular compulsory fire
insurance for buildings, compulsory pension
funds for agricultural workers, the liberal
professions (doctors, chemists, architects
notaries) and (in Bavaria, for example)
members of the Honourable Company of
Chimney Sweeps and for example, a
supplementary pension fund for workers in
the Free and Hanseatic City of Bremen. In
Bavaria there is compulsory insurance for
livestock intended for slaughter.
BELGIUM:
Motor vehicles, hunting, nuclear installations
accidents at work, transport accidents (for paying
transport by motor vehicles).
Compulsory insurance exists in the following
Member States of the Community for the
following articles, installations activities and
occupations, although this list does not claim to
be complete:
DENMARK:
Motor vehicles
accountants.
dogs nuclear installations
FRANCE:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  (37
Liability  insurance compulsory for owners of
motor vehicles, airline companies, hunters
owners of nuclear installations and handling
of nuclear combustible materials and other
radioactive materials road haulage
accountants and tax advisers, security firms
those responsible for schools for nursing,
infant and child care and midwifery,
automobile experts, notaries professional
organizations those responsible for
development aid, exhibitors, pharamaceutical
firms;
Life  insurance for master chimney sweeps;
Operators of ships and nuclear installations, sand
motor vehicles, operators of cable-cars, chair-lifts
and other such mechanical units, hunting, estate
agents managers of property, syndics of
co-owners, business managers operators of
sports centres, accountants, agricultural mutual
assistance schemes, legal advisers, physical
education establishments and pupils, operators of
dance halls, managers of pharmacists' shops in
the form of a private limited liability company
(S. 1.), blood transfusion centres, architects
motor vehicle experts, farmers.
1. Federal
LUXEMBOURG:
Accident  insurance for airline companies and
usufructuaries;
Motor vehicles hunting and hunting
organizations hotel establishments nuclear
installations, fire and theft insurance for hotel
establishments;No C 59/114 Official Journal of the European Communities
Insurance against the seizure' of livestock 
sla ugh~erhouses.
NETHERLANDS:
Motor vehicles, nuclear installations, tankers.
UNITED KINGDOM:
Third party liability in respect of motor vehicles;
Employers' liability in  respect of accidents at
work;
Insurance of nuclear installations;
Insurance of British registered ships against oil
pollution;
Compulsory insurance scheme for a number of
professions, e. g. solicitors and insurance brokers.
139.  Insurance of immovable property
The second exception referred to at the end of
paragraph 13 7 is particularly designed to ensure
that Article 9 continues to apply even when the
policy-holder is domiciled outside the
Community. However, this exception has further
implications. It prohibits jurisdiction agreements
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts
mentioned in Article 9. This applies even where
the national law of the State in which the
immovable property is situated allows agreements
conferring jurisdiction in such circumstances.
II.  Insurance of large risks, in particular marine and
aviation insurance
140. The United Kingdom s request for special rules
for the insurance of large risks was probably the
most difficult problem for the Working Party.
The request was based on the realization that the
concept of social protection underlying a
restriction on the admissibility of provisions
conferring jurisdiction in insurance matters is no
longer justified where the policy-holders are
powerful undertakings. The problem was one of
finding a suitable demarcation line. Discussions
on the second Directive on insurance had already
revealed the impossibility of taking as criteria
abstract, general factors like company capital or
turnover. The only solution was to examine
which types of, insurance contracts were in
general concluded only by policy-holders who did
not require social protection. On this basis,
special treatment could not be conceded to
industrial insurance as a whole.
Accordingly, the Working Party directed its
attention to the various classes of insurance
connected with the transport industry. In this
area there is an additional justification for special
treatment for agreements on jurisdiction: the
risks insured are highly mobile and ,~p.surance
policies tend to change hands several times in
quick succession. This leads to uncertainty as to
which courts will have jurisdiction and the
difficulties in calculating risks are thereby greatly
increased. On the other hand, there are here, too,
certain areas requiring social protection.
Particular complications were caused by the fact
that there is a well integrated insurance market
for the transport industry. The various types of
risk for different means of transport are usually
covered under one single policy. The British
insurance industry in particular has developed
standard policies which only require for their
completion a notification by the insured that the
means of transport (which can be of many
different types) have set off.
The result of a consideration of all these matters
is the solution which figures in the new
paragraph (5) of Article 12, as supplemented by
Article 12a: agreements on jurisdiction are in
principle to be given special treatment in marine
insurance and in some sectors of aviation
insurance. In the case of insurance of transport by
land alone no exceptional rules of any kind
appeared justified.
In order to avoid difficulties and differences of
interpretation, a list had to be drawn up of the
types of policy for which the admissibility of
agreements on jurisdiction was to be extended.
The idea of referring for this purpose to the list of
classes of insurance appearing in the Annex to the
First Council Directive of 24 July 1973
(731239/EEC)  proved inadequate. The
classification used there took account of the
requirements of State administration of
insurance, and was not directed towards a fair
balancing of private insurance interests. There
was thus no alternative but to draw up a separate
list for the purposes of the 1968 Convention. The
following comments apply to the list and the
classes of insurance not included in it.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/115
141. 1. Article 12 a (1) (a)
This provision applies only to hull insurance and
not to liability insurance. The term ' seagoing
ships' means all vessels intended to travel on the
sea. This includes not only ships in the traditional
sense of the word but also hovercraft, hydrofoils
barges and lighters used at sea. It also covers
floating apparatus which cannot move under its
own power, e.g. oil exploration and extraction
installations which are moved about on water.
Installations firmly moored or to be moored on
the seabed are in any event expressly included in
the text of the provision. The provision also
covers ships in the course of construction, but
only in so far as the damage is the result of a
maritime risk. This is damage caused by the fact
that the ship is on the water and not therefore
damage which occurs in dry-dock or in the
workshops of shipyards.
142. 2. Article 12a (1) (b)
In the same way as (1) (a) covers the value of the
hull of a ship or of an aeroplane, (1) (b) covers
the value of goods destroyed or lost in transit, but
not liability insurance for any loss or damage
caused by those goods. The most important single
decision taken on the provision was the addition
of the words ' consists of or includes . The reason
for this is that goods in transit are frequently not
conveyed by the same means of transport right to
their final destination. There may be a sequence
of journeys by land, sea and air. There would be
unwarranted complications for the insurance
industry in drafting policies and settling claims, if
a fine distinction had always to be drawn as to
the section of transit in which loss or damage had
occurred. Moreover it is often impossible to
ascertain this. One has only to think of container
transport to realize how easily a loss may be
discovered only at the destination. Practical
considerations therefore required that agreements
on jurisdiction be permitted, even where goods
are carried by sea or by air for only part of their
journey. Even if it can be proved that the loss
occurred in the course of transport on land
agreements on jurisdiction permitted by the new
paragraph (5) of Article 12 remain effective. The
provision applies even if the shipment does not
cross any national border.
143. The exception in respect of injury to passengers
and loss of or damage to their baggage, which is
repeated in Article 12a (2) (a) and (b), is justified
by the fact that such persons as a group tend to
have a weaker economic position and less
bargaining power.
144. 3. Art i cl e 12 a (2) (a)
Whether these provisions also cover all liability
arising in connection with the construction
modification and repair , of a ship; whether
therefore the provision includes all liability which
the shipyard incurs towards third parties and
which was caused by the ship; or whether the
expression 'use or operation' has to be construed
more narrowly as applying only to liability
arising in the course of a trial voyage  all these
are questions of interpretation which still await
an answer. The exception for compulsory aircraft
insurance is intended to leave the Member States
free to provide for such protection as they
consider necessary for the policy-holder and for
the victim.
145. 4. Article 12a (2) (b)
As there is no reason to treat combined
transport any differently for liability insurance
than for hull insurance, it is equally irrelevant
during which section of the transport the
circumstances causing the liability occurred (see
paragraphs 142 and 143).
146. 5. Article 12a (3)
The most important application of this provision
is stated in the text itself. In the absence of a
provision to the contrary in the charter party, an
air crash would cause the carrier to lose his
entitlement to freight and the owner his
charter-fee from the charterer. Another example
might be loss caused by the late arrival of a ship.
For the rest the notion is the same as that used in
Directive  73/239/EEc.
147. 6. Article 12a (4)
Insurance against ancillary risks is a familiar
practice, especially in United Kingdom insuranceNo C 59/116 Official Journal of the European Communities
contracts. An example would be 'shipowner
disbursements consisting of exceptional
operational costs, e.g. harbour dues accruing
whilst a ship remains disabled. Another example
is insurance against 'increased value, providing
protection against loss arising from the fact that a
destroyed or damaged cargo had increased in
value during transit.
The provision does not require an ancillary risk
to be insured under the same policy as the main
risk to which it relates. The Working Party
therefore deliberately opted for a somewhat
different wording from that in Directive
73/239/EEC  for the ' ancillary risks' referred to in
that Directive. The definition in that Directive
could not be used since it is concerned with a
different subject, the authorization of insurance
undertakings.
148. III.  The remaining scope of Articles  and  1 0
The revised text of Article 12, like the original
text, does not expressly deal with the effect of
agreements on jurisdiction or the special
jurisdictions for insurance matters set out in
Section 3. Nevertheless, the legal position is clear
from the systematic construction of Section 3 of
the 1968 Convention, as amended. Agreements
on jurisdiction cover all legal proceedings
between insurer and policy-holder, even where
the latter wishes, pursuant to the first paragraph
of Article 10, to join the insurer in the court in
which he himself is sued by the injured party.
However jurisdiction clauses in insurance
contracts cannot be binding upon third parties.
The provisions of the second paragraph of Article
10 concerning a direct action by the injured party
are thus not affected by such jurisdiction clauses.
The same is true of the third paragraph of Article
10.
IV.  Other problems of adjustment and clarification in
insurance law
149. 1. Co-insurance
The substantive amendment in the first paragraph
of Article 8 covers jurisdiction where several
co-insurers are parties to a contract of insurance.
What usually happens is that one insurer acts as
leader for the other co-insurers and each of them
underwrites a part of the risk, possibly a very
small part. In such cases, however, there is no
justification for permitting all the insurers
including the leader, to be sued in the courts of
each State in which any one of the many
co-insurers is domiciled. The only additional
international jurisdiction which can be justified
would be one which relates to the circumstances
of the leading insurer. The Working Party
considered at length whether to refer to the
leading insurer s domicile, but the effect of this
would have been that the remaining co-insurers
could be sued there even if the leader was sued
elsewhere. An additional jurisdiction based on the
leading insurer s circumstances is justifiable only
if it leads to a concentration of actions arising out
of an insured event. The new version of the first
paragraph of Article  therefore refers to the
court where proceedings are brought against the
leading insurer. Co-insurers can thus be sued for
their share of the insurance in that court, at the
same time as the leading insurer or subsequently.
However, the provision does not impose an
obligation for proceedings to be concentrated in
one court; there is nothing to prevent a
policy-holder from suing the various co-insurers
in different courts. If the leading insurer has
settled the claim out of court, the policy-holder
must ,bring any action against the other
co-insurers in one of the courts having
jurisdiction under points (1) or (2) of the new
version of the first paragraph of Article 8.
The remaining amendments to the first paragraph
of Article 8 merely rephrase it for the sake of
greater clarity.
150. 2. Insurance agents, the setting up of
branches
There was discussion on the present text of the
second paragraph of Article 8 of the 1968
Convention because its wording might give rise to
the misunderstanding that jurisdiction could be
founded not only on the intervention of an agent
of the insurer, but also on that of an independent
insurance broker of the type common in the
United Kingdom. The discussion revealed that
this provision was unnecessary in view of Article
5 (5). The Working Party therefore changed the
present paragraph three into paragraph two. The
addition of the words 'or other establishment' is
intended merely to ensure consistency between
Article 5 (5) and the third paragraph of the new
Article 13. The latter provision is necessary in
addition to the former in order to prevent Article
4 being applicable.Official Journal of the European Communities No C  5~/117
151. 3. Reinsurance Section 4
Reinsurance contracts cannot be equated with
insurance contracts. Accordingly, Articles 7 to 12
do not apply to reinsurance contracts.
Jurisdiction over consumer contracts
153. I.  Principles
The previous authentic texts o the 1968
Convention use the term 'preneur d'assurance
and the equivalent in German, Italian and Dutch;
the nearest English equivalent of the term proved
to be 'the policy-holder . However, this should
not give rise to the misunderstanding that the
problems arising from a transfer of legal rights
are now any different from those existing before
the accession of the new Member States to the
Convention. The rightful possessor of the policy
document is not always the 'preneur d'assurance
It is of course conceivable that the whole legal
status of the other party to the contract with the
insurer might pass to another person by
inheritance or some other means, in which case
the new party to the contract would become the
preneur d'assurance . However, this case must
be clearly distinguished from the transfer of
individual rights arising out of the contract of
insurance, especially in the form of assignment of
the sum assured to a beneficiary. Such an
assignment may be made in advance and may be
contingent, for instance, upon the occurrence of a
claim. In this event it is conceivable that the
insurance policy might be passed on to the
beneficiary at the same time as the assignment of
the right to the sum assured so that he can claim
his entitlement from the insurer, if the case arises.
The beneficiary would not thereby become the
preneur d'assurance . Hence, where a court
jurisdiction is dependent on individual
characteristics of the ' preneur d'assurance , the
situation remains unchanged as a result of prior
assignment of any claim to the sum assured
which might arise, even if the policy document is
transferred at the same time.
Leaving aside insurance matters the 1968
Convention pays heed to consumer protection
considerations only in one small section, that
dealing with instalment sales and loans. This was
consistent with the law as it then stood in the
original Member States of the Community since it
was in fact at first only in the field of instalment
sales and loans that awareness of the need to
protect the consumer against unfairly worded
contracts became widespread. Since that time
legislation in the Member States of the
Community has become concerned with much
broader-based consumer protection. In particular
there has been a general move in consumer
protection legislation to ensure appropriate
jurisdictions for the consumer. Intolerable
tensions would be bound to develop between
national legislation and the 1968 Convention in
the long run if the Convention did not afford the
consumer much the same protection in the case of
transfrontier contracts as he received under
national legislation. The Working Party therefore
decided to propose that the previous Section 4 of
Title II be extended into a section on jurisdiction
over consumer contracts, establishing at the same
time for future purposes that only final
consumers acting in a private capacity should be
given special protection and not those contracting
in the course of their business to pay by
instalments for goods and services used. The
Working Party was influenced on this last point
by the proceedings in the Court of Justice of the
European Communities in response to a reference
from the French Cour de cassation concerning the
interpretation of ' instalment sales and loans
proceedings which centred on the question of
whether the existing Section 4 of Title II covered
instalment sales contracts concluded by
businessmen (Case  150/77:  Societe Bertrand v.
Paul Ott KG).
152. 4. The term 'policy-holder
For the amendment to Article 12 (3) (' at the time
of conclusion of the contract ), see paragraph 161
(a).
The basic principle underlying the provisions of
the new section is to draw upon ideas emerging
from European Community law as it has evolved
and is currently evolving. Consequently, most of
the existing provisions on instalment sales and
loans have been incorporated in the new section
which also draws on Article 50f the preliminary
draft Convention on the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations. On
points of drafting detail, however, improvements
152. (a) 5. Agreements on jurisdiction be-
tween parties to a contract from
the same StateNo C  59/118 Official Journal of the European Communities
were made on the wording of the preliminary
draft Convention. One substantive change was
necessary, since to accord with the general
structure of the 1968 Convention reference had
to be made to the place where the parties are
domiciled, rather than habitually resident. Details
are as follows:
154. II.  The scope of the new Section
Using .the device of an introductory provision
defining the scope of the Section, the proposal
follows the practice previously adopted at the
beginning of Sections 3 and 4 of Title II.
1. Persons covered
155. The only new point of principle is a provISIOn
governing the persons covered by the section
including in particular the legal definition of the
section central term, the 'consumer . The
substances of the definition is taken from Article
5 of the preliminary draft Convention on the law
applicable to contractual and non-contractual
obligations the most recent version of which was
used by the Working Party. The amendments
made were only drafting improvements.
2. Subject matter covered
156. As regards the subject matter covered by the new
section, a clear distinction is drawn between
instalment sales, including the financing of such
sales, and other consumer contracts. The
consequent effect on the precedence of the
provisions of Sections 3 and  is as follows:
Section 3 is a more specific provision than Section
4 and hence takes precedence over it. A contract
of insurance is not a contract for the supply of
services within the meaning of the 1968
Convention. Within Section 4, the provisions on
instalment sales are more specific than the general
reference to consumer sales in the first paragraph
of Article 13.
157. (a) As in the past, instalment sales are subject to
the special provisions without any further
preconditions. The sole change lies in the
stipulation that the special provisions apply only
where the purchaser is a private consumer. The
rules governing instalment sales also apply
automatically to the legal institution of hire
purchase, which has developed into the
commonest legal form for transacting instalment
sales in the United Kingdom and Ireland. For
reasons which are not material for jurisdiction
purposes, instalment sales in those countries
usually take the form in law of a contract of hire
with an option to purchase for the hirer. In form
the instalments represent the hire fee, whereas in
substance they form the purchase price. At the
end of the prescribed 'hire' period , once all the
prescribed instalments of the 'hire fee' have been
paid, the 'hirer' is entitled to purchase the article
for a nominal price. As the term 'instalment sale
under the continental legal systems by no means
implies that ownership of the article must
necessarily pass to the purchaser at the same time
as physical possession, hire purchase is in practice
tantamount to an instalment sale.
Contracts to finance instalment sales to private
consumers are also subject to the special
provisions without any further preconditions.
Contrary to the legal position obtaining hitherto
the Working Party has made actions arising out
of a loan contract to finance the purchase of
movable property subject to the special provision
even if the loan itself is not repayable by
instalments or if the article is purchased with a
single payment (normally with the funds lent).
Credit contracts are not, moreover, contracts for
the supply of services, so that, apart from point
(2) of the first paragraph of Article 13, the whole
of Section 4 does not apply to such contracts.
Contracts of sale not falling under point (1) of
the first paragraph of Article 13 do not, for
instance, come under point (2) of that paragraph
although Section 4 may be applicable to them
subject to the further conditions contained in
point (3) (see paragraph 158).
158. (b) On the other hand, consumer contracts other
than those referred to in paragraph 157 are
subject to the special provisions only if there is a
sufficiently strong connection with the place
where the consumer is domiciled. In this, the new
provisions once again follow the preliminary
draft Convention on the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations.
Both the conditions referred to in point (3) of the
first paragraph of Article 13-an offer or
advertising in the State of the consumer
domicile, and steps necessary for the conclusion
of the contract taken by the consumer in that
State-must be satisfied. The introductory phrase
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will apply to all consumer contracts, as has until
now been the case only for instalment sales and
for loans repayable by instalments. One
particular consequence of this is that, subject to
the second paragraph of Article 13 , Section 4
does not apply where the defendant is not
domiciled in the EEc.
For further details of what is meant by 'a specific
invitation' or 'advertising' in the State of the
consumer s domicile and by 'the steps necessary
for the conclusion of the contract , see the report
currently being drawn up by Professor Giuliano
on the Convention on the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations.
3. Only a branch agency or other
establishment within the Community
159. The exclusion from the scope of Section 4 of
contracts between consumers and firms domiciled
outside the EEC would not be reasonable where
such firms have a branch, agency or other
establishment within the EEc. Under the national
laws upon which jurisdiction is to be founded in
such cases pursuant to Article 4, it would often
be impossible for the consumer to sue in the
courts which would be guaranteed to have
jurisdiction for his purposes in the case of
contracts with parties domiciled within the EEc.
Insurers with branches agencies or other
establishments in the EEC are treated as regards
jurisdiction in like ~anner to those domiciled
within the Community (Article 8) and  for  the
same reasons the other parties to contracts with
consumers must also be deemed to be domiciled
within the EEC if they have a. branch, agency of
other establishment in the Community. , It is
however, only logical that it should not be
possible to invoke exorbitant jurisdictions against
such parties simply because their head office lies
outside the EEc.
Contracts of transport
160. The last paragraph of Article 13 is again taken
from Article 5 of the preliminary draft
Convention on the law applicable to contractual
and non-contractual obligations. The reason for
leaving contracts of transport out of the scope of
the special consumer protection provisions in the
1968 Convention is that such contracts are
subject under international agreements to special
sets of rules with very considerable ramifications
and the inclusion of those contracts in the 1968
Convention purely for jurisdictional purposes
would merely complicate the legal position.
Moreover, the total exclusion of contracts of
transport from the scope of Section 4 means that
Sections 1 and 2 and hence in particular Article 5
(1) remain applicable.
161. III.  The substance of the provisions of Section 
There are only a few points requiring a brief
explanation of the substance of the new
prOVISIons.
1. Subsequent change of domicile by the
consumer
In substance, the new Article 14 closely follows
the existing Article 14, while extending it to
actions arising from all consumer contracts. The
rearrangement of the text is merely a rewording
due to the availability of a convenient description
for one party to the contract, the 'consumer
which was better placed at the beginning of the
text so as to make it more easily comprehensible.
The Working Party s decision means in substance
that, as in the case with the existing Article 14
the consumer may sue in the courts of his new
State of domicile if he moves to another
Community State after concluding the contract
out of which an action subsequently arises. This
only becomes practical, however, in the case of
the instalment sales and credit contracts referred
to in points (1) and (2) of the first paragraph of
Article 13. For actions arising out' of other
consumer contracts the new Section 4 will in
virtually all cases cease to be applicable if the
consumer transfers his domicile to another State
after conclusion of the contract. This is because
the steps necessary for the conclusion of the
contract will almost always not have been taken
in the new State of domicile. The cross-frontier
advertising requirement also ensures that the
special provisions will in practice not 
applicable to contracts between two persons
neither of whom is acting in a professional or
trading capacity.
2. Agreements on jurisdiction
161a. The new version of Article 15, too is in
substance based on the existing version relating
to instalment sales and loans. The only addition
is intended to make it clear that it is at the time of
conclusion of the contract, and not when
proceedings are subsequently instituted, that the
parties must be domiciled in the same State. ItNo C 59/120 Official Journal of the European Communities
was then necessary to align and clarify Article 12
(3) in the same way.
Although Article 13 is not expressed to be subject to Article 17 the Working Party was
unanimously of the opinion that agreements on
jurisdiction must, in so far as they are permitted
at all, comply with the formal requirements of
Article 17. Since the form of such agreements is
not governed by Section 4, it must be governed
by Article 17.
Section 5
Exclusive jurisdiction
162. The only amendment proposed by the Working
Party to the cases of exclusive jurisdiction
provided for in Article 16 is a technical
amendment in Article V d of the Protocol annexed
to the 1968 Convention, to clarify Article 16 (4).
The Working Party did, however, spend some
time discussing paragraphs (1) and (f) of that
Article. Details of the information supplied to the
new Member States regarding exclusive
jurisdiction in actions relating to the validity of
the constitution of companies or to their
dissolution have already been given elsewhere
(see paragraph 56  et seq.
). 
It is only necessary to
add that a company may have more than one
seat. Where under a legal system it is possible for
a company to have two seats, and it is that
system which, pursuant to Article 53 of the 1968
Convention, is to determine the seat of the
company, the existence of two seats has to be
accepted. It is then open to the plaintiff to choose
which of the two seats he will use to base the
jurisdiction of the court for his action. Finally, it
should be pointed out that Article 16 (2) also
applies to partnerships established under United
Kingdom and Irish law (see paragraph 55).
Thus essentially the only exclusive jurisdiction
left to be dealt with more fully here is that in
respect of actions relating to rights  in rem  , or
tenancies of, immovable property. There were
five problems with regard to which the new
Member States had requested explanations.
163. There was no difficulty in clarifying that actions
for damages based on infringement of rights 
rem  or in damage to property in which rights 
rem  exist do not fall within the scope of Article
16 (1). In that context the existence and content
of such rights  in rem usually rights of ownership,
are only of marginal significance.
164. The Working Party was unable to agree whether
actions concerned only with rent, i.e. dealing
simply with the recovery of a debt, are excluded
from the scope of Article 16 (1) as, according
to the Jenard report, was the opinion of
the Committee which drafted the 1968
Convention (38). However the underlying
principle of the provision quite clearly does not
require its application to short-term agreements
for use and occupation such as, for example
holiday accommodation.
165. Two of the three remaining problems which the
Working Party examined relate to the differences
between the law of immovable property on the
continent and the corresponding law in the
Unitea Kingdom and Ireland; they require
therefore somewhat more detailed comments.
There is, first, the question what are rights  in rem
(1) within the meaning of Article 16 (1), and
secondly, the problem of disputes arising in
connection with the transfer of immovable
property (2). Certain other problems emerged as
a result of developments which have taken place
in the meantime in international patent law (3).
1. Rights 'in rem in immovable
property in the Member States of the
Community
166. (a) The concept of a right  in rem  as distinct
from a right  in personam  is common to the
legal systems of the original Member States of the
EEC, even though the distinction does not appear
everywhere with the same clarity.
A right  in personam  can only be claimed against
a particular person; thus only the purchaser is
obliged to pay the purchase price and only the
lessor of an article is obliged to permit its use.
A right  in rem on the other hand, is available
against the whole world. The most important
legal consequence flowing from the nature of a
right  in rem  is that its owner is entitled toOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/121
demand that the thing in which it exists be given
up by anyone not enjoying a prior right.
In the legal systems of all the original Member
States of the EEC without exception, there are
only a restricted number of rights  in rem even
though they do not rigidly apply the principle.
Some rights  in rem  are defined only in outline
with freedom for the parties to agree the details.
The typical rights  in rem  are listed under easily
identifiable heads of the civil law, which in all six
countries is codified (39). In addition, a few rights
in rem  are included in some special laws, the
most important of which are those on the
co-ownership of real property. Apart from
ownership as the most comprehensive right 
rem a distinction can be made between certain
rights of enjoyment and certain priority rights to
secure liabilities. All the legal systems know the
concept of usufruct, which confers extensive
rights to enjoyment of a property. More restricted
rights of enjoyment can also exist in these legal
systems in various ways.
167. (b) At first glance there appears to be in United
Kingdom and Irish law too a small, strictly
circumscribed group of statutory rights
corresponding to the Continental rights  in rem.
However, the position is more complicated
because these legal systems distinguish between
law and equity.
In this connection it has always to be borne in
mind that equity also constitutes law and not
something merely akin to fairness lying outside
the concept of law. As a consequence of these
special concepts of law and equity in the United
Kingdom and in Ireland, equitable interests can
exist in immovable property in addition to the
legal rights.
In the United Kingdom the system of legal rights
has its origin in the idea that all land belongs to
the Crown and that the citizen can only have
limited rights in immovable property. This is the
reason why the term 'ownership' does not appear
in the law of immovable property. However, the
estate in fee simple absolute in possession is
equivalent to full ownership under the
Continental legal systems. In addition the Law of
property Act 1925 provides for full ownership for
a limited period of time ('term of years absolute
The same Act limits restricted rights in
immovable property ('interests or charges in or
over land') to five. All the others are equitable
interests, whose number and content are not
limited by the Act. Equitable interests are not
however, merely the equivalent of personal rights
on the Continent. Some can be registered and
then, like legal rights, have universal effect, even
against purchasers in good faith. Even if not
registered t~ey operate in principle against all the
world; only purchasers in good faith who had no
knowledge of them are protected in such a
case (40). If the owner of an estate in fee simple
absolute in possession grants another person a
right of way over his property for the period of
that person s life, this cannot amount to a legal
right. It can only be an equitable interest, though
capable of registration (41). Equitable interests
can thus fulfil the same functions as rights  in rem
under the Continental legal systems, in which
case they must be treated as such under Article 16
(1). There is no limit to the number of such
interests. The granting of equitable interests is on
the contrary the method used for achieving any
number of subdivisions of proprietary rights (42
168. (c) If an action relating to immovable property is
brought in a particular State and the question
whether the action is concerned with a right 
rem  within the meaning of Article 16 (1) arises
the answer can hardly be derived from any law
other than that of the  situs.
2. Actions 
obligations to
property
connection wi th
transfer immovable
169. The legal systems of the original and the new
Member States of the Community also differ as
regards the manner in which ownership of
immovable property is transferred on sale.
Admittedly the legal position even within the
original Member States differs in this respect.
170. (a) German law distinguishes most clearly
between the transfer itself and the contract of sale
(or other contract designed to bring about 
transfer). The legal position in the case of
immovable property is no different from that
obtaining in the case of movable property. The
transfer is a special type of legal transaction
which in the case of immovable property is called
Auflassung (conveyance) and which even
between the parties becomes effective only on
entry in the land register. Where a purchaser of
German immovable property brings proceedings
on the basis of, a contract for sale of immovable
property which is governed by German law, theNo C  59/122 Official Journal of the European Communities
subject matter of such proceedings is never a right
in rem  in the property. The only matter in issue is
the defendant s personal obligation to carry out
all acts necessary to transfer and hand over the
property. If one of the parties fails to fulfil its
obligations under a contract for sale of
immovable property, the remedy in German law
is not a court order for rescission, but a claim for
damages and the right to rescind the contract.
Admittedly it is possible with the vendor
consent to protect the contractual claim for a
transfer of ownership by means of a caution in
the land register. In that case the claim has, as
against third parties, effects which normally oaly
attach to a right  in rem.  The consequence for
German domestic law is that nowadays rights
secured by such a caution may be claimed against
third parties in the jurisdiction competent to deal
with the property concerned (43). However, any
proceedings for a transfer of ownership against
the vendor himself would remain an action based
on a personal obligation.
171. (b) Under French, Belgian and Luxembourg law
which is largely followed by Italian law, the
ownership, at any rate as between the parties
passes to the purchaser as soon as the contract of
sale is concluded, just as it does in the case of
movable property, unless the parties have agreed
a later date (see e.g. Article 711 and 1583 of the
French Civil Code and Article 1376 of the Italian
Civil Code). The purchaser need only enter the
transfer of ownership in the land register
transcription ) to acquire a legal title which is
also effective against third parties. For the
purchaser to bring proceedings for performance
of the contract is therefore normally equivalent to
a claim that the property be handed over him.
Admittedly this claim is based not only on the
obligation which the vendor undertook by the
contract of sale, but also on ownership which at
that point has already passed to the purchaser.
This means that the claim for handing over the
property has as its basis both  personal
obligation and a right  in rem.  The system of
remedies which is available in the event of one
party to a contract not complying with its
obligations is fully in accordance with this.
Accordingly, French domestic law has treated
such actions as a 'matiere mixte' and given the
plaintiff the right to choose between the
jurisdiction applicable to the right  in rem  and the
jurisdiction applicable to the personal obligation
arising from the contract, i.e. the law of the
defendant's domicile or of the place of
performance of the contract (44
The 1968 Convention does not deal with this
problem. It would seem that the personal aspect
of such claims predominates and Article 16 (1) is
inapplicable.
172. (c) In the United Kingdom ownership passes on
the conclusion of a contract of sale only in the
case of movable property. In the case of a sale of
immovable property the transfer of ownership
follows the conclusion of the contract of sale and
is effected by means of a separate document, the
conveyance. If necessary, the purchaser has 
bring an action for all necessary acts to be
performed by the vendor. However, except in
Scotlan , in contrast with German law, the
purchaser rights prior to the transfer of
ownership are not limited to a personal claim
against the vendor. In fact the purchaser has an
equitable interest (see paragraph 167) in the
property which provided the contract 
protected by a notice on the Land Register, is also
effective against third parties. Admittedly the new
paragraph (6) of Article. 5 does not apply (see
paragraph 114  et seq.
), 
because a contract of sale
does not create a trust within the meaning of
Article 5 (6), even if it is in writing. It is only in
one respect that a purchaser s equitable interest
does not place him i~' as strong a position as the
French owner of immovable property prior to
transcription' (see paragraph 171): the vendor
cooperation, is still required to make the new
owner s legal title fully effective.
This legal position would justify application of
the exclusive jurisdiction referred to in Article 16
(1) even less than the corresponding position
under French law. The common law has
developed the conc~pt of equitable interests so as
to confer on parties to an agreement which
originally gave them nothing more than merely
personal rights a certain protection as against
third parties not acting in good faith. As against
the other party to the contract the claim remains
purely a personal one, as does a claim, under
German law, to transfer of ownership (see
paragraph 170) secured by a caution in the Land
Register. In Scotland contracts in favour of a
third party are enforceable by that party  (jus
quaesitum tertii).
Actions based on contracts for the transfer of
ownership or other rights  in rem  affecting
immovable property do not therefore have as
their object rights  ' rem.  Accordingly they may
also be brought before courts outside the United
Kingdom. Admittedly, care will have to 
exercised in that case to ensure that the plaintiff
clearly specifies the acts to be done by the
defendant so that the transfer of ownership
(governed by United Kingdom law) does indeed
become effective.173. 3. J urisdiciion 
patent disputes
connection with
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Since the 1968 Convention entered into force, two
Conventions on patents have been signed which
are of the greatest international importance. The
Munich Convention on the grant of European
patents was signed on 5 October 1973 and the
Luxembourg Convention for the European patent
for the common market was signed on 
December 1975. The purpose of the Munich
Convention is to introduce a common patent
application procedure for the Contracting States,
though the patent subsequently granted is
national in scale. It is valid for one or more
States , its substance in each case being basically
that of a corresponding patent granted nationally.
The aim of the Luxembourg Convention is to
institute in addition a patent granted  ab initio  for
all States of the Community in a standard manner
and with the same substance based on
Community law; such a patent necessarily
remains valid or expires uniformly throughout
the EEc.
Both instruments contain specific provisions on
jurisdiction which take precedence over the 1968
Convention. However, the special jurisdiction
provisions relate only to specific matters, such as
applications for the revocation of patents
pursuant to the Luxembourg Convention. Article
16 (4) of the 1968 Convention remains relevant
for actions for which no specific provision is
made. In the case of European patents under the
Munich Convention it is conceivable that this
provision might be construed as meaning that
actions must be brought in the State in which the
patent was applied for and not in the State for
which it is valid and in which it is challenged.
The new Arti~le V d of the Protocol annexed to
the 1968 Convention is designed to prevent this
interpretation and ensure that only the courts of
the State in which the patent is valid have
jurisdiction, unless the Munich Convention itself
lays down special provisions.
Clearly, such a prOViSIOn cannot cover a
Community patent. under the Luxembourg
Convention, since the governing principle is that
the patent is granted, not for a given State, but
for all the Member States of the EEc. Hence the
exception at the end of the new provision.
However, even in the area covered by the
Luxembourg Convention patents valid for one or
more, but not all, States of the Community are
possible. Article 86 of that Convention allows
this for a transitional period to which no term
has yet been set. Where the applicant for a patent
takes up the option available to him under this
provision and applies for a patent for one 
more, but not all, States of the EEC, the patent is
not a Community patent even though it comes
under some of the provisions of the Luxembourg
Convention but merely a patent granted for one
or more States. Accordingly, the courts of that
State have exclusive jurisdiction under Article
Vd of the Protocol annexed to the 1968
Convention. The same is true for any case in
which a national patent is granted in response to
an international application ' e.g. under the
Patent cooperation Treaty opened for signature at
Washington on 19 June 1970.
It only remains to be made clear that Article 16
(4) of the 1968 Convention and the new Article
V d of the Protocol annexed to the Convention
also cover actions which national legislation
allows to be brought at the patent application
stage, so as to reduce the risk of a patent being
granted, and the correctness of the grant being
subsequently challenged.
Section 6
Jurisdiction by consent (45
174. Article 17, applying as it does only if the
transaction in question is international in
character (see paragraph 21), which the mere fact
of choosing a court in a particular State is by no
means sufficient to establish, presented the
Working Party with four problems. First, account
had to be taken of the practice of courts in the
United Kingdom (excluding Scotland) and Ireland
of deducing from the choice of law to govern the
main issue an agreement as to the courts having
jurisdiction. Secondly, there was the problem
previously ignored by the 1968 Convention, of
agreements conferring jurisdiction upon a court
outside the Community or agreements' conferring
jurisdiction upon courts \yithin the Community
by two parties both domiciled outside the
Community. Thirdly, special rules had to 
made for provisions in trusts. And finally, the
Working Party had to consider whether it was
reasonable to let Article 17 stand in view of the
interpretation which had been placed upon it by
the Court of Justice of the European
Communites. It should be repeated (see
paragraph 22) that the existence of an agreement
conferring jurisdiction on a court other than the
court seised of the proceedings is one of the
points to be taken into account by the court of its
own motion.No C  59/124 Official Journal of the European Communities
1. Choice-of-Iaw clause
national jurisdiction
and In ter-
175. Nowhere in the 1968 Convention is there
recognition of a connection be~ween the law
applicable to  particular issue and the
international jurisdiction of the courts over that
issue. However, persons who, relying on the
practice of United Kingdom or Irish courts, have
agreed on choice-of-Iaw clauses before the entry
into force of the Accession Convention, are
entitled to expect protection. This explains the
transitional provision contained in Article 35
of the proposed Accession Convention. The
term ' entry into force' within the meaning of this
provision refers to the date on which the
Accession Convention comes into effect in the
State in question. For the various systems of law
applying in the United Kingdom, see paragraph
11.
2. Agreements conferring jurisdiction
on courts outside the Communit'v
176. (a) In cases where parties agree to bring their
disputes before the courts of a State which is not
a party to the 1968 Convention there is obviously
nothing in the 1968 Convention to prevent such
courts from declaring themselves competent, if
their law recognizes the validity of such an
agreement. The only question is whether and, if
so, in what form such agreements are capable of
depriving Community courts of jurisdiction
which is stated by the 1968 Convention to be
exclusive or concurrent. There is nothing in the
1968 Convention to support the conclusion that
such agreements must be inadmissible in
principle (46). However, the 1968 Convention
does not contain any rules as to their validity
either. If a court within the Community is applied
to despite such an agreement, its decision on the
validity of the agreement depriving it of
jurisdiction must be taken in accordance with its
own  lex fori.  In so far as the local rules of conflict
of laws support the authority of provisions of
foreign law, the latter will apply. If, when these
tests are applied, the agreement is found to be
invalid, then the jurisdictional provisions of the
1968 Convention become applicable.
177. (b) On the other hand, proceedings can be
brought before a court within the Community by
parties who, although both domiciled outside the
Community, have agreed that that court should
have jurisdiction. There is no reason for the
Convention to include rules on the conditions
under which the court stipulated by such parties
must accept jurisdiction. It is however important
for the Community to ensure, by means of more
detailed conditons, that the effect of such an
agreement on jurisdiction is recognized
throughout the EEc. The new third sentence of
the first paragraph of Article 17 is designed to
cater for this. It covers the situation where
despite the fact that both parties are domiciled
outside the Community, a court in a Community
State (' ) would, were it not for a jurisdiction
agreement, have jurisdiction, e.g. on the ground
that the place of performance lies within that
State. If in such a case the parties agree that the
courts of another Community State are to have
exclusive jurisdiction, that agreement must be
observed by the courts of State X, provided the
agreement meets the formal requirements of
Article 17. Strictly speaking, it is true, this is not
necessary adjustment. Such situations were
possible before, in relations between the original
Member States of the Community. However
owing to the frequency with which jurisdiction is
conferred upon United Kingdom courts in
international trade, the problem takes on
considerably greater importance with the United
Kingdom accession to the Convention than
hitherto.
3. Jurisdiction clauses in trusts
178. A trust (see paragraph 111) need not be
established by contract. A unilateral , legal
instrument is sufficient. As the previous version
of Article 17 dealt only with 'agreements' on
jurisdiction, it needed to be expanded.
4. The form of agreements 
jurisdiction in international trade
179. Some of the first judgments given by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities since it was
empowered to interpret the 1968 Convention
were concerned with the form of jurisdiction
clauses incorporated in standardized general
conditions of trade (47). The Court of Justice
interpretation of Article 17 of the 1968
Convention does protect the other party to a
contract with anyone using such general
conditions of trade from the danger of
inadvertently finding himself bound by standard
forms of agreement containing jurisdiction
clauses without realizing it. However, the Court'sOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/125
interpretation of that Article . which many
national courts have also shown a tendency to
follow (45), does not cater adequately for the
customs and requirements of international trade.
In particular, the requirement that the other party
to a contract with anyone employing general
conditions of trade has to give written
confirmation of their inclusion in the contract
before any jurisdiction clause in those conditions
can be effective is unacceptable in international
trade. International trade is heavily dependent on
standard conditions which incorporate
jurisdiction clauses. Nor are those conditions in
many cases unilaterally dictated by one set 
interests in the market; they have frequently been
negotiated by representatives of the various
interests. Owing to the need for calculations
based on constantly fluctuating market prices, it
has to be possible to conclude contracts swiftly
by means of  confirmation of order
incorporating sets of conditions. These are the
factors behind the relaxation of the formal
provisions for international trade in the amended
version of Article 17. This is however, as should
be clearly emphasized, only a relaxation of the
formal requirements. It must be proved that a
consensus existed on the inclusion in the contract
of the general conditions of trade and the
particular provisions, though this is not the place
to pass comment on whether questions of
consensus other than the matter of form should
be decided according to the national laws
applicable or to unified EEC principles. Dealing
with the form of jurisdiction agreements in a
separate second sentence in the first paragraph of
Article 17, rather than in passing in the first
sentence as hitherto, is designed merely to obviate
rather cumbersome wording.
Section 7
Examination of own motion
Adjustments and further clarification were not
necessary.
Section 8
Lis pendens' and related actions (48
180. As regards  lis pendens there are two structural
differences between the laws of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, on the one hand, and the
Continental legal systems on the other. However
neither of them necessitated a technical
amendment of the 1968 Convention.
1. Discretion of the court
181. The rules governing  lis pendens  in England and
Wales, and to some extent in Scotland, are more
flexible than those on the Continent. Basically, it
is a question for the court's discretion whether a
stay should be granted. The doctrine of  lis
pendens  is therefore less fully developed there
, than in the Continental States. The practice is in a
sense an application of the doctrine of  forum
conveniens  (see paragraph 77  et seq.
). 
Generally a
court will in fact grant an application for a stay
of proceedings, where the matter in dispute is
already pending before another court. Where
proceedings are pending abroad, the courts in
England and Wales exercise great caution, and if
they grant a stay of proceedings at all, they will
do so only if the plaintiff in England or Wales is
also the plaintiff in the proceedings abroad.
Scottish courts take into account to a
considerable extent any conflicting proceedings
which a Scottish defendant may have instituted
abroad, or which are pending against him
abroad.
After the United Kingdom has acceded to the
1968 Convention, it will no longer be possible for
this practice to be maintained in relation to the
other Member States of the Community. United
Kingdom courts will have to acknowledge the
existence of proceedings instituted in the other
Member States, and even to take notice of them
of their own motion (see paragraph 22).
2. Moment at which proceedings become
pending
182. The fact that the moment at which proceedings
become pending is determined differently in the
United Kingdom and Ireland from the way it is
determined on the Continent is due 
peculiarities of procedural law in those States. In
the original Member States of the Community a
claim becomes pending when the document
instituting the proceedings is served (49). Filing
with the court is sometimes sufficient. In the
United Kingdom, except Scotland, and in Ireland
proceedings become pending as soon as the
originating document has been issued. In
Scotland, however, proceedings become pending
only when service of the summons has been
effected on the defender. The moment at which
proceedings become pending under the nationalNo C 59/126 Official Journal of the European Communities
procedural law concerned is the deciding factor
for the application of Article 21 of the 1968
Convention. The addition to the text of Article
20 does not concern this point. It is justified by
the fact that in the United Kingdom and in
Ireland foreigners who are abroad do not receive
the original writ but only notification of the order
of the court authorizing service.
Section 9
Provisional measures
183. .No particular adjustments had to be made to the
provisions of the 1968 Convention concerning
provisional measures. The change in emphasis
CHAPTER 5
which the accession of further Member States
introduced into the 1968 Convention consists in
this field entirely in the wide variety of
provisional measures available in the law of
Ireland and of the United Kingdom. This will
involve certain difficulties where provisional
judgments given in these States have to be given
effect by the enforcement procedures of the
original Member States of the Community.
However, this problem does not affect only
provisional measures. The integration of
judgments on the main issue into the respective
national enforcement procedures also involves
difficulties in the relationship between Ireland
and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the
original Member States of the Community on the
other (see paragmph 221  et seq.
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
GENERAL REMARKS INTERLOCUTOR Y
COURT DECISIONS
184. Article 25 emphasizes in terms which could
hardly be clearer that every type of judgment
given by a court in a Contracting State must be
recognized and enforced throughout the rest 
the Community. The provision is not limited to a
judgment terminating the proceedings before the
court, but also applies to provisional court
orders. Nor does the wording of the provision
it!~jcate that interlocutory court decisions should
be exclm:led from its scope where they do not
provisionally regulate the legal relationships
between the parties, but . are for instance
concerned only with the taking of evidence. What
is more, the legal systems of the original Member
States of the Community describe such
interlocutory decisions in  way which
corresponds to the terms given, by way 
example, in Article 25. Thus, in France court
decisions which order the taking of evidence are
also called 'jugements (d' avant dire droit)' . In
Germany they are termed '(Beweis) beschli.isse' of
the court. Nevertheless, the provisions of the
1968 Convention governing recognition and
enforcement ~re in general designed to cover only
court judgments which either determine or
regulate the legal relationships of the parties. An
answer to the question whether, and if so which
interlocutory decisions intended to be 
procedural assistance fall within the scope of the
1968 Convention cannot be given without further
consideration.
1.  RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONTINENTAL
STATES WITH EACH OTHER
185. This matter is of no great significance as between
the original Member States of the EEC, or as
between the latter and Denmark. All seven States
are parties to the 1954 Hague Coiwention
relating to civil procedure. The latter governs the
question of judicial assistance, particularly in the
case of evidence to be taken abroad, and its
provisions take precedence over the 1968
Convention by virtue of Article 57. In any case, it
is always advisable in practice to make use of the
machinery of the Hague Convention, which 
particularly suited to the processes required for
obtaining judicial assistance. See paragraph 238
and note 59 (7) on the Hague Convention of 15
November 1965 on the service abroad of judicial
and extrajudicial documents in civil or
commercial matters and on the Hague
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the taking of
evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters.
2.  RELATIONSHIP OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND IRELAND WITH THE OTHER MEMBER
STATES
186. It is only with the accession of the United
Kingdom and Ireland to the 1968 Convention
that the problem assumes any degree ofOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/127
importance. Ireland has concluded no
convention judicial assistance of any kind with
the other States of the European Community.
Agreements on judicial assistance do, however
exist between the United Kingdom and the
following States: the Federal Republic of
Germany (Agreement of 20 March 1928), the
Netherlands (Agreement of 17 November 1967).
The United Kingdom is also party to the Hague
Conventions of 1965 and 1970 referred to in
paragraph 185. It has concluded no other
agreements with Member States of the
Community.
3.  PRECISE SCOPE OF TITLE III OF THE  1968
CONVENTION
187. If it were desired that interlocutory decisions by
courts on the further conduct of the proceedings,
and particularly on the taking of evidence, should
be covered by Article 25 of the 1968 Convention
this would also affect decisions with which the
parties would be, totally unable to comply
, without the court s cooperation and the
enforcement of which would concern third
parties, particularly witnesses. It would therefore
be impossible to 'enforce' such decisions under
the 1968 Convention. It can only be concluded
from the foregoing that interlocutory decisions
which are not intended to govern the legal
relationships of the parties, but to arrange the
further conduct of the proceedings, should be
excluded from the scope of Title III of the 1968
Convention.
COMMENTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL SECTIONS
Section 1
Recognition
188. With two exceptions (4), no formal amendments
were required to Articles 26 to 30. The Working
Party did,.however, answer some questions raised
by the new Member States regarding the
interpretation of these provisions. Basically, these
concerned problems arising in connection with
the application of the public policy reservation in
Article 27 (1)  (2), the right to a hearing 
Article 27 (2)  (3), and the nature of the obliga-
tion to confer recognition, as distict from en-
enforceability (1). The fact that Article 28 makes
no reference to the provisions of Section 6 
Title II on jurisdiction agreements is intentional
and deserves mention. When considering such
agreements it must be borne in mind that the
court seised of the proceedings in the State of
origin must of its own motion take note of any
agreement to the contrary (see paragraphs 22
and 174).
1. Article 26
189. Article 26, second paragraph, introduces a special
simplified procedure for seeking recognition
modelled on the provisions governing the issue of
orders for enforcement. However, this is not the
only way in which recognition may be sought.
Every court and public authority must take
account of judgments which qualify for
recognition, and must decide whether the
conditions for recognition exist in a particular
case, unless this question has already been
determined under Article 26, second paragraph.
In particular, every court must itself decide
whether there is an obligation to grant
recognition, if the principal issue in a foreign
judgment concerns a question which in the fresh
proceedings emerges as a preliminary issue. Each
of these two recognition procedures involves a
problem which the Working Party discussed.
190. (a) If proceedings are conducted in accordance
with Article 26, second paragraph, the court may
of its own motion take into account grounds for
refusing recognition if they appear from the
judgment or are known to the court. It may not
however, make enquiries to establish whether
such grounds exist, as this would not be
compatible with the summary nature of the
proceedings. Only if further proceedings are
instituted by way of an appeal lodged pursuant to
Article 36 can the court examine whether the
requirements for recognition have been satisfied.
191. (b) The effects of a court decision are not
altogether uniform under the legal systems
obtaining in the Member States of the
Community. A judgment delivered in one State as
a decision on a procedural issue may, in another
State, be treated as a decision on an issue of
substance. The same type of judgment may be of
varying scope and effect in different countries. In
France, a judgment against the principal debtor is
also effective against the surety, whereas in the
Netherlands and Germany it is not (50No C 59/128 Official Journal of the European Communities
The Working Party did not consider it to be its
task to find a general solution to the problems
. arising from these differences in the national legal
systems. However, one fact seemed obvious.
Judgments dismissing an action as unfounded
must be recognized. If a German court declares
that it has no jurisdiction, an English court
cannot ' disclaim its own jurisdiction on the
ground that the German court was in fact
competent. Clearly, however German decisions
on procedural matters are not binding, as to the
substance, in England. An English court may at
any time allow (or, for substantive reasons
disallow) an action, if proceedings are started in
England after such a decision has been given by a
GenTIan court.
2. Article 27 (1)  public policy
192. (a) The 1968 Convention does not state in terms
whether recognition may be refused pursuant to
Article 27 (1) on the ground that the judgment
has been obtained by fraud. Not even in the legal
systems of the original Contracting States to the
1968 Convention is it expressly stated that fraud
in obtaining a judgment constitutes a ground for
refusing recognition. Such conduct is, however
generally considered as an instance for applying
the doctrine of public policy (51). The legal
situation in the United Kingdom and Ireland is
different inasmuch as fraud constitutes a special
ground for refusing recognition in addition to the
principle of public policy. In the conventions
on enforcement which the United Kingdom
concluded with Community, States, a middle
course was adopted by expressly referring to
fraudulent conduct, but treating it as a special
case of public policy (52
As a result there is no doubt that to obtain a
judgment by fraud can in principle constitute an
offence against the public policy of the State
addressed. However, the legal systems of all
Member States provide special means of redress
by which it can be contended, even after the
expiry of the normal period for an appeal, that
the judgment was the result of a fraud (see
paragraph 197  et seq.
). 
court in the State
addressed must always, therefore, ask itself
whether a breach of its public policy still exists in
view of the fact that proceedings for redress can
be, or could have been, lodged in the courts of
the State of origin against the judgment allegedly
obtained by fraud.
193. (b) Article 41 (3) of the Irish Constitution
prohibits divorce and also provides, as regards
, marriages dissolved abroad:
No person whose marriage has been
dissolved under the civil law of any other
State but is a subsisting valid marriage under
the law for the time being in force within the
jurisdiction of the Government and
Parliament established by this Constitution
shall be capable of contracting a valid
marriage within that jurisdiction during the
lifetime of the other party to the marriage so
dissolved.'
In so far as the jursidiction of the 1968
Convention is concerned, this Article of the
Constitution is of importance for maintenance
orders made upon a divorce. The Irish ,courts
have not yet settled whether the recognition of
such maintenance orders would, in view of the
constitutional provisions cited, be contrary to
Irish public policy.
3. The right to a hearing (Article 27 (2))
194. Article 27 (2) is amended for the same reason as
Article 20 (see paragraph 182). The object of the
addition to Article 20 was to specify the moment
when proc~edings became pending before the
Irish or British courts; in Article 27 (2) it 
intended to indicate which documents must have
been served for the right to a hearing to 
respected.
Ordinary and extraordinary appeals
195. The 1968 Convention makes a distinction in
Articles 30 and 38 between ordinary and
extraordinary appeals. No equivalent for this
could be found in the Irish and United Kingdom
legal systems. Before discussing the reason for
this and explaining the implications of the
solutions proposed by the Working Party (b),
something should be said about the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary appeals in
the Continental Member States of the EEC, since
judges in the United Kingdom and Ireland will
have to come to terms with these concepts which
to them are unfamiliar (a).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/129
196. (a) A clearly defined distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary appeals is nowhere to be
found.
Legal literature and case law (53) have pointed
out two criteria. In the first place neither an
appeal ('Berufung ) nor an objection to a default
judgment ('Einspruch' ) has to be based on
specific grounds; a party may challenge a
judgment by alleging any kind of defect. Secondly
execution is postponed during the period allowed
for an 'appeal or objection, or after an appeal or
objection has been lodged, unless the court
otherwise directs or unless exceptionally,
different legal provisions apply.
Some legal systems contain a list of ordinary
appeal procedures.
197. Part 1, Book 4 of the French Code de procedure
civile of 1806, which still applies in Luxembourg,
referred to extraordinary forms of appeal by
which a judgment could be contested. It did not
say, however, what was meant by ordinary
appeals. Book 3 referred merely to 'courts of
appeal' . However, in legal literature and case law
appeals ('appel') and objections to default
judgments ('opposition ) have consistently been
classified as ordinary appeals. The new French
Code de procedure civile of 1975 now expressly
clarifies the position. In future only objections
(Article 76) and appeals (Article 85) are to 
classified as ordinary appeals.
198. The Belgian Code judiciaire of 1967 has retained
the French system which previously applied in
Belgium. Only appeals and objections are
considered as ordinary appeals (Article 21).
199. There is no distinction in Netherlands law
between ordinary and extraordinary appeals.
Academic writers classify the forms of appeal as
follows: objections ('Verzet where a judgment
is given in default), appeals ('Hoger beroep
appeals in cassation '('Beroep in cassatie ) and
appeals on a point of law ('Revisie ) are classed as
ordinary appeals. 'Revisie' is a special form of
appeal which lies only against certain judgments
. of the Hoge Raad sitting as a court of first
instance.
200. The Italian text of Articles 30 and 38 refers to
impugnazione' without distinguishing between
ordinary and extraordinary appeals. However
Italian legal literature distinguishes very clearly
between ordinary and extraordinary appeals.
Article 324 of theCodice di procedura civile states
that a judgment does not become binding as
between the parties until tl~e periods within
which the following forms of appeal' may be
lodged have expired: appeals on grounds of
jurisdiction ('regolamento di competenza
appeals ('appello ), appeals in cassation ('ricorso
per cassazione), or petitions for review
revocazione ), where these are based on one of
the grounds provided for in Article 395 (4)
and (5). These forms of appeal are classified as
ordinary.
201. In Denmark, too the distinction' between
ordinary and extraordinary appeals is recognized
only in legal literature. The deciding factor
mentioned there is whether a form of appeal may
be lodged within a given period without having
to be based on particular grounds, or whether its
admissibility depends on special, consent by 
court or ministry. Accordingly, appeals (' Anke
and objections to default judgments
Genoptagelse af sager, i hvilke der er afsagt
udebl~velsesdom are classified as ordinary
appeals.
202. Book 3 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
ZivilprozeRordnung is headed 'Rechtsmittel'
means of redress ) and. it governs ' Berufung
(appeals) 'Beschwerde (complaints) and
Revision' (appeals on a point of law). These are
frequently said to have in common the fact that
the decision appealed against does not become
binding ('rechtskriiftig ) until the period within
which these means of redress may be lodged has
expired. However Article 705 of the Code defines
Rechtskraft' as the stage when these means of
redress are no longer available. The material
difference between the means of redress and other
forms of appeal is that the former need not be
based on particular grounds of appeal, that they
are addressed to a higher court and that, as long
as the decision has not become binding,
enforcement is also postponed pursuant to Article
704 unless the court, as is almost invariably the
case, allows provisional enforcement. If the
expression 'ordinary appeal' is used at all, a
reference to 'Rechtsmittel' (means of redress) is
intended.
German legal writers, in accordance with the
phraseology used by the law, do not classify
objections to default judgments as a means of
redress ('Rechtsmittel' ) (54). It does not involve
the competence of a higher court. However, it has
the effect of suspending execution and is not tied
to specific grounds of appeal just like anNo C 59/130 Official Journal of the European Communities
objection in the other original Member States of
the Community. It must, therefore, be included
under 'ordinary appeals' within the meaning of
Articles 30 and 38 of the 1968 Convention.
203. In its judgment of 22 November 1977 (55) the
European Court held that the concept of an
ordinary appeal' was to be uniformly determined
in the original Member States according to
whether there was a specific period of time for
appealing, which started to run 'by virtue of' the
judgment.
204. (b) In Ireland and the United Kingdom nothing
which would enable a distinction to be drawn
between ordinary and extraordinary appeals can
be found in either statutes, cases or systematic
treaties on procedural law. The basic method of
redress is the appeal. Not only is this term used
where review of a judgment can be sought within
a certain period, without being subject to special
grounds for appeal; it is also the name given to
other means of redress. Some have special names
such as; for default judgments
, '
reponing' (in
Scotland) or ' application to set the judgment
aside' (in England , Wales and Ireland); or again
motion (in Scotland) or ' application (in
England, Wales and Ireland) 'for a new trial'
which correspond roughly to a petition for, review
in Continental legal systems. They are the only
forms of redress against a verdict by a jury. A
further distinctive feature of the appeal system in
these States is the fact that the enforceability of a
judgment is not automatically .affected by the
appeal period or even by the lodging of an
appeal. However, the appellate court will usually
grant a temporary stay of execution, if security is
given. Fjnally there do exist in the United
Kingdom legal procedures whose function
corresponds to the ordinary legal procedures of
Continental legal systems, but which are not
subject to time limits. The judge exercises his
discretion in deciding on the admissibility of each
particular case. This is the case, for example, with
default judgments. The case law of the European
Court could therefore not be applied to the new
Member States.
The Working Party therefore made prolonged
efforts to work out an equivalent for the United
Kingdom and Ireland of the Continental
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
appeals, but reached no satisfactory result. This
failure was due in particular to the fact that the
term 'appeal' is so many-sided and cannot be
regarded, like similar terms in Continental law, as
a basis for ' ordinary appeals . The Working Party
therefore noted that the legal consequences
resulting from the distinction drawn in Articles
30 and 38 between ordinary and extraordinary
appeals do not have to be applied rigidly, but
merely confer a discretion on the court.
Accordingly, in the interests of practicality and
clarity, a broad definition of appeal seemed
justified in connection with judgments of Irish
and United Kingdom courts. Continental courts
will have to use their discretion in such a way
that an equal balance in the application of
Articles 30 and 38 in all Contracting States will
be preserved. To this effect they will have to
make only cautious use of their discretionary
power to stay proceedings, if the appeal is one
which is available in Ireland or the United
Kingdom only against special defects in a
judgment or which may still be lodged after a
long period. A further argument in favour of this
pragmatic solution was that, in accordance with
Article 38, a judgment is in any event no longer
enforceable if it was subject to appeal in the State
of origin and the appellate court suspended
execution or granted a ter:nporary stay 
execution.
5. Conflicts with judgments given in
non-con~racting States which qualify
for recognition
205. In one respect the provIsIOns of the 1968
Convention governing recognition required
formal amendment. A certain lack of clarity in
some of these provisions can be accepted since
the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to
interpret them. However, Member States cannot
be expected to accept lack of clarity where this
might give rise to diplomatic complications with
non-contracting States. The new Article 27 (5) is
designed to avoid such complications.
This may be explained by way of an example. A
decision dismissing an action against a person
domiciled in the Community is given in
non-contracting State A. A Community State, B
is obliged to recognize the judgment under a
bilateral convention. The plaintiff brings fresh
proceedings in another Community State, C
which is not obliged to recognize the judgmentOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/131
given in the non-contracting State. If he 
successful the existing text of the 1968
Convention leaves it open to doubt whether the
judgment has to be recognized in State B.
In future, it is certain that this is not the case. In
order to avoid unnecessary discrepancies, the text
of the new provision is based on Article 5 of the
Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil and commercial matters. Its
wording is slightly wider in scope than would
have been required to avoid diplomatic
complications. A judgment given in 
non-contracting State takes priority even where it
has to be recognized, not by virtue \ of 
international convention but- merely under
national law. For obligations under conventions
not to recognize certain judgments, see paragraph
249  et seq.
Section 2
Enforcemen t
Preliminary remarks
206. The Working Party s efforts were almost entirely
confined to deciding which courts in the new
Member States should have jurisdiction in
enforcement proceedings, and what appeal
procedures should be provided in this context. In
this connection four peculiarities of United
Kingdom and, to a certain extent, Irish law had
to be considered.
The Working Party took no decision on
amendments to deal with the costs of the
enforcement procedure. On this point, however
reference should be made to the judgment of the
Court of Justice of the European Communites of
30 November 1976 (Case 42/76). According to
that decision, Article 31 prohibits a successful
plaintiff from bringing fresh proceedings in the
State in which enforcement is sought. But the
Contracting States are obliged to adopt rules on
costs which take into account the desire to
simplify the enforcement procedure.
207. The Working Party also abandoned attempts to
draft provisions in the Convention on seizure for
international claims, although it was clear that
problems would occur to a certain extent if
debtors and third party debtors were domiciled in
different States. If, in one State, the court of the
debtor s domicile has jurisdiction over seizure for
such claims, then the State of domicile of the
third party debtor may regard the making of the
order for seizure applicable to the latter as a
violation of its sovereignty, and refuse to enforce
it. In such a situation the creditor can seek
assistance by obtaining a declaration that the
judgment is enforceable in the State of domicile
of the third party debtor, and enforcing the
debtor s claim against the third party in that
State provided that this State assumes
international jurisdiction over such a measure.
208. (a) United Kingdom and Irish law does not have
the  exequatur  system for foreign judgments. In
these countries an action on the basis of the
foreign judgment is necessary unless, as in the
United Kingdom, a system of registration applies
to the judgments of certain States (including the
six original Member States with the exception of
Luxembourg) (see paragraph 6). In that case the
foreign judgments, if they are to be enforced, must
be registered with a court in the United Kingdom.
They then have the same force as judgments of
the registering court itself. The application has to
be lodged by the creditor in person or by 
solicitor on his behalf. Personal appearance is
essential; lodging by post will not suffice. If the
application is granted, an order to that effect will
be entered in the register kept at the court.
Except in Scotland, however the United
Kingdom has no independent enforcement officer
like the French 'huissier or the German
Gerichtsvollzieher' (see paragraph 221). Only the
court which gave the judgment or where the
judgment was registered can direct enforcement
measures. Since this system of registration affords
the same protection to a foreign judgment
creditor as does the  exequatur  system on the
Continent the United Kingdom registration
system could also be accepted for applying the
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209. (b) A special feature of the constitution of the
United Kingdom has already been mentioned in
the introductory remarks (see paragraph 11):
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland are independent judicial areas. A new
paragraph had to be added to Article 31 to cover
this. Similarly the appeal possibilities provided
for in Articles 37 and 40 apply separately to each
registration. If a judgment has been validly
registered with the High Court in London
another appeal is again possible against a
subsequent registration with the Court of Session
in Edinburgh.
210. (c) As far as the enforcement of foreign
judgments is concerned the United Kingdom
traditionally concedes special treatment to
maintenance orders (see paragraph 7). Until now
they have been enforced only in respect of a few
Commonwealth countries and Ireland, and their
enforcement is entrusted to courts different from
those responsible for enforcing other judgments.
Since the 1968 Convention contains no
provIsIOns precluding different recognition
procedures for different types of judgment, there
is no reason why maintenance orders cannot be
covered by a special arrangement within the
scope of the 1968 Convention. This will permit
the creation of a uniform system for the
recognition of maintenance orders from the
Community and the Commonwealth and, in view
of the type of court having jurisdiction, the
setting up of  central agency to receive
applications for enforcement (see paragraph 218).
For agreements concerning maintenance see
paragraph 226.
211. (d) Finally there were still problems in connection
with judgments ordering performance other than
the payment of money. Judgments directing a
person to do a particular act are not generally
enforceable under United Kingdom and Irish law
but only in pursuance of special legal provisions.
These provisions cover judgments ordering the
delivery of movable property or the transfer of
ownership or possession of immovable property,
and injunctions by which the court may in its
discretion order an individual to do or refrain
from doing a certain act. Enforcement is possible
either by the sheriff's officer using direct compul-
sion or indirectly by means of fines or imprison-
ment for contempt of court. In Scotland, in addi-
tion to judgments for the transfer of possession or
ownership of immovable property and preventa-
tive injunctions, there are also ' decrees  ad factum
prestandum  by means of which the defendant can
be ordered to perfmm certain acts, particularly to
hand back movable property.
212. (aa) If an application is made in the Federal
Republic of Germany for the enforcement of such
judgment given in Ireland or the United
Kingdom, the court must apply the same means
of compulsion as would be applicable in the case
of a corresponding German judgment, i. e. a fine
or imprisonment. In the reverse situation, the
United Kingdom and Irish courts may have to
impose penalties for contempt of court in the
same way as when their own orders are
disregarded.
213. (bb) The system for enforcing orders reqUIrIng
the performance of a specific act is fundamentally
different in other States of the Community, e.g.
Belgium, France and Luxembourg. The defendant
is ordered to perform the act and at the same
time to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff to
cover a possible non-compliance with the order. In
France he is initially only threatened with a fine
astreinte ). In case of non-compliance, a
separate judgment is ,required and is hardly ever
as high as the fine originally threatened. In
Belgium the amount of the fine is already fixed in
the judgment ordering the act to 
performed (56). With a view to overcoming the
difficulties which this could cause for the
inter-State enforcement of judgments ordering
specific acts. Article 43 provides that, if the
sanction takes the form of a fine ('astreinte ), the
original court should itself fix the amount.
Enforcement abroad is then limited to the
astreinte . French ' Belgian Dutch and
Luxembourg judgments can be enforced without
difficulty in Germany, the United Kingdom and
Italy if the original court has proceeded on that
basis.
However, the 1968 Convention leaves open the
question whether such a fine for disregarding a
court order can also be enforced when it accrues
not to the judgment creditor but to the State.
Since this is not a new problem arising out of the
accession of the new Member States, the Working
Party did not express a view on the matter.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/133
2. Formal adjustments as regards courts
having jurisdiction and authorized
appeals
214. Apart from the inclusion of a term equivalent in
the Irish and United Kingdom legal systems to
ordinary appeal (see paragraph 195), and apart
from Article 44 which deals with legal aid (see
paragraph 223), the formal adjustments to
Articles 32 to 45 relate exclusively to the courts
having jurisdiction and the possible types of
appeal again~t their decisions. (See paragraph 108
for adjustments relating to maintenance.
215. (a) For applications for  declaration of
enforceability (see paragraph 208) of judgments
other than maintenance orders only one court has
been given jurisdiction in each of Ireland
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland. This is due to the peculiarities of the
court systems in these countries (see paragraphs
, 208 and 209).
216. If the judgment debtor wishes to argue against
the authorization of enforcement, he must lodge
his application to set the registration aside not
with a higher court, as in Germany, France and
Italy, but, as in Belgium and the Netherlands
with the court which registered the judgment.
The proceedings will take the form of an ordinary
contentious civil action.
corresponding position applies regarding the
appeal which the applicant may lodge if his
application is refused, although in such a case it is
a higher court which has jurisdiction in all seven
Continental Member States of the Community.
217. The adjustment of the second paragraph of
Article 37 and of Article 41 gave rise to
difficulties with regard to the solution adopted
for Articles 32 and 40.
In the original Member States of the Community
an appeal against judgments of courts on which
jurisdiction is conferred by Articles 37 and 40
could only be lodged on a point of law and with
the highest court in the State. It was therefore
sufficient to make the same provision apply to the
appeals provided for in the 1968 Convention and
in the case of Belgium, simply to bypass the Cour
appel. The purpose of this arrangement is to
limit the number of appeals, in the interests of
rapid enforcement, to a single appeal which may
involve a full review of the facts and a second one
limited to points of law. It would therefore not
have been enough to stipulate for the new
Member States that only one further appeal
would be permitted against the judgment of the
court which had ruled on an appeal made by
either the debtor or the creditor. Instead, the
second appeal had to be limited to points of law.
Ireland and the United Kingdom will have to
adapt their appeal system to the requirements of
the 1968 Convention. In the case of Ireland
which has only a two-tier superior court system
the Supreme Court is the only possibility.
Implementing legislation in the United Kingdom
will have to determine whether the further
appeals should go direct to the House of Lords
, depending on the judicial area concerned (see
paragraph 11), to the Court of Appeal in England
and Wales, to the court of. ~he same name in
Northern Ireland or to the Inner House of the
Court of Session in Scotland. The concept of
appeal on a point of law is the nearest
equivalent as far as United Kingdom law is
concerned to the 'Rechtsbeschwerde' of German
law and the appeal in cassation in the legal
systems of the other original Member States of
the Community, the common feature of which is
restriction of the grounds of appeal to an
incorrect application of the law (as opposed to an
incorrect assessment of the facts). Even in relation
to appeals in cassation and 'Rechtsbeschwerde
the distinction between points of law and matters
of fact is not identical; for the United Kingdom
and Ireland, too, this will remain a matter for its
own legislation and case law to clarify.
Traditionally the leave of the Minister for Justice
is required for an appeal to the highest Danish
court at third instance. The Wor~ing Party was
initially doubtful whether it should accept this in
the context of the 1968 Convention. It emerged
however, that the Convention does not guarantee
a third instance in all circumstances. In' order to
relieve the burden on their highest courts
Member States may limit the admissibility of the
appeals provided for in Article 41. The Danish
solution is only one manifestation of this idea.
There was also no need in the case of Denmark to
stipulate that the appeal to the highest court
should be limited to a point of law. When
granting leave the Ministry of Justice can ensure
that the appeal concerns only questions of law
requiring further elucidation. Denmark has givenNo C  59/134 Official Journal of the European Communities
an assurance that leave will always be granted, if
the court of second instance has not made use of
its discretion to refer a matter to the European
Court of Justice or if enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been refused on legal grounds.
218. (b) In Ireland the proposed arrangement also
applies to maintenance orders. In the United
Kingdom, however maintenance orders are
subject to a special arrangement (see paragraph
210). In England and Wales and in Northern
Ireland registration is a matter for the
Magistrates' Courts, and in Scotland for the
Sheriff Courts. These courts also have jurisdiction
in respect of other maintenance matters including
the enforcement of foreign maintenance orders.
Foreign maintenance creditors cannot, however
have recourse to any of the above courts directly,
but must apply to the Secretary of State (57), who
will transmit the order to the appropriate court.
This arrangement was made in the interest of the
foreign maintenance creditors because
Magistrates' Courts and Sheriff Courts have lay
justices and no administrative machinery.
As regards jurisdiction in respect of appeals
which may be brought by either the creditor or
the debtor under the 1968 Convention, the usual
system will continue to apply, i.e. the appeal is
decided by the court which registered the order or
refused such registration. It is impossible for a
maintenance order to be amended during
registration proceedings, even if it is claimed that
the circumstances have changed (see paragraph
104  et seq.
The special situation regarding maintenance
orders in the United Kingdom offers a series of
advantages to the maintenance creditor. After
forwarding the order to the Secretary of State, he
has virtually no further need to concern himself
with the progress of the proceedings or with their
enforcement. The rest will be done free of charge.
The Secretary of State transmits the order to the
appropriate court and, unless the maintenance
creditor otherwise requests, the clerk of that
court will be regarded as the representative 
litem  within the meaning of Article 33 , second
paragraph, second sentence. In England and
Wales and in Northern Ireland the clerk in
question will also be responsible for taking the
necessary enforcement measures and for ensuring
th~t the creditor receives the proceeds obtained.
Only in Scotland need the creditor under the
order seek the services of  solicitor when
applying for enforcement following registration
of an order. The Law Society of Scotland
undertakes to provide solicitors whose fees are, if
necessary, paid in accordance with the principles
of legal aid. Should the maintenance debtor move
to another judicial area in the United Kingdom
(see paragraph 11), a maintenance order will
unlike other judgments, be automatically
registered with the court which then has
jurisdiction. For agreements concernmg
maintenance, see paragraph 226.
Other adjustment problems
219. (a) The United Kingdom asked whether Article
34 excludes the possibility of notifying the debtor
that an application for registration of a foreign
judgment has been lodged. One of the aims of
Article 34 is to secure the element of surprise
which is essential if measures of enforcement are
to be effective. Therefore, although this 'provision
does not expressly forbid notifying the debtor in
the proceedings of the application for the grant of
an enforcement order, such notification should be
confined to very exceptional cases. An example
might be an application for registration made a
long time after the original judgment was given.
In any case, the court may not consider
submissions from the debtor, whether or not he
was notified in advance.
220. (b) The appeal provided for in Article 36 can be
based inter alia on the grounds that the
judgment does not come within the scope of the
1968 Convention, that it is not yet enforceable
or that the obligation imposed by the judgment
has already been complied with. However, the
substance of the judgment to be enforced or the
procedure by which it came into existence can be
reviewed only within the limits of Articles 27 and
28. For the adjustment of maintenance orders, see
paragraph 108.
221. (c) The Working Party discussed Article 39 
length. The provision in question is modelled on
the French legal system and legal systems related
to it, to which the institution of 'huissier' is
familiar. Under these systems measures of
enforcement in respect of movable property or
contractual claims belonging to the debtor can be
taken, without involving the court, by instructing
a 'huissier' to deal with their execution. It is for
the creditor to choose between the av9ilableOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C  59/135
methods of enforcement. The enforcing agency
has no discretion whatsoever in the matter. The
legal postion obtaining in the United Kingdom
(especially in England and Wales and also in
Scotland) and Ireland is quite different. In the
United Kingdom it is the court which has given or
registered the judgment which has jurisdiction
over measures of enforcement. In Ireland it is the
court which has given or enforced the judgment.
The court also has some discretion as to which
enforcement measures it will sanction. Protective
measures confined to securing enforcement of a
claim do not yet exist.
This position will have to be altered by the
implementing legislation of these / States, which
will have to introduce protective measures, in so
far as this consequence does not arise as an
automatic result of the entry into force of the
1968 Convention for one of these States (see
paragraph 256).
The 1968 Convention does not guarantee specific
measures of enforcement to the creditor. Neither
is it in any way incompatible with the 1968
Convention to leave the measures of enforcement
entirely to the court. The 1968 Convention
contains no express provision obliging the
Member States to employ an institution similar to
the French 'huissier . Even within its original
scope, creditors have to apply directly to the
court in the case of certain measures of
enforcement; in Germany, for example, they
would be required to do so in the case of
enforcement against immovable property. It 
certain however that in the German text the
phrase 'in das Vermogen des Schuldners
' ('
against
the property of the party against whom
enforcement is sought') does not mean that
measures of enforcement are permissible as
against third parties. The words quoted above
could be omitted without changing the meaning
of the provision. The question under what
conditions measures of enforcement are possible
against persons other than the judgment debtor is
to be answered solely on the basis of national
law. But the qualifications contained in Article 39
must also be observed.
The court enforcing the judgment need not be the
one which grants the order of enforcement or
registers the foreign judgment. Therefore, for the
purposes of enforcement under the 1968
Convention, Denmark can retain its present
system, by which execution is entrusted to a
special enforcement judge.
222. (d) For the problems presented by the system of
astreintes which applies in some Member
States, see paragraph 213.
223. (e) In its present form, Article 44 does not
provide for the case of a party who had been
granted only partial legal aid in the State in which
the judgment was given. Although this did not
involve an adjustment problem specifically due to
the accession of the new Member States, the
Working Party decided to propose an
amendment. The Working Party discussions
revealed that if the text were to remain in force in
its present form it could result in some
undesirable complications. The Working Party
proposal was largely based on the formulation of
Article 15 of the Hague Convention of 2 October
1973 on the recognition and enforcement of
decisions relating to maintenance obligations
which has now come into force. This provision
opts for a generous solution: even if only partial
legal aid was granted in the State of origin, full
aid is to be granted in the enforcement
proceedings.
This has a number of further advantages:
As the main application of Article 44 as amended
relates to maintenance claims, the amended
version contributes to the harmonization of
provisions in international conventions.
Moreover, it leads to a general simplification of
applications.
Since the rules concerning the granting of partial
legal aid are not the same in all the Contracting
States, the amended version also ensures a
uniform application of the legal aid provisions.
Lastly, it secures the suprise effect of enforcement
measures abroad, by avoiding procedural delays
caused by difficult calculations concerning the
applicant s share in the costs.
The first paragraph of Article 44 does not
however, oblige States which do not at present
have a system of legal aid in civil matters to
introduce such a system.
224. (f) The reason for the new second paragraph of
Article 44 relates to the jurisdiction of the Danish
- administrative authorities (see paragraph 67)
whose services are free. No question of legal aid
therefore arises. The new provision is designed to
ensure that the enforcement of Danish
maintenance orders is not, for this reason, at a
disadvantage in the other EEC countries by
comparison with maintenance orders from EEC
co\mtries other than Denmark.No C  59/136 Official Journal of the European Communities
Section 3 certainly admissible in appellate proceedings
where the debtor appeals against registration or
against a declaration of enforceability, or the
creditor against a refusal to register. However, all
the other means of giving evidence which are
normally admissible must also be available in
those proceedings.
Common provisions
225. The discussion of Articles 46 to 49 centred on
whether the new Member States, in accordance
with their legal tradition, could require an
affidavit, in particular to the effect that none of
the grounds for refusing recognition, specified in
Articles 27 and 28, obtain. Affidavit evidence 
The addition to Article 46 (2) is proposed for the
reasons given in paragraphs 182 and 194.
CHAPTER 6
AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS AND COURT SETTLEMENTS
226. In England and Ireland there is no equivalent of enforceable instruments. In Scotland
instruments establishing a clearly defined obligation to perform a contract can 
entered in a public register. An extract from the public register can then serve as a
basis for enforcement in the same way as a court judgment. Su~h extracts are covered
by Article 50.
In the United Kingdom, the courts having jurisdiction for recognition and enforce-
ment of maintenance orders are different from those concerned with other kinds of
judgment (see paragraphs 210 and 218). It is for the internal Jaw of the United King-
dom to determine whether foreign court settlements concerning maintenance should
be treated as maintenance orders or as other judgments.
CHAPTER 7
GENERAL PROVISION~
227. The outcome of the discussion of Articles 52 and 53 has already been recorded else-
where (see paragraphs 73  et seq. and 119).
CHAPTER 8
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
228. Article 54 continues to apply to the relationships
between the original Member States. For their
relationships with the new Member States, and
the relationships of the new Member States with
each other, an appropriate transitional provision
is included in Article 34 of the proposed
Accession Convention. It is closely modelled on
Article 54 of the 1968 Convention, but takes intoOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/137
account the fact that the latter has already been
in force in its present form between the original
Member States since 1 February 1973 , and also
the fact that some amendments are to be made to
it. Finally, the Interpretation Protocol of 3 June
1971 also had to be taken into account in the
transitional rules. The detailed provisions are as
follows (58
I. JURISDICTION
229. 1. The provlSlons on jurisdiction in the 1968
Convention apply in the new Member States only
in their amended version and only to proceedings
instituted after the Accession Convention has
come into force, and hence after the 1968
Convention has come into force, in the State in
question (Article 34 (1)).
230. 2. The amended version also applies to
proceedings instituted in the Qriginal Member
States after that date. Jurisdiction in respect of
proceedings instituted in the original Member
States before that date but after 1 February 1973
will continue to be determined in accordance
with the original text of the 1968 Convention
(Article 34 (1)). It is to be noted, as regards the
relationships of the old Member States with each
other, that under Article 39 of the Accession
Convention the amended version can only come
into force simultaneously for all six of them.
II. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
1.  END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
231. The recognition and enforcement of judgments
are in all respects governed by the Convention as
amended, provided the transitional period had
already ended at the time of institution of the
proceedings. For this purpose, the Accession
Convention must have come into force by that
time both in the State of origin and in the State
subsequently addressed (Article 34 (1)). It is not
sufficient for the Accession Convention to be in
force in the former State only, since rules of
exorbitant jurisdiction may still be invoked under
Article 4 of the 1968 Convention against
domiciliaries of the State subsequently addressed
if that State was not also a party to the Accession
Convention at the time of institution of the
proceedings. This would render an obligation to
recognize and enforce a judgment in that State
, without any preliminary review unacceptable.
If we assume that the Accession Convention
comes into force for the original Member States
of the Community and Denmark on 1 January
1981 and an action is brought in Germany
against a person domiciled in Denmark on 3
January 1981, then a judgment on 1 July 1981
finding in favour of the plaintiff would be
enforceable irrespective of transitional provisions
even if, say, the United Kingdom did not become
a party to the Convention until 1 December
1981. However, if in this example the action was
brought and judgment given against a person
domiciled in the United Kingdom, Article 34 (1)
would not govern recognition and enforcement in
the United Kingdom. That would be a true
transitional case.
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 34 deal with
judgments during the transitional period, i.
judgments given after the Accession Convention
has come into force in the State addressed, but in
proceedings which were instituted at a time
when, either in the State of origin or in the State
addressed, the Accession Convention was not yet
in force. In Article 34 (2) and (3) a distinction is
drawn between cases involving only the original
Member States of the Community and those
involving new Member States as well.
2. Among the original Member States of
the Community
232. Article 34 (2) makes the recognition and
enforcement of judgments among the original
Member States of the Community subject
without any restriction to the 1968 Convention
as amended, even if the actions were started
before the entry into force of the Accession
Convention which will necessarily be
simultaneous in those States (see the end of
paragraph 230). This amounts indirectly to 
statement that the situation as regards the
recognition and enforcement of judgments among
those States remains that in Article 54 of the
1968 Convention in the case of judgments given
before the entry into force of the Accession
Convention. The most important implication of
Article 34 (2) is that in proceedings for the
recognition of judgments among the original
Member States of the Community there is to be
no consideration of whether the court giving theNo C  59/138 Official Journal of the European Communities
judgment whose recognition is sought would
have had jurisdiction after the entry into force of
the Accession Convention. If the action was
started after 1 February 1973 then the
jurisdiction of the court giving the judgment
whose recognition is sought may no longer be
examined. The point is of note since that court
jurisdiction could still have been founded on
exorbitant jurisdictional rules where domiciliaries
of the new Member States are concerned.
To illustrate the point with an example, if a
Frenchman were in 1978 to bring an action in the
French courts pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil
Code against a person domiciled in Ireland
which would be possible under Article 4 of the
1968 Convention, and judgment was given in
favour of the plaintiff in 1982; then, assuming
the Accession Convention came into force for the
original Member States of the Community and
Ireland in 1981, the judgment would have to be
recognized and enforced in Germany, but not in
Ireland.
3. Where new
involved
Member are States
233. The arrangements obtaining under Article 34 (3)
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments
between the original Member States and the new
Member States, or as between the new Member
States, differ somewhat from those applying
among the original Member States. Article 34 (3)
is concerned with the possibility of recognition
and enforcement being sought in one of the new
Contracting States of a judgment from an original
Contracting State or from another new
Contracting State. Apart from the cases referred
to in paragraph 231, this is possible after the end
of the transitional ,period subject to three
requirements being met.
234. (a) The judgment must have been given after the
Accession Convention came into force in both
States.
235. (b) In addition, the proceedings must have been
instituted, in the words of the Convention
before 'the date of entry into force of this
Convention, between the State of origin and
the State addressed'. The purport of this is
that, at the time when the proceedings were
instituted, the Accession Convention may
have come into force either in the State of the
court giving the judgment for which
recognition is sought, or in the State in which
recognition and enforcement are subsequently
sought, but not in both of these States.
236. (c) Finally, the jurisdiction of the court giving the
judgment for which recognition is sought
must satisfy certain criteria which the court in
the State addressed must check. These criteria
exactly match what Article 54 of the 1968
Convention laid down regarding transitional
cases which were pending when that
Convention came into force between the six
original Member States. In proceedings for
recognition, the jurisdiction of the court
which gave judgment is to be accepted as
having been valid, provided one of two
requirements is met:
(aa) The judgment must be recognized where
the court in the State of origin would
have had jurisdiction if the Accession
Convention had already been in force as
between the two States at the time when
the proceedings were instituted.
(bb) The judgment must also be recognized
where the court jusrisdiction was
covered at the time when the
proceedings were instituted by another
?nternational convention which was in
force between the two States.
Reverting to the example in paragraph 232, the
position would be as follows: the French
judgment would indeed have been given after the
Accession Convention had come into force in
Ireland and France. The proceedings would have
been instituted at a time when the Accession
Convention was not yet in force in France (or in
Ireland). Had this Convention already been in
force as between France and Ireland at that time,
the French courts would no longer have been able
to found their jurisdiction on Article 14 of the
Civil Code and hence, it must further be assumed
would have been unable to assume jurisdiction.
Lastly, there is no bilateral convention between
France and Ireland concerning the direct or
indirect jurisdiction of the courts. Consequently,
the judgment would not have had to 
recognized in Ireland.
If one changes the example so that it now
concerns France and the United Kingdom, one
has to take into consideration the Convention
between those two States of 18 January 1934
providing for the reciprocal enforcement of
judgments. However, jurisdiction deriving fromOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C  59/139
Article 14 of the Civil Code is not admitted under
that Convention; thus the judgment would not
have to be recognized in the United Kingdom
either.
If the example concerned Germany and the
United Kingdom, and the defendant resident in
the United Kingdom had agreed orally before the
commencement of the proceedings that the
German courts should have jurisdiction, then
under the 1968 Convention the judgment would
haye to be recognized and enforced in the United
Kingdom. Under Article IV (1) (a) of the
Convention between the United Kingdom and
Germany of 14 July 1960, oral agreement '
sufficient to give grounds for jurisdiction for the
purposes of recognition ('indirect' jurisdiction).
However, the German court would have had to
be a 'Landgericht' , since 'Amtsgericht' judgments
are not required to be recognized under that
Convention (Article I (2)). In the event of a
written agreement on jurisdiction, even the
judgment of an 'Amtsgericht' would have to be
recognized, under Article 34 (3) of the Accession
Convention, as the ' Amtsgericht' would in that
case have assumed jurisdiction under
circumstances in which jurisdiction would also
have had to be assumed if the Accession
Convention had been in force between Germany
and the United Kingdom.
CHAPTER 9
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER CONVENTIONS
I. ARTICLES 55 AND 56
237. The Working Party included in Article 55 the
bilateral conventIons between the United
Kingdom and other Member States of the
Community. No such conventions have been
concluded by Ireland and Denmark.
II. ARTICLE 57 (59
1.  THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED
PROVISION
238. Great difficulties arose when an attempt was
made to explain to the new Member States the
exact scope of Article 57, the main reason being
the statement that the Convention 'shall not
affect' any conventions in  relation to particular
matters, without stating how the provisions in
such conventions could be reconciled with those
of the 1968 Convention where they covered only
part of the matters governed by the latter, which
is usually the case. Special conventions can be
divided into three groups. Many of them contain
only provisions on direct jurisdiction, as in the
case with the Warsaw Convention of 12 October
1929 for the unification of certain rules relating
to international carriage by air and the
Additional Protocols thereto (*), and the Brussels
Convention relating to the C\frest of seagoing
ships which is of great importance for maritime
law (Article 7) (see paragraph 121). Most
conventions govern only the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, and merely refer
indirectly to jurisdiction in so far as it constitutes
a precondition for recognition. This is the case
with the Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 on
the recognition and enforcement of decisions
relating to maintenance obligations towards
children. Finally, there are also Conventions
which contain provisions directly regulating
jurisdiction as well as recognition and
enforcement as for example the Berne
Convention on carriage by rail and the
Mannheim Convention for the navigation of the
Rhine. It is irrelevant for present purposes
whether the conventions contain additional
provisions on the applicable law or rules of
substantive law.
239. (a) It is clear beyond argument that where a
special convention contains no provisions directly
governing jurisdiction, the jurisdiction provisions
of the 1968 Convention apply. It is equally clear
that where all the Contracting States are parties
to a special convention containing provisions on
( ,:-
) Not to be confused with the Brussels Convention of the
same date for the unification of certain rules relating to
penal jurisdiction in matt~rs of collision.No C  59lt40 Official Journal of the European Communities
jw:isdidiQlt, those provisions prevail. But for
'Situations between these two extremes the
~rioo provided by Article 57 is a great deal less
dJeu~ Tm.'s lS paniadady the case for a number of
which arise where only the State of
origin .and the Sttat:eaddressed are parties to the
~ciU coo:venuOl1l.. The problems become acute
OllJr one of these two States is a party. 
both States ,are parties to a special convention
whiCh governs only direct jurisdiction, will the
;prcwtisrhoins of the 1968 Convention regarding
.e~cioI:1 of jurisdiction by the court of its
!(j)'fNn mGtiaI\ (Article  20~, lis pendens  (Article 21)
amd t'mltoooem.en.t apply? Do the provisions of the
1968 Convention on the procedure for
fe'CGg)lli.ri()J1 and enforcement apply, if a special
.aomventi())n on the recognition and enforcement
ofjuc\~ments ,does not deal with procedure? Can
a person ,domiciloo ilia Contracting State which
is nota party to a special convention be sued in
the courts of another Contracting State on the
basis of jurisdiction provisions in the special
conventions, or can the State of domicile which is
not a party to the special convention claim that
the jurisdiction Tules of the 1968 Convention
must be observed? Must a judgment given in a
court which has jurisdiction only under a special
convention be recognized and enforced even in a
Contractirtg State which is not a party to that
partiicuJla:r special convention? And, finally, what
15 the poSition where the special convention does
not claim to beexdusive?
240. '(Ib)1(Cf!lItatt1ve _and 'CooHicring views were -a:~d widlii'.lll 'the Working Party as to how
t'heS'e pTo'b!lems  ~e ro be solved in interpreting
Artide 57 In its oo~nai form. It become dear
1ihat it ~uM not be practicable to provide a
p-rocise ,~l'lll1ion ro an of them, particularly since
it is 1~sible to pl'edict the form of future
convent-rems.. It was oowev'ef 'appropriatt; in the
imerests 'crl darifyi1'1g the obligations about to be
a'Ssumed by :the new Member States, to ind ude in
the AiCCessiol'l CGnvennon an authentic
interpretanon which 'concerns some problems
which a're of especial importance. The
opportunity was taken to. make a drafting
improvement to the present Article 57 of the
968 'Convention  the new paragraph 1 of this
Article  whim win speak of recognition or
enforcement. By reason of the purely drafting
nature of the amendment to. the text, the
p.wvi'sian laying down the authentic
interpretation of the new Article 57 (1) also
;~ 
t'G 'the pmesemt vet'Sion.
Tibe saiJutioo ::wriwed at .is based on the following
l'if.i~.  'I'he 1 '968  Convention contains the
rules generally applicable in all Member States;
provisions in special conventions are special rules
which every State may make prevail over the
1968 Convention by becoming a party to such a
convention. In so far as a special convention does
not contain rules covering a particular matter the
1968 Convention applies. This is also the case
where the special convention includes rules of
jurisdiction which do not altogether fit the
inter-connecting provisions of the various parts of
the 1968 Convention, especially those governing
the relationship between jurisdiction and
enforcement. The overriding considerations are
simplicity and clarity of the legal position.
The most important consequence of this is that
provisions on jurisdiction contained in special
conventions are to be regarded as if they were
provisions of the 1968 Convention itself, even if
only one Member State is a Contracting Party to
such a special convention. Even Member States
which are not Contracting Parties to the special
convention must therefore recognize and enforce
decisions given by courts which have jurisdiction
only under the special convention. Furthermore
in the context of two States which are parties to a
special convention, a person who wishes to
obtain the recognition or enforcement of a
judgment may rely upon the procedural
provisions of the 1968 Convention on
recognition and enforcement.
At the same time, the Working Party did not wish
to reach a final conclusion on the question
whether the general principle outlined above
could be consistently applied in all its
ramifications. To take a critical example, it was
left open whether exclusive jurisdiction under the
provisions of  special convention must
invariably be applied. The same applies to the
question whether a case of  lis pendens  arising
from a special convention is covered by Article 21
of the 1968 Convention. The Working Party
therefore preferred to provide expressly for the
application or Article 20 and to leave the solution
of the outstanding problems to legal literature
and case law. For the implications of an authentic
interpretation of Article 57 for maritime
jurisdiction, see paragraph 121.
2.  EXAMPLES
241. A river boatman domiciled in the Netherlands is
liable for damages arising from an accident which
occurred on the upper Rhine. It is however noOfficial Journal of the European Communities No  C 59/141
longer possible to determine whether the harmful
event occurred on German or French territory or
from where the damage emanated.
242. It is not possible in such a case for either German
or French courts to assume jurisdiction under
Article 5 (3) or any other provision of the 1968
Convention. According to Article 34 (2) (c) and
Article 35a of the revised Rhine navigation
Convention of 17 October 1868 in the version of
the Protocol of 25 October 1972 (60), jurisdiction
in such cases belongs to the court of the State
which was the first or only one seised of the
matter. That court must, however, take into
account Article 20 of the 1968 Convention, even
though no equivalent of this Article exists in the
Rhine navigation Convention. For example, if the
defendant fails to enter an appearance, the court
must of its own motion (see paragraph 22)
ascertain whether all means have been exhausted
of determining exactly where the accident
occurred, for only if this cannot be determined
does the court have jurisdiction under the
abovementioned provisions of the Rhine
navigation Convention.
243. If the court first seised of the matter was French
then any judgment of that court must be
recognized in Germany. The Rhine navigation
Convention is even stricter than the 1968
Convention in forbidding any re-examination of
the original judgment in the State addressed.
According to the correct interpretation of Article
57 of the 1968 Convention the judgment creditor
has the choice of availing himself of the
enforcement procedure provided by the Rhine
navigation Convention or by the 1968 Conven~
tion. However, if he proceeds under the 1968
Convention the court may not refuse recognition
on any of the grounds given in Article 27 or Arti-
cle 28 of the 1968 Convention. Unlike the en-
forcement procedure itself, the conditions for
recognition and enforcement are exclusively
governed by the special conventions  in this
example, the Rhine navigation Convention.
244. If, however, a judgment has been given in the
court with jurisdiction at the place of destination
pursflant to Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention of 12 October 1929 for the
unification of certain rules relating to
international carriage by air the 1968
Convention applies fully to both recognition and
enforcement, because the Warsaw Convention
contains no provisions at all on these matters.
The same applies where in maritime law the
jurisdiction of the court of origin was based on
the provisions governing arrest contained in the
1952 Brussels Convention (see paragraph 121).
245. If the boatman in the above example on Rhine
navigation had been domiciled in Luxembourg,
which is not a party to the Rhine navigation
Convention, the position would be as follows~
any jurisdiction assumed in France or Germany
pursuant to the Rhine navigation Convention can
no longer be regarded in Luxembourg as an
infringement of the 1968 Convention. Under the
provisions and procedure of the 1968
Convention, Luxembourg is obliged to recognize
and enforce a judgment given by the German or
French Rhine navigation courts. If, conversely,
the boatman is sued in the court of his
Luxembourg domicile, which is also permissible
under the 1968 Convention, Germany and France
would have to accept this, even though they are
parties to the Rhine navigation Convention which
does not recognize jurisdiction based on domicile.
3.  UNDERTAKINGS IN CONVENTIONS
BETWEEN STATES NOT  TO  RECOGNIZE
JUDGMENTS
246. Whether Article 57 also covers conventions under
which one Member State of the Community
undertakes not to recognize judgments given in
another Member State remains an open question.
It could be argued that the admissible scope of
such conventions was governed exclusively by
Article 59.
International obligations of this sort can result
from a special convention which provides for the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of one of the
Contracting Parties. Such an obligation can
however also result indirectly from the fact that
the exercise of jurisdiction under the special
convention is linked to a special regime of
liability. For example, the Paris Convention of
1960 on third party liability in the field of
nuclear energy, apart from laying down rules of
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement:
1. places the sole liability for damage on the
operator of a nuclear installation;
2. makes his liability an absolute one;
3. sets maximum limits to his liability;No C 59/142 Official Journal of the European Communities
4. requires him to insure against his liability;
5. allows a Contracting State to provide
additional compensation from public funds.
The recognition and enforcement of a judgment
which is given in a State not party to such a
special convention and which is based on legal
principles quite different from those outlined
above could seriously undermine the operation of
that special convention.
The 1968 Convention should always be
interpreted in such a way that no limitations 
liability contained in international conventions
are infringed. The question however remains
open whether this result is to be achieved by
applying the public policy provision of Article 27
(1), by analogy with the new paragraph (5) of
Article 27, or by a broad interpretation of Article
57.
For conventions limiting liability in maritime law
see paragraph 124  et seq.
4.  PRECEDENCE OF SECONDAR  COMMUNITY
LAW
247. Within the 'Working Party opinion was divided as
to whether secondary Community law, or
national laws adopted pursuant to secondary
Community law, prevail over international
agreements concluded between the Member
States, in particular in the case of a convention
provided for in Article 220 of the Treaty of
Rome. There was, however, agreement that
national and Community law referred to above
should prevail over the 1968 Convention. This
decision is embodied in Article 57; the provision
is based on Article 25 of the preliminary draft
Convention on the law applicable to contractual
and non-contractual obligations.
5.  CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE FUTURE
ACCESSION BY MEMBER STATES OF THE
COMMUNITY TO FURTHER AGREEMENTS
248. By their accession to the Convention, the new
Member States are also bound by the Joint
Declaration made by the Contracting States at the
time of the signing of the 1968 Convention. In
the Declaration the States declare that they will
arrange for regular periodic contacts between
their representatives. The Working Party was
unanimously of the opinion that consultations
should also take place when a Member State
intended to accede to a convention which would
prevail over the 1968 Convention by virtue of
Article 57.
III. ARTICLE 59
249. This prOVlSlon refers only to judgments given
against persons domiciled or habitually resident
outside the Community. Such persons may also
be sued on the basis of jurisdictional provisions
which could not be invoked in the case of persons
domiciled within the Community, and which are
classed as exorbitant and disallowed pursuant to
the second paragraph of Article 3. Nevertheless
any judgment which may have been given is to be
recognized and enforced in accordance with the
1968 Convention. As the Jenard, report explains
it is intended that the Contracting States should
remain free to conclude conventions with third
States excluding the recognition and enforcement
of judgments based on exorbitant jurisdictions 
even though the 1968 Convention permits this in
exceptional cases. The aim of the proposed
amendment to Article 59 is further to limit the
possibility of recognition and enforcement.
250. The way this will work may be illustrated by an
example. If a creditor has a claim to be satisfied
in France against a debtor domiciled in that
country, then Danish courts have no jurisdiction
under any circumstances to decide this issue, even
if the debtor has property in Denmark and even if
the claim is secured on immovable property there.
Supposing the debtor is domiciled in Norway,
then if Danish national law so allows Danish
courts may very well claim jurisdiction, e.g. on
the basis of the presence in Denmark of property
owned by the debtor. Normally, the judgment
given in such a case would also be enforceable in
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom could
however undertake in a convention with Norway
an obligation to refuse recognition and
enforcement of such a judgment. This kind of
treaty obligation may not however extend to a
case where the jurisdiction of the Danish courts is
based on the ground that immovable property in,
Denmark constitutes security for the debt. In such \
circumstances the judgment would 
enforceable even in the United Kingdom.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/143
CHAPTER 10
FINAL PROVISIONS
1.  IRELAND
251. Ireland has no territorial possessions outside the
integral parts of its territory.
2.  UNITED KINGDOM
252. The term 'United Kingdom' does not include the
Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, Gibraltar or the
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. There is no
obligation on the United Kingdom to extend the
scope of the 1968 Convention to include these
territories, even though it is responsible for their
external relations. It might, however, be useful if
the United Kingdom were to extend the 1968
Convention and it should be authorized to do so.
It would have to undertake the necessary
adjustments' itself, and there was no need to
provide for them in the Accession Convention.
The following adjustments would be required:
indication of any exorbitant jurisdictions in the
second paragraph of Article 3; a declaration as to
whether in the newly included territories every
appeal should be regarded as an ordinary appeal
for the purposes of Articles 30 and 38; a
declaration as to whether registration in any such
territory in accordance with the second
paragraph of Article 31 is effective only within its
area; establishing which courts are competent
under Articles 32, 37 and 40, the form in which
the application should be made, and whether the
adjustments in respect of the United Kingdom
contained in the second paragraph of Article 37
as amended and in Article 41 as amended should
also apply in the newly included territories. If any
international conventions should apply to any
one of the territories in question, appropriate
adjustments would also have to be made to
Article 55.
CHAPTER 11
The penultimate paragraph of the proposed
addition to Article 60 relates to the fact that
judgments of courts in these territories which do
not belong to the United Kingdom can be
challenged in the last instance before the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. It would be
illogical to bring Privy Council decisions within
the scope of the 1968 Convention if they related
to disputes arising in territories to which the
1968 Convention does not apply.
3.  DENMARK
253. For the purposes of EEC law, Greenland is
included in the European territory of Denmark.
The special constitutional positions of the Faroe
Islands led to a solution corresponding closely to
that proposed for the territories for whose foreign
relations the United Kingdom is responsible. This
had to allow for the fact that both appellate and
first instance proceedings which relate to the
F aroes and are therefore conducted under the
Code of Civil Procedure specially enacted for
these islands can be brought in Copenhagen.
4.  CHANGES IN A STATE'S TERRITORY
254. The Working Party was unanimous that any
territory which becomes independent of the
mother country thereby ceases to be a member of
the European Community and, consequently, can
no longer be a party to the 1968 Convention. It
was unnecessary to provide for this expressly
and, in any case, to have drafted such a provision
would have gone beyond the Working Party
terms of reference.
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROTOCOL OF 3 JUNE 1971 ON THE INTERPRETATION
BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF THE 1968
CONVENTION
1.  FORMAL ADJUSTMENTS
255. Formal adjustments to the Interpretation Protocol
were few and fairly obvious. It became necessary
to make only one short addition to its
provisions: the courts in the new Member States
which, in accordance with Article 2 (1) and
Article 3, are required to request the Court ofNo C 59/144 Official Journal of the European Communities
Justice to give preliminary rulings on questions of
interpretation, had to be designated (61). In the
United Kingdom, unlike the other Member States,
not only the highest court within the country has
been included, as it is more difficult to refer a
matter to the House of Lords than it is to have
recourse to the highest courts on the continent.
Therefore, at least the appellate proceedings
provided for in the second paragraph of Article
37 and in Article 41 of the 1968 Convention
should in the United Kingdom also terminate in a
court which is obliged to request a preliminary
ruling from the Court of Justice. The expression
appellate capacity' in Article 2 (2) should not be
construed in a narrow technical sense, but in the
sense of any challenge before a higher
jurisdiction, so that it might be taken also to
include the French 'contredit'.
The remaining formal adjustments concerned
merely the scope (Article 1) and territorial
application of the Protocol. Article 6, which deals
with the latter point, is wholly based on Article
60 of the 1968 Convention (see paragraphs 251
to 254). Which authorities are to be designated as
competent within the meaning of the third
paragraph of Article 4 is a question to be decided
entirely by the new Member States.
2.  THE SPECIAL NATURE OF IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND IRELAND
256. The extension of the Interpretation Protocol to
the United Kingdom and Ireland will, however, in
all probability also present a procedural problem.
long-standing legal tradition in these States
does not allow provisions of international treaties
to become directly applicable as national law. In
the United Kingdom legislation has to be passed 
transforming such provisions into national law.
In many cases the legislative enactment does not
follow precisely the wording of the treaty. The
usual form of legislation in this State often calls
for a more detailed phraseology than that used in
treaty. The treaty and the corresponding
national law are, therefore, to be carefully
distinguished.
If the implementing legislation in the United
Kingdom follows the usual pattern, courts in that
country would only rarely be concerned with the
interpretation of the 1968 Convention, but
mostly with interpretation of the national
implementing legislation. Only when the latter is
not clear would it be open to a court, under the
existing rules of construction in that country, to
refer to the treaty on which the legislation is
based, and only when the court is then faced
with a problem of interpretation of the treaty
may it turn to the European Court of Justice. If
the provisions of implementing legislation are
clear in themselves, the courts in the United
Kingdom may as a rule refer neither to the text of
the treaty nor to any decision by an international
court on its interpretation.
This would undoubtedly lead to a certain
disparity in the application of the Interpretation
Protocol of 3 June 1971. The Working Party was
of the opinion that this disparity could best be
redressed if the United Kingdom could in some
way ensure in its implementing legislation that
the 1968 Convention will there too be endowed
with the status of a source of law, or may at any
rate be referred to directly when applying the
national implementing legislation.
In the event of a judgment of the European Court
of Justice being inconsistent with a provision of
the United Kingdom implementing legislation, the
latter would have to be amended.
It is also the case in Ireland that international
agreements to which that State is a party are not
directly applicable as national law. Lately,
however, a number of Acts putting international
agreements into force in national law have taken
the form of an incorporation of the text of the
agreement into national law. If the Act putting
into force the 1968 Convention as amended by
the Accession Convention were to take this form
the problems described above in relation to the
United Kingdom would not arise in the case of
Ireland.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/145
ANNEX I
Extract from the Protocol to the preliminary draft Bankruptcy Convention (1975) (see paragraph 54)
Certain details of this list have been amended by later documents which, however, are not themselves
final.
(aa)  Bankruptcy proceedings:
Belgium:
faillite
- '
faillissement' ;
Denmark:
Konkurs
Federal Republic of Germany:
Konkurs
' ;
France:
liquidation des biens
Ireland:
bankruptcy
, '
winding-up in bankruptcy of partnerships
, '
winding-up by the court under Sections
213, 344 and 345 of the Companies Act 1963'
, '
creditors' voluntary winding-up under Section
256 of the Companies Act 1963'
Italy:
fallimento
Luxembourg:
faiIIite
Netherlands:
faillissement
' ;
United Kingdom:
bankruptcy' (England , Wales and Northern Ireland), 'sequestration' (Scotland), 'administration in
bankruptcy of the estates of persons dying insolvent' (England, Wales and Northern Ireland),
compulsory winding-up of companies
, '
winding-up of companies under the supervision of the
court
' .
(bb)  Other proceedings:
Belgium:
concordat judiciaire
- '
gerechtelijk akkoord'
sursis de paiement
- '
uitstel van betaling
Denmark:
tvangsakkord' ,
likvidation af insolvente aktieselskaber eller anpartsselskaber
likvidation af banker eller sparekasser, der har standset deres betalinger
Federal Republic of Germany:
gerichtliches VergleichsverfahrenNo C 59/146 Official Journal of the European Communities
France:
reglement judiciaire
' ,
procedure de suspension provisoire des poursuites et d'apurement collectif du passif de certaines
entreprises
' ;
Ireland:
arrangements under the control of the court'
, '
arrangements, reconstructions and compositions of
companies whether or not in the course of liquidation where sanction of the court is required and
creditors' rights are affected'
Italy:
concordato preventivo
amministrazione controllata
liquidazione coatta amministrativa in its judicial stage;
Luxembourg:
concordat preventif de la faillite
' ,
sursis de paiement
' ,
regime special de liquidation applicable aux notaires
Netherlands:
surseance van betaling
regeling, vervat in de wet op de vergadering van houders van schuldbrieven aan toonder
United Kingdom:
compositions and schemes of arrangement' (England and Wales),
compositions' (Northern Ireland),
arrangements under the control of the court' (Northern Ireland),
judicial compositions' (Scotland),
arrangements, reconstructions and compositions of companies whether or not in the course of
liquidation where sanction of the court is required and creditors' rights are involved'
creditors' voluntary winding-up of companies
deeds of arrangement approved by the court' (Northern Ireland).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/147
ANNEX II
) When references are given to Articles without any further mention, reference is to the 1968 version
of the Convention.
e) The Royal Decree of 13 April 1938, reproduced in 'Bundesanzeiger' 1953 , No 105, p. 1 and in
Bulow-Arnold
, '
Internationaler Rechtsverkehr , 925.
) For this concept, seethe Jenard report, Chapter II, Band C, and Chapter IV, A and B.
) Zweigert-Kotz
, '
Einfiihrung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des Privatrechts , Vol. 1
(1971), p. 78  et seq.
) Case No 29/76  (1976J  ECR 1541. The formal part of the Judgment reads as follows:
1. In the interpretation of the concept 'civil and commercial matters' for the purposes of the
application of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, in particular Title III thereof, reference must not be
made to the law of one of the States concerned but, first, to the objectives and scheme of the
Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national
legal systems;
2. A judgment given in an action between a public authority and a person governed by private
law, in which the public authority has acted in the exercise of its powers, is excluded from the
area of application of the Convention.
) Law No 75-617 JO 1975 7171.
(1) In the text of Law No 75-617 (note (6
)).
) Document of the Commission of the European Communities XI/449/75-
) The word 'analogous' does not appear in Article 1 (1) simply because the proceedings in question
are listed in a Protocol.
(10) See the Report on the Convention on bankruptcy, winding-up arrangements, compositions and
similar proceedings by NoeI-Lemontey (16.775/XIV/70) Chapter 3, section I.
(11) See preliminary draft Bankruptcy Convention, Article 17 and Protocol thereto, Articles 1 and 2
(note 8).
(12 op. cit.
(13) 1975 preliminary draft (see note (8)), Article 1 (1), subparagraph (3), and Article II of the Protocol.
See Noel-Lemontey report (note (10)) for reasons for exclusion.
(14) Although it does not have its own legal personality it corresponds by and large to the ' offene
Handelsgesellschaft' in German law and the ' societe en nom collectif' in French law.
(15) In the form of a ' private company' it corresponds to the continental ' Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung' (company with limited liability) and in the form of a ' public company' to the continental
Aktiengesellschaft' (joint stock company).
(16) UK: Bankruptcy Act 1914, Sections 119 and 126. See Tridmann-Hicks-Johnson
, '
Bankruptcy Law
and Practice' (1970), page 272.
(17) In respect of Great Britain  Companies Act 1948; in respect of Northern Ireland  Companies
Acts 1960 and Companies (Amendment) Act 1963; in respect of Ireland  Company Act 1963
Section 213.
(18
) '
if... the company is unable to pay its debts
(19) Decree No 75-1123 of 5 December 1975, 00) 1975, 1251.
) The adjustment proposed for Article 57 admittedly has certain repercussions on the scope of Article
20 (see paragraph 240).
) The following cases may be mentioned with regard to difficulties of interpretation which have
arisen hitherto in judicial practice in 'connection with the application of Articles 5 and 6: Corte
Cassazione Italiana of 4 June 1974
, '
Giur. it.' 1974 , 18 (with regard to the concept of place of
performance); Corte Cassazione Italiana No 3397 of 20 October 1975 (place of performance in the
case of deliveries via a forwarding agent who has an obligation to instal); Tribunal de Grande
Instance Paris D 1975, 638 with commentary by Droz (place where the harmful event occurred in
cases of illegal publication in the press); Court of Justice of the European Communities, 6 October
1976, Case No 12/76  (1976J  ECR 1473. No C  59/148 Official Journal of the European Communities
(22) In the judgments referred to the formal parts of the judgments read as follows:
The 'place of performance of the obligation in question' within the meaning of Article 5 (1) of the
Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters is to be determined in accordance with the law which governs the obligation in
question according to the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought
(Case No 12/76).
In disputes in which the grantee of an exclusive sales concession is charging the grantor with having
infringed the exclusive concession, the word 'obligation' contained in Article 5 (1) of the
Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters refers to the contractual obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings
namely the obligation of the grantor which corresponds to the contractual right relied upon by the
grantee in support of the application (Case No 14/76 (1976) ECR 1497).
In disputes concerning the consequences of the infringement by the grantor of a contract conferring
an exclusive concession, such as the payment of damages or the dissolution of the contract, the
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